Here’s the English version of the interview that I gave to Dan Viet’s Dang Thuy on recent events.
1. How do you assess the current state of the Ukrainian Conflict? Are we witnessing the groundwork being laid for a “frozen conflict” scenario, or do the primary stakeholders still believe an absolute military victory is possible?
Both sides underestimated each other. The West mistakenly assumed that Russia would quickly collapse under the weight of the unprecedented sanctions regime and then withdraw from the entirety of Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders out of desperation for sanctions relief while Russia mistakenly assumed that the West didn’t have the wherewithal nor unity for a protracted war of attrition if it came to it. The future of the conflict is thus difficult to predict but two scenarios are the most realistic at this point.
Russia either freezes the conflict or it continues fighting till it obtains at least full control over Donbass, which is important for Russia due to it hosting several Ukrainian fortress-towns and being symbolically associated with the conflict’s origins since it’s where the Ukrainian Civil War first started. It’s difficult to imagine Russia achieving all of its goals that were stated at the onset of its special operation, however, just like it’s even more difficult to imagine Russia withdrawing from the entirety of pre-2014 Ukraine.
2. Western support for Ukraine is facing growing political fatigue and domestic fractures, particularly in the US and the EU. In your view, how long is the West’s “sustainability threshold” before they feel compelled to pressure Kyiv into entering negotiations with territorial concessions?
The West already surprised critics, including those among its own populace, by maintaining financial, military, logistical, intelligence, and other forms of support for Ukraine as long as it has thus far. Contrary to some predictions, a wave of populist electoral revolutions didn’t break out in Europe for catapulting to power those forces who’d suspend their country’s participation in the Ukrainian Conflict. The current trend is the US stepping back and the EU replacing its gradually reduced, but still present, role.
That being the case, and coupled with the de facto suspension of the US-mediated Russian-Ukrainian talks, the conflict will likely continue until Russia either decides to freeze it or Russia inflicts enough military-strategic damage to Ukraine for Ukraine to agree to more of Russia’s demands for peace. Russia’s newly announced “systematic strikes” against military targets in and around Kiev could represent an inflection point in Russia’s favor if it keeps up the pace and they inflict significant damage.
3. How effectively has Russia adapted to the comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the West over the past few years? In what ways has Moscow’s pivot toward a war economy and its deepened ties with the Global South altered its geopolitical standing?
Russia surprised critics by proving resilient to the world’s most intense sanctions regime, which was the result of its people rallying behind the government, the government implementing very effective fiscal policies, and Russia being blessed with immense natural resource wealth. This combined to enable Russia to develop autarkically to a large degree during the early transitional period as it pivoted away from its erstwhile dependence on the West towards more balanced trade with the Global South.
Nearly four and a half years later, Russia has reduced its aforesaid economic and financial dependence on the West while being careful not to replace it through newfound dependence on China, to which end ties with India, Muslim-majority countries, and Southeast Asia have been pivotal in maintaining this balance. Looking forward, Russia is working hard to restore some of its Soviet-era economic influence in Africa and Latin America, but that’s a work in progress and Asia remains the focus of new trade ties.
4. Following the recent direct and indirect military exchanges between Iran and Israel, what is your assessment of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” strategy? Is Iran capable of managing its proxy network to avoid a total, direct war with the US and Israel?
Iran impressively withstood the joint US-Israeli month-long bombing campaign, but the future of its “Resistance Axis” remains uncertain after the Houthis declined to resume their blockade of the Bab el Mandeb, Hamas largely abides by its ceasefire with Israel, and Hezbollah is still being bombed by Israel. For all intents and purposes, while the political and ideological basis of its network remains intact, the “Resistance Axis” no longer functions as a united military alliance like it once did just a few years ago.
West Asian geopolitics were revolutionized by the October 7th terrorist attack as a result of the game-changing events that followed. The “Resistance Axis” is now a shadow of its former self in the regional security sense while Israeli and Turkish influence has filled the void left by Iran. The Gulf Kingdoms were also exposed as paper tigers after declining to retaliate against Iran despite their shared US ally’s urging and thus leaving their energy-dependent economies at Tehran’s mercy.
5. The footprints of Russia and China in the Middle East are becoming increasingly pronounced, particularly through the Russia-Iran strategic partnership. What does the involvement of these two great powers mean for the balance of power in a region historically dominated by the United States?
Those two’s ties with Iran are important but shouldn’t be overestimated since Russia only reportedly provided targeting intelligence to Iran during the latest war while China only reportedly provided some low-level material support (e.g. alleged supplies for replenishing its ballistic missile arsenal). Neither directly intervened unlike what some, including many of their supporters on social media and the Alt-Media Community, predicted before hostilities broke out.
Nevertheless, each has recently expanded their influence in West Asia, including among the Gulf Kingdoms. Russia closely coordinates with Saudi Arabia through OPEC+ while retaining close financial ties with the UAE. China also imports a lot of its oil from the Gulf. Be that as it may, the US still retains more influence there than they do, though it’s possible that it might militarily withdraw from the Gulf as part of a peace deal with Iran, partly due to how disappointed it is that they didn’t retaliate against Iran.
6. In a worst-case scenario where the Strait of Hormuz is blockaded or conflict escalates to its peak in the Gulf, how severely would the global economy and energy security be compromised?
The global economy has already been significantly affected by the Third Gulf War, both due to the dual (but imperfect) blockades of the strait and the damage that Iran dealt to the Gulf Kingdoms’ energy infrastructure. The effect has been somewhat delayed for many economies due to their strategic stockpiles cushioning the blow, however, and might not materialize in full till mid-summer. The ultimate impact might also be less than expected if a peace deal is soon agreed to for fully reopening the strait.
While it would still take time for the global economy to recover, the worst-case scenario of a full-blown meltdown would be averted, but the US would still fare better than most countries even if that happens. That’s because it’s already restored most of its lost hegemony over the Western Hemisphere since the start of Trump 2.0 and could therefore rely on its half of the world for resources and markets in the dark scenario that the Eastern Hemisphere descends into chaos if all Gulf energy is taken offline indefinitely.
7. You have written extensively on the transition toward a multipolar world. Are the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East accelerating this shift, or are they acting as a brake on the process?
Russia’s special operation unprecedentedly accelerated preexisting multipolar trends, but the Third Gulf War reminded observers of just how dependent the Eastern Hemisphere is on regional energy imports, which particularly affects China. It’s widely considered to be the dual engine of global multipolar processes alongside Russia and is with good reason seen by the US as its only strategic rival due to its enormous economic, financial, and logistical influence that combines to reshape the global order.
Xi is playing nice with Trump now as proven by him declaring a new “constructive relationship of strategic stability” between their countries in early May, which was likely influenced in no small part by China being humbled by the US indirectly cutting off its oil imports from the Gulf for a brief moment. This showed how vulnerable the Chinese economy is to the scenario of the US blockading Hormuz and/or Malacca and might lead to a temporary deceleration of, but not a halt to, its multipolar policies.
The interview was originally published at Dan Viet under the title “Phỏng vấn độc quyền: Nga-phương Tây và cú nhầm chết người”.
