Alexei Zakharov is a respected Russian expert on South Asia who serves as a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme, which is one of India’s top think tanks. He recently published an insightful piece titled, “Can India rely on Russia to diplomatically isolate Pakistan? It seems unlikely”, which candidly explains Russia’s neutrality during the latest Indo-Pak conflict. In a nutshell, he believes that Russia’s growing ties with Pakistan are the main reason, but there’s actually a bit more to it.
This analysis here from last summer enumerates several others which posit that a pro-BRI policymaking faction now exists in Russia as the friendly rival of the established balancing/pragmatic one. The first believes that the return to a form of Sino-US bi-multipolarity is inevitable and thus wants to accelerate China’s superpower trajectory as revenge against the US for all it’s done since 2022. The second, by contrast, want to avert outsized dependence on China by relying on India as a friendly counterweight.
Russia’s neutrality towards the latest Indo-Pak conflict coupled with the pro-Pakistani (and even sometimes anti-Indian) commentary of top “Non-Russian Pro-Russian” influencers within its global media ecosystem, which could have been corrected with some “gentle nudges” but wasn’t, surprised some observers. After all, it was concluded here after Modi’s trip to Moscow last summer that his visit was a victory for the balancing/pragmatic policymaking faction, yet it was evidently short-lived as seen.
It arguably seems like the pro-BRI faction is back to influencing Russia’s South Asian policy as suggested by the preceding examples, with this perception being lent immense credence by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s speech at the Diplomatic Club on Thursday. He warned that the West wants to pit India against China and strongly alluded to the Quad, in which India participates, as an example of an “openly confrontational” format. All of this implies that Russia might be reassessing India’s role in Eurasia.
Instead of continuing to be seen as a friendly counterweight to China that’ll also help jointly speed up Eurasia’s integration, it might soon be suspected of being a hostile counterweight to China that could also obstruct the aforesaid integration at the US’ behest. The second perception could influence policy if Russia becomes more dependent on China in the event that tensions escalate with the US over Ukraine or if Russia engages in major deal-making with the US and/or China in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Either scenario would likely solidify the pro-BRI policymaking faction’s newly restored influence over their balancing/pragmatic rivals, though Putin himself remains a committed member of the second faction, which is why his planned trip to India later this year could even everything out in that event. If neither of the abovementioned scenarios materializes, then policymaking influence might naturally oscillate back towards the balancing/pragmatic faction with time, or at least after Putin’s planned trip.
Circling back to Zakharov, he’s correct that Russia’s growing ties with Pakistan were responsible for Russia’s neutrality during the latest Indo-Pak conflict, but that’s only due to the newly influential pro-BRI policymaking faction conceptualizing them in a Sino-US bi-multipolarity context. This contrasts with how their balancing/pragmatic rivals conceptualize them as part of Russia’s multi-alignment strategy. India should be aware of these new policymaking dynamics in order to avoid misunderstandings with Russia.
