Poland’s RMF24 cited the latest Eurostat data in early September to report that ~6,300 Ukrainian refugees left Poland in June followed by ~8,100 in July, so nearly a one-third increase over a single month, but these numbers are small compared to the ~953,100 Ukrainian refugees that are still in Poland. The larger context concerns the ongoing Polish-Ukrainian dispute that erupted in late May after Zelensky glorified the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits at the state level.
Since then, some highly publicized incidents occurred between Poles and Ukrainians in Poland as the locals’ views about them soured as a result, which drew attention to what the ruling liberal coalition considers to be rising “hate crimes” against Ukrainians. Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek announced over the summer that over 100 prosecutors are working to convict Poles accused of such crimes, Prime Minister Donald Tusk condemned this alleged trend, and nationwide protests were organized against it.
For whatever one thinks about all of this, and some Poles on social media have argued that Ukrainians provoked the locals in some of the highly publicized incidents in order to then film their reaction as a means of manipulating perceptions about what happened, it’s a major topic of discussion in Poland. Some Ukrainians might therefore truly believe, whether rightly or not, that they’re in danger if they remain in Poland and accordingly decided to leave for elsewhere in Europe.
The alleged trend of rising “hate crimes” against Ukrainians aside, some Ukrainians might also have begun feeling more uncomfortable if some of the locals started treating them differently in everyday life as a result of the ongoing Polish-Ukrainian dispute, which could contribute to them leaving. Another factor might be that Ukrainians no longer enjoy special benefits in Poland like before after conservative President Karol Nawrocki, Tusk’s rival, abolished them earlier this year in accordance with his promise.
While the ruling liberal coalition might lament the emerging trend of Ukrainians finally beginning to leave Poland, no matter how statistically insignificant it is at present, the conservative and libertarian-nationalist opposition parties are probably pleased and might hope that the numbers grow much larger. That’s because they’re increasingly aware of the security-related risks of a substantial Ukrainian minority being formed in what was one of the world’s most ethno-culturally homogenous countries before 2022.
“The Ukrainian Ambassador To Poland Admitted That His Co-Ethnics Don’t Want To Assimilate” in September 2025, which was followed a month later by Ukrainian media talking about how “An Ethnic Ukrainian Lobby Might Soon Take Shape In The Polish Sejm”. Ukrainian nationalists also claim southeastern Poland, which recontextualizes the “Project Trident” anti-crime initiative as a dual preemptive anti-insurgency one. Less Ukrainians in Poland means less of a post-war threat from Ukraine.
It’s premature to predict that the emerging trend of Ukrainians finally beginning to leave Poland will soon reach a meaningful level, let alone that most of them will ultimately leave instead of pursue a path to citizenship, but it’s still worth monitoring. If that’s indeed what happens, however, then it’s expected to become another partisan issue ahead of fall 2027’s next Sejm elections and figure into Ukraine’s anti-Polish propaganda since it’ll likely be blamed on the alleged trend of rising “hate crimes”.
