Dmitry Medvedev’s magnum opus on Germany’s remilitarization, which was reviewed and analyzed here, also included some commentary about Poland. In the order that he made his points, he believes that Poland might be exploited by Germany as a “blocking unit” against Russia alongside Ukraine. He also said that Germany “despises” Poland. Medvedev then hinted that Germany is funding anti-Russian hysteria in Poland, which its “ultra-patriots” regard as “a chance for geopolitical revanche” in the east.
The next point was intimating that Germany might try to militarily recapture the erstwhile Prussia’s former territories in what’s nowadays western Poland (and which were Polish before becoming German). Medvedev is also of the view that “The only way Berlin can get Warsaw to drop its claims for over $1 trillion in reparations”, which is objectively unenforceable, “is through military action.” He contradicted himself, however, by then describing Poland as “proudly bear[ing] the title of Berlin’s ally”.
His final point was that “There are only two historical paths open to Poland, as has been well established: either to be a destitute vassal of Germany or to be a partner of Russia.” With all due respect to Medvedev, he got some things wrong but also some things right. Beginning with what he got right, it’s true that liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk considers himself to be “Berlin’s ally”, so much so that conservative opposition leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski famously alleged that he’s a “German agent”.
Many Germans also do indeed “despise” Poland and Poles, and if self-professed German nationalists on X are any indication, many also lament the post-war loss of land to Poland. Medvedev’s speculation that Germany plays a role in fanning the flames of anti-Russian hysteria in Poland has long been speculated, the reason being that this redirects nationalists’ attention away from itself. Where he’s wrong, however, is that Polish “ultra-patriots” want to reclaim their lost Eastern Borderlands (“Kresy”).
The absolute majority of Poles are content with being able to visit historical sites and their ancestors’ graves in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, and barely anyone wants to spark a war with Russia over the Belarusian part of the “Kresy” nor take economic responsibility for millions of anti-Polish Ukrainians. Likewise, the absolute majority of Germans feel the same about their own lost eastern lands in Poland, so both conflict scenarios are unlikely. Medvedev’s prediction about Poland’s future is also contentious.
He didn’t mention the third scenario, which is presently being pursued, of Poland restoring part of its long Great Power status by becoming the core of NATO’s Eastern Flank via the “Three Seas Initiative’s” dual-use military logistical projects. Medvedev’s assessment that “the Americans need neither Poland nor, for that matter, the rest of Europe” is also challenged by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth describing Poland last spring as “the model ally” due to its role in containing Russia per the aforesaid arrangement.
The reason why it’s important to correct Medvedev’s perception of Poland’s role in the grand strategic context of the New Cold War is because inaccurate appraisals could lead to ineffective policies or worse. As was advised here late last year, “the Kremlin should prioritize the management of Russian-Polish tensions instead of the restoration of strategic ties with Germany, but the latter should still continue to be pursued for balancing purposes.” That advice is still relevant as are the calculations that led to it.
