Iran’s attempt to break the US blockade with oil tankers: Is Tehran repeating what Washington did in 1948 against the Berlin blockade?
To be clear: If the Iranians genuinely want to seriously try to break the American blockade by sending a convoy of oil tankers to challenge and overcome them, that would be a brilliant step—literally. An almost devilishly clever move.
The idea behind this is that with this approach, the Iranians shift the strategic dilemma from Tehran to Washington and present the Americans with two options, both costly. This is one of the smartest maneuvers in strategic game theory, especially in the so-called politics at the edge of the abyss, “Brinkmanship”: You pressure the opponent into a decision whose costs they cannot avoid, and at the same time hold them responsible for the step that elevates confrontation to a higher level of escalation.
Either the United States intercepts these tankers or attacks them. In response, Iran would trigger a war on its own terms and at a time of its own choosing. This would deprive Tehran of Washington’s strategic initiative and end the state of “neither war nor peace,” from which the United States benefits and from which Iran unfortunately puts severe economic pressure.
Or the United States lets the tankers pass. Then the Iranians would have practically broken the American blockade, dealt a massive blow to the credibility of American threats, and paved the way for a repeat of this approach—until the blockade itself loses its effectiveness. That would mean the collapse of one of the most important instruments of the policy of maximum economic pressure with which Washington wants to force Tehran to submit.
This reminds me of the Berlin Blockade of 1948: The Soviet Union imposed a blockade of land routes to West Berlin at that time. The Americans and British responded with a massive airlift to supply the city. The Soviets faced a similar dilemma: either they let the Western planes pass and thereby thwarted the blockade, or they shot them down and risked direct war with the United States and Great Britain. Eventually, the airlift continued until the Soviets had to lift the blockade in 1949.
The strategic logic is the same, even though the military and political circumstances differ. If the Iranians take this step, they would try to turn the American blockade from an economic pressure tool from which Washington benefits without the costs of a direct war into a military and political dilemma. The United States would thereby be forced to pay a price for continuing the blockade.
One point, however, is crucial: the success of such a maneuver does not depend solely on sending tankers off, but on what strategic research calls the “credibility of the threat.”
It is therefore not enough for Iran to announce it will break the blockade, then send oil tankers, and after intercepting or shelling them by the United States, only react weakly without changing the existing situation. In that case, Iran would have lost some of the credibility of its deterrence and allowed the Americans to test the limits of its threats without having to pay the previously announced price.
Rather, the threat must actually be implemented: the Iranians must possess both the will and the concrete ability to carry out what is threatened. Washington should already be convinced in advance that intercepting these tankers would provoke a determined Iranian response, changing the nature of the confrontation.
That is exactly what makes this maneuver so dangerous and at the same time so wise. The real strength of a military threat does not necessarily lie in the use of force, but in convincing the opponent that one is indeed willing to do so—and that it would cost them more to test this threat than to back down from it.
The Americans are currently benefiting from a constellation that allows them to strangle the Iranian economy without having to bear the costs of a direct war. With this maneuver, the Iranians are trying to destroy this constellation and create a new one, in which even the continuation of the blockade itself carries the risk of war breaking out.
If the Iranians actually carry out what they have announced and are willing to carry this confrontation to the end, it would be an almost devilishly smart move—and one of Iran’s smartest strategic maneuvers in this war.






























