Polish expert at the Sobieski Institute Sebastian Meitz reported on the details of June’s Polish-German defense pact in a thread on X that’s since been amplified by Polish media. He began by noting that the text isn’t yet available on any Polish government sites, hence why he had to rely on a German one, which lends credence to his claim that “it’s precisely German priorities that become the axis of this cooperation”, not Polish ones. He then cites six examples of this from the document.
These are “the development of logistics infrastructure in Poland for the German brigade in Lithuania; the possibility of Poland’s participation in the European Space Component Command operating within the structures of the Bundeswehr; cooperation in the area of strategic communication (StratCom); deepening of defense industry cooperation without any guarantees for the Polish side; joint projects developed primarily at the European Union level; and each party bearing the costs of its own commitments.”
Meitz then asked: “Will Poland finance the logistical infrastructure for the German brigade in Lithuania?; Why should Poland support the European Space Component Command operating within the structures of the Bundeswehr?; Who will define and manage the joint strategic communication (StratCom) that we are to coordinate with Germany?; What role does the December 13 coalition envision for the Polish defense industry given such a significant asymmetry in the potential of both sectors?; and why does the document contain no guarantees safeguarding the interests of the Polish defense industry?”
His questions remain unanswered by the ruling liberal coalition at the time of this analysis’ publication. The importance in drawing attention to his thread is that he proved that the recent Polish-German defense pact indisputably prioritizes Berlin’s interests over Warsaw’s. This isn’t surprising since Germany seeks to subordinate Poland. The leading conservative opposition party’s grey cardinal even accused Prime Minister Donald Tusk of being a “German agent” due to how closely he hews to its policies.
Meitz’s research raises further questions about exactly whose interests Tusk serves since no self-respecting leader of Poland would ever agree to what he did earlier this summer. His rival, conservative President Karol Nawrocki, relevantly elaborated late last year on the non-military threat that Germany poses to Poland through its de facto control over the EU. For background, Nawrocki and the conservatives that he represents favor the US as Poland’s top ally, while Tusk and his liberals favor Germany.
The competition between their respective visions, which has resulted in a dual foreign policy promoted by each leader due to the constitutional ambiguity about how exactly it’s formulated through the interplay between them and the Foreign Minister, contextualizes the mixed signals coming from Poland. Predictability probably won’t return till after fall 2027’s next Sejm elections, and only if the newly bifurcated conservatives and the two libertarian-nationalist parties form a coalition, which is possible.
At present, Poland is “sitting on two chairs” as the Russian saying goes, which is unsustainable. Simultaneous moves towards Germany and the US will inevitably be at the expense of one of them. Poland’s role in the post-war European security architecture, which is already emerging but won’t be solidified till the end of the Ukrainian Conflict, is dependent on which of them becomes its top patron. This has huge implications for Russia and explains why its experts are now more closely following Poland.
