Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Tomas Taraba declared during a visit to Baku in mid-May that his country wants to sign a decade-long gas deal with Azerbaijan. Several days prior, Bloomberg reported that Turkiye is considering building a military fuel pipeline to Romania via Bulgaria. This analysis here argues that it would be supplied by Azerbaijan via Armenia and could eventually include gas from Turkmenistan unless Russia puts a stop to it. A parallel pipeline could conceivably be built for supplying civilian sectors.
The Dubrovnik Declaration that followed last month’s annual “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) Summit mentions the Solidarity Ring among several regional connectivity projects to be prioritized. This project refers to a pipeline that would connect Slovakia with Azerbaijan via the same route that Bloomberg reported that Turkiye is considering for its military fuel pipeline. Interestingly, this route mirrors that of the scrapped Nabucco Pipeline, which is poised to be de facto revived through these means.
The whole reason why Slovakia is even considering importing costlier gas from far-away Azerbaijan is because of the EU’s decree late last year mandating that the bloc complete the de-Russification of its energy industry by 2028 at the latest for countries like Slovakia that have long-term contracts with Russia. As was analyzed here at the time, Poland is positioning itself as the entry point for US LNG into Central & Eastern Europe, specifically for its fellow Visegrad Group allies Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary.
As of late last year, the relatively new “Poland-Slovakia gas interconnector stands largely idle as Bratislava sticks with Russian supplies”, but that’s expected to soon change so that Poland can profit from facilitating the flow of US LNG to Slovakia and then Hungary. Likewise, Hungary under its new pro-EU government is expected to facilitate the flow of Azeri gas to Slovakia through the Solidarity Ring, thus leading to American and Azeri gas replacing Russian gas upon the de-Russification of their gas industries.
These supplies are more expensive than Russian gas, though Slovakia has little choice but to comply with the EU’s demands, especially since Russian energy imports via Ukraine are unreliable due to Kiev already weaponizing its transit state role. If it’s any consolation, Slovakia is preparing to complete a long-delayed segment along the Via Carpathia highway that’ll optimize trade between the Baltic and Black Seas and thus also between regional economic heavyweights Poland and Turkiye.
Additionally, Romania now plans to complete a branch of this same corridor on its own territory, the A3 motorway, which will shorten travel times between Central Romania and Hungary. Upon the completion of these Via Carpathia projects, Slovakia and Hungary will be at the Baltic-Black Sea trade. Likewise, the completion of the Solidarity Pipeline and seemingly inevitable opening of the Poland-Slovakia gas interconnector will place them at the center of the region’s post-Russian American-Azeri gas duopoly.
All of this is bad for Russia since the Via Carpathia has a dual military logistics role while the Solidarity Pipeline will squeeze its gas out of the EU market. Nevertheless, there doesn’t seem much that Russia can realistically do to stop it. The same goes for Slovakia and Hungary, which could benefit from the Via Carpathia’s commercial aspect but will pay more for American and Azeri gas. Poland and Turkiye gain more than anyone else from these projects, however, which speak to their growing regional influence.
