The memorandum of understanding (MoU) that was just signed between Iran and the US for ending the Third Gulf War essentially restores the status quo antebellum, thus raising questions about why the US and Israel initiated it in the first place. As for Israel, it didn’t achieve a single one of its five goals in full since they all depended on the US staying the course, which Trump ultimately decided against due to the growing costs that pursuing his country’s maximum goals entailed. This requires further elaboration.
Like Israel, the US also pursued regime change and even “Balkanization”, though Trump now denies it. Nevertheless, the former only went as far as wiping out Iran’s last two groups of leaders while still preserving the Islamic Republic, whereas the latter was offset by the Kurds hoarding the arms that they received instead of sharing them with others and revolting. Even so, the US decided to call it quits, claim victory, and lift sanctions on Iran, which is what Iran ever wanted since Trump 1.0 reimposed them.
Some might argue that potentially forthcoming US investments in post-sanctions Iran’s resource industry are a tangible reward from the war, but these were already on the table beforehand as confirmed by Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister in February as a means of maintaining any hypothetical deal to avert war. Therefore, the only difference between now and then is that two groups of Iranian leaders were killed and an unclear amount of its military capabilities destroyed, with everything else remaining the same.
As was explained here, Iran pulled off the upset of the century by not only surviving, but also not capitulating to the US’ maximalist demands. Even worse, the US’ Gulf allies now know that hosting its bases actually made them less safe, which could complicate their ties despite rhetoric from both sides alleging that they’re fine. The US thus ruined its reputation with them and arguably Israel too just to kill two groups of Iranian leaders and partially, though crucially not irreversibly, demilitarize their country.
To be sure, such an outcome unintentionally facilitates the US’ possibly inevitable withdrawal from the region, which would align with the National Security Strategy’s focus on the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. Be that as it may, this could have also been implemented without the Third Gulf War, so the US veritably accomplished nothing other than what was described above. It can therefore be concluded that the US lost, though not as badly as Israel did, while Iran surprisingly won.
As Valdai Club’s Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov wrote, “Tehran just showed why military supremacy no longer guarantees political victory”, which is relevant for Russia with respect to NATO-backed Ukraine. If the conflict ends without the fulfillment of Russia’s explicitly stated goals of demilitarizing Ukraine, restoring its constitutional neutrality, denazifying its society, and asserting Moscow’s writ over the entirety of the new regions, then it can also be concluded that Russia didn’t “win” its own conflict either.
At the same time, it would be dishonest to claim that Russia “lost” since it’s fighting for its survival just like Iran was, so its continued existence would be a “victory” in itself. In any case, “The Ukrainian Conflict’s Outcome Is Still Far From Decided”, so anything can happen before then. From the perspective of Russia’s supporters, hopefully it learned the lessons from the US’ defeat in the Third Gulf War and will apply them to the Ukrainian Conflict, otherwise it too risks a disappointing end to its own conflict.
