Here’s the English-language version of the interview that I gave to Forças Terrestres’ Alexandre Galante on recent events.
1. You have written for years about hybrid wars and regime change. In light of the war in Ukraine, does the concept of hybrid warfare still adequately explain the conflict, or has the war returned to a more classical form of military-industrial attrition between states?
The Ukrainian Conflict began as a Hybrid War through the planned evolution of a Color Revolution into an Unconventional War that led to the “EuroMaidan” coup, but after 2022, it took on more conventional characteristics. Be that as it may, the US-led West is still waging a Hybrid War on Russia through Ukraine, which nowadays includes several drone attacks against its nuclear triad. Former top Russian spy Andrey Bezrukov talked about this in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
2. Russia claims it is fighting against NATO’s strategic expansion, while the West defines the war as an aggression against Ukrainian sovereignty. Which of these narratives has greater explanatory power for understanding the origin and duration of the conflict?
Both are true in that NATO’s clandestine expansion to Ukraine prompted Russia to initiate large-scale hostilities there after diplomatic means failed to stop this trend. Each side naturally leans into their respective explanation of events, which resonates with various audiences. At this point, the vast majority of folks have already made up their mind about who’s right and are unlikely to change their view. Thus, each side’s information operations are mostly aimed at maintaining their own side’s morale.
3. After more than four years of open war, what would be the minimum objectives today for Moscow, Kyiv, and Washington to accept a realistic negotiation?
An RT contributor claimed that the “Spirit of Anchorage” refers to the quid pro quo whereby Russia would cease hostilities in exchange for Ukraine withdrawing from Donbass, but it remains unconfirmed. Both Ukraine and the US, however, want to freeze the conflict now with no concessions. At this point, it’s difficult to envisage a pathway for Russia to obtain the maximalist goals that it declared at the onset of the conflict. Therefore, it’ll likely continue fighting until it at least obtains full control over Donbass.
4. Europe appears more heavily armed, but still dependent on the United States for security, and more economically pressured since 2022. Has the war in Ukraine strengthened or weakened European strategic autonomy?
The EU subordinated itself to the US from 2022 onward as its largest-ever vassal state, but the US’ National Security Strategy and associated NATO 3.0 concept make clear that it wants the bloc to shoulder more responsibilities for its own security. This has led to a “cordon sanitaire” forming around Russia through the UK-led “Viking Bloc” in the Arctic-Baltic region, Poland’s attempts to restore its lost influence in Central Europe, and Turkiye expanding its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
5. Could eventual “Ukraine fatigue” in the West open the way for a diplomatic solution, or would it merely create conditions for a new phase of military instability in Eastern Europe?
Despite palpable fatigue, the West surprised critics by continuing to support Ukraine at scale, driven in part by the sunk cost fallacy in the sense of wanting to finally obtain some return on its huge investment. The West now wants to freeze the conflict, but Russia refuses until it at least obtains full control over Donbass. Russia also suspects that the West just wants to buy time to rearm ahead of reinitiating proxy hostilities, which might even evolve into a conventional NATO-Russian war in the worst-case scenario.
6. Do you believe the war in Ukraine has accelerated the formation of a multipolar order, or, on the contrary, has it reinforced U.S. centrality over its European and Asian allies?
The global systemic transition to multipolarity predates Russia’s special operation but was unprecedentedly accelerated by everything that followed it. The outcome is much more mixed than the media, both mainstream and alternative, tend to claim. On the one hand, multipolar processes across the world have indeed entered a new phase, but the US also consolidated its “sphere of influence”. Trump 2.0 is also implementing the Neo-Reagan Doctrine for rolling back Russian influence worldwide.
7. In the case of Taiwan, to what extent has the rivalry between the United States and China already moved beyond the economic and technological sphere and become a latent military confrontation?
Taiwan has always had the potential to become a Sino-US conflict but more so nowadays than any time since the 1970s Sino-US rapprochement. That’s because Trump 2.0’s Neo-Reagan Doctrine also involves the creation of a de facto Asian NATO, which can be called AUKUS+, for containing China. At the same time, Taiwan’s strategic relevance to the US nowadays is its chip industry, so chip diversification efforts could reduce its relevance in a few decades, at which time the US might not care what happens to it.
8. Beijing is closely observing the war in Ukraine. What military, diplomatic, and economic lessons might China be drawing from the conflict for a possible crisis scenario in the Taiwan Strait?
The most relevant lesson is that the US can successfully rally its regional partners around the defense of another and that they’ll support their shared cause even at immense economic harm to themselves. Drones have also led this generation’s revolution in military affairs and would therefore certainly play a significant role in any hypothetical conflict over Taiwan. In that scenario, China should thus brace for a possibly protracted and drone-centric proxy war in which it’s sanctioned by some of its key partners.
9. Washington claims to be deterring Beijing over Taiwan, but it is also trying to contain China through technological sanctions, military alliances, and pressure in the Indo-Pacific. Is this strategic containment, or a form of long-term hybrid warfare?
It’s a blend of both in that hybrid means are being employed to contain China, but it hasn’t – at least not yet – crossed the threshold into kinetic activity, not even of a proxy nature. While it’s true that the West backs the armed anti-government opposition and various ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar, which is a Chinese partner, the conflict is much more complex than superficial descriptions of it as a Sino-US proxy war. It could become one, however, but China is reluctant to directly intervene for many reasons.
10. The war involving Iran tends to reorder the Middle East, affect the energy market, and force Russia and China to calibrate their positions. What will be the impact of such a conflict on the global balance between the Western bloc and the Eurasian axis?
There is no Eurasian Axis in the sense of a Sino-Russo alliance, but those two can be described as being in an Entente that broadly – but imperfectly and in no way comprehensively – coordinates foreign policy. As regards Iran, it’s close to the Sino-Russo Entente, but neither are allied with it and have only at most provided minimal support per credible reports (discounting sensational Alt-Media reports of course). The extreme scenario of Iran subordinating itself to the US would revolutionize Eurasian geopolitics, though.
11. The U.S. military intervention in Venezuela put Latin America back at the center of geopolitical dispute. Do you see such an episode as an isolated operation against Maduro, or as part of a broader strategy to reaffirm U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere?
The US has been waging what I’ve earlier described as “Operation Condor 2.0” for over a decade already and its capture of Maduro was just the latest evolution of this policy. Per the National Security Strategy, the US wants to restore its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, which can thus serve as its redoubt in the extreme scenario that it withdraws from the Eastern Hemisphere. Even if it remains engaged there, then it can rely on Latin America’s resources and markets to fuel the expansion of its influence.
12. After Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela, U.S. foreign policy appears to combine sanctions, military pressure, information operations, and selective interventions. Does this pattern confirm your thesis on hybrid wars, or does it represent a more direct phase of imperial coercion?
This pattern represents the intensification of the Hybrid War model that I described in my book and have built upon in my analyses in the decade since. The purpose is to coerce resistance and defiant countries into conceding to whatever the US’ demands may be. After the global systemic transition to multipolarity accelerated since the start of Russia’s special operation, the US became more desperate to preserve and ideally (from its perspective) reverse its declining hegemony, ergo this Hybrid War intensification.
13. Where does Brazil fit into this new world order: as an autonomous emerging power, as an actor oscillating between blocs, or as a country vulnerable to simultaneous pressure from the United States, China, and Russia?
Lula 3.0’s pivot to the US’ Democrats during the Biden era was always risky but ultimately backfired after Trump’s return. He’s now trying to repair the damage. Brazil is an emerging power but very vulnerable to US influence. It’s also deeply divided internally, and this has recently been exploited twice by the US, both to get rid of Lula’s once-successor Dilma and then to get rid of Bolsonaro, who Biden’s US despised for ideological reasons. Lula and whoever succeeds him must thus be very careful in dealing with the US.
14. Brazil seeks to preserve relations with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Caracas, while also participating in BRICS and the G20 and maintaining dialogue with NATO and the European Union. Is this balancing policy sustainable in an increasingly polarized world?
Yes, but Brazil could learn a lot from India, which practices what it describes as multi-alignment. Despite incredible pressure from the US and various resultant recalibrations of its geostrategic balancing act in recent years, India still maintains the fundamentals of this policy by remaining close to Russia, which serves as a counterweight to US influence and preemptively averts disproportionate dependence on the US. Brazil has tried to have China play the role that Russia plays with India but with mixed success.
15. If you could advise Brazilian foreign policy decision-makers, what would be the three strategic priorities for protecting national sovereignty, avoiding great-power traps, and expanding Brazil’s role in the multipolar order in the next 10 years?
Brazil must retain control over its natural resources (unlike how it just sold a rare earths company to the US and is allowing NGO activity in the Amazon as well as partnering with France there); learn from China and India by practicing a non-ideological foreign policy even if it promotes an ideological agenda at home; and take another page from those two’s book by practicing principled neutrality towards international conflicts (instead of making partisan statements like Lula did with Biden vis Ukraine).
The interview was originally published at Forças Terrestres under the title “Andrew Korybko: guerras híbridas, multipolaridade e o lugar do Brasil na nova ordem mundial”.
