Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed during a Q&A session after the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in India that his host nation become the long-term mediator between Iran and the Gulf Kingdoms. The context concerned him being asked about the de facto state of armed conflict between two of the group’s members, Iran and the UAE, to which he responded by putting forth his proposal due both to India’s rotating presidency of BRICS as well as its large-scale energy imports from the region.
In his words, “India, in its capacity as chair, is directly dependent on oil supplies, including from this region. Why not offer its good offices, including as the country chairing BRICS, and invite Iran and the UAE, to begin with, to talk to each other and ascertain how to prevent enmity.” He proposed this in spite of BRICS not yet sharing a statement on the war, India condemning all of Iran’s attacks against the Gulf Kingdoms (but not all US-Israeli attacks against Iran), and Pakistan mediating between Iran and the US.
Even so, Lavrov added that “Pakistan is currently helping to establish a dialogue between Iran and the United States. This aims to resolve the immediate problem – the ongoing crisis. In the long term, the role of such an intermediary, a mediator between Iran and its Arab neighbours, could well be played by India, given its considerable diplomatic experience and standing.” His “long-term” vision of India mediating between Iran and the Gulf Kingdoms goes beyond diplomatic formalities and requires elaboration.
For starters, the innuendo is that Pakistan’s mediation won’t last beyond this war, whether due to its mutual defense alliance with Iran’s historic Saudi nemesis being an obvious conflict of interest in Iran’s eyes or its reported hosting of multiple Iranian military aircraft being the same in the Saudis’. Pakistan’s incredibly close ties with the US, which are decades-old but became exceptionally close over the past year under Trump 2.0, might also make Iran suspect that it can’t be trusted in “long-term” negotiations.
Be that as it may, critics might retort that the Indian-Emirati “strategic defense partnership” that was agreed to on the same day as Lavrov’s Q&A discredits India in Iran’s eyes as does its “Major Defense Partnership” with the US since 2016, but there are three key differences between India and Pakistan. Unlike Pakistan, India is a founding member of BRICS and the “Non-Aligned Movement” before it, and India also remains Russia’s “special and privileged” strategic partner despite its growing ties with the US.
Iran trusts Russia, therefore, Russia’s trust of India despite lies to the contrary could bolster Iran’s trust of it and thus lead to Lavrov’s vision coming to fruition if the political will exists on all sides. On that topic, Saudi Arabia reportedly floated a Helsinki-inspired non-aggression pact that could become the first step towards actualizing Russia’s long-proposed collective security proposal for the Gulf, which India could help negotiate. Of course, it might not happen, but it can’t be ruled out either.
Even if nothing comes of Lavrov’s proposal, it still served to reaffirm the “special and privileged” nature of the Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership, especially with regards to what it implies about India’s overall trustworthiness and diplomatic capabilities compared to Pakistan. To be clear, Russian-Pakistani relations are presently better than at any moment in history and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is expected in Moscow sometime this summer, but India will always remain Russia’s top regional partner.
