Trump repeated late-February’s plans for the US to restore its military presence at Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase while addressing US troops in Qatar last week. It was assessed back then that “Trump Will Likely Have To Cut A Deal With Pakistan If He’s Serious About His Afghan Plans”. His rhetoric after the latest Indo-Pak conflict suggests that they might be discreetly negotiating this right now, the overall context of which was elaborated on in this analysis here about why he’s unexpectedly damaging Indo-US ties.
In brief, his newly announced “total reset” with China might presage a comprehensive deal with the People’s Republic that results in the return of Sino-US bi-multipolarity in some form, which some describe as the G2/“Chimerica” scenario. The US’ planned “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China, in which India is envisaged playing a key role, would therefore lose its importance. That could explain why he seemingly has no compunctions about so deeply offending India nowadays.
Even so, his serious interest in Bagram Airbase is explicitly driven by its proximity to China, thus implying that he’s hedging his bets on any “New Détente” it. At the same time, however, any restoration of the US’ military presence there could also be part of a grand deal with China. This could see the US ramping up military aid to Pakistan on anti-terrorist pretexts, thus helping to secure the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in exchange for China letting Pakistan facilitate the US’ military return to Afghanistan.
The US’ tacit acceptance of CPEC, which India opposes due to it running across Indian-claimed but Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, would rile India as would the ramping up of military aid to Pakistan after their latest clash since such equipment could have a dual use against India. The speculative arrangement that was described could have negative implications for Russia too if (key qualifier!) any progress is made on it since the Kremlin opposes the US’ military return to the region after its inglorious 2021 withdrawal.
Moreover, the restoration of US influence over Pakistan could imperil late-December’s plans for Russia to modernize its resource sector, which were analyzed here with the conclusion that the US tacitly agreed not to impose sanctions since this deal could erode some Chinese influence there. If the US clinches a “New Détente” with China before it does so with Russia, or if this is reached instead of one with Russia in the event that tensions escalate over Ukraine, then the US might not care if China gets these contracts.
There’s also the possibility that the US leverages its influence over who Pakistan gives these profitable contracts to even in a “New Détente” with Russia, regardless of whether one is also reached with China, to get Russia to tacitly accept the US’ military return to Afghanistan. In exchange, the US could let Pakistan give these contracts to Russia and the US wouldn’t trying to squeeze it out of Afghanistan, instead agreeing to be “friendly competitors” there and allowing planned Russian projects to proceed.
Such major Russian-American deal-making in Pakistan (and then Afghanistan), especially if China is also involved in the event of a Sino-US “New Détente”, would ring alarm bells in India. A Russian-Pakistani trade corridor via Afghanistan could pair with CPEC and possible US critical mineral investments in both (along with US arms) to reshape the regional order. Pressure could then be placed on India from the US, China, Pakistan, and even Russia to agree to Kashmir’s partition for the “greater good of Greater Eurasia”.
