Reuters exclusively reported in early July that “Pakistan mediating Libya unity push as rival camps seek deal, Pakistani sources say”, which allegedly began late last year and is being supported by the US and Pakistan’s new mutual security ally Saudi Arabia. Reuters added that “While analysts view Pakistan as a secondary player in Libya, where the U.S., the UAE, Turkey and Egypt have for years wrestled for influence, Islamabad has maintained ties with both sides that other regional actors may be lacking.”
Be that as it may, it’s difficult to imagine Pakistan playing a more important role in this process than the US or Turkiye, the latter of which began patching up its problems with General Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based “Libyan National Army” (LNA) throughout the course of last year after being enemies since 2020. Turkiye is also considered to be the patron of the western-based and UN-recognized “Government of National Unity” (GNU). It thus looks like Pakistan is playing a support role in Libya to aid its two allies.
While its role allegedly began late last year, the timing of Reuters’ report suggests an interest in further bolstering Pakistan’s renown after it mediated the Iranian-US MoU, which advances American, Turkish, and Saudi interests by having Pakistan do the diplomatic lifting for them from now on. It might thus replace the role played by Trump’s envoy Massad Boulos in Libya and take cues from him when it comes to mediating elsewhere across the “Ummah”. Here are three background briefings on Libya and Pakistan:
* 5 January: “Pakistan Is Playing Second Fiddle To Turkiye In Afro-Eurasian Security”
* 26 April: “American Moves In Libya Aim To Sever Russia’s Air Bridge To The Sahelian Alliance”
* 20 May: “Russia Hinted At Its Latent Threat Perception Of Pakistan”
To oversimplify, Pakistan facilitated its allies’ openings to the LNA by offering to sell it over a dozen high-tech fighter jets, and any peace deal in Libya brokered by them could cut off Russia’s aerial logistical access to its West African allies like newly besieged Mali. Two top Russian military officials also hinted that Pakistan might help NATO return to Central-South Asia and could even be aiding ISIS-K infiltration into Afghanistan. This is important to keep in mind when reading these three RT reports about Libya:
* 20 May: “Washington is about to screw Libya over again”
* 23 June: “The ‘Tiffany’s father’ gambit: Inside the secret US deal to carve up Libya”
* 1 July: “Washington thinks it can fix Libya. It may be about to break it again instead”
The gist is that the US is on the brink of reunifying de facto partitioned Libya, but this is mostly being brought about through “a pragmatic business alliance between the two families” running each half of the country, and it risks widening divisions by failing to address the root causes of the civil war. Pakistan wants US support against the Taliban, so it’s willing to be the face of this risky deal to avoid egg on Trump’s face if it fails, even if it succeeds in severing Russia’s air bridge to the Sahelian Alliance.
This calculation is all the more compelling to Pakistani policymakers, de facto dictator Asim Munir chief among them, due to the speculation regarding the new Russian-Afghan military-technical deal. It’s only for maintenance and not aimed against Pakistan, but against ISIS-K, though some suspect that there’s more to it after the Taliban began carrying out minor drone strikes against Pakistan shortly after. They’d therefore rather appeal to the US in Libya at Russia’s expense than protect Russia’s interests there.
Pakistan is also part of the nascent “Islamic NATO” that began to form this year between itself, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkiye, the first three of which are “Major Non-NATO Allies” while the last is formally part of the bloc. Obviously, this geostrategic construct will advance US goals, first in Libya like it’s presently seeking to do and possibly soon thereafter in Central Asia too. Pakistan’s newly public role in mediating a solution to the Libyan Civil War therefore risks worsening Russia’s threat perception of it.
