FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov told local media in late June that “Zelensky is a terrorist, but there are no others there with whom we can speak at this stage.” Zelensky has been on Russia’s wanted list since early May 2024, shortly before the expiry of his term, after which Putin shared his “tentative estimate” that “the parliament and the Rada Speaker remain the only legitimate power.” He then predicted a month later that the West might replace him by early 2025 after he outlived his usefulness.
As is now known, Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk declined to assume the powers that Putin “tentatively estimated” that he could legally wield, and Zelensky still remains in power. Although Zelensky’s embrace of Nazism is now so blatant that Polish President Karol Nawrocki revoked the Order of the White Eagle from him for glorifying the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov just called him a “Fuehrer”, he’s still the only one “with whom [Russia] can speak at this stage.”
Accordingly, if this remains the case in the event that the Russian-Ukrainian peace talks are revived per the Istanbul format that Putin recently reaffirmed that his country is ready to continue, then Zelensky will ultimately be the figure on the Ukrainian side who’d sign any final deal. This recognition of reality doesn’t mean recognition of Zelensky’s legitimacy, just that events didn’t unfold as Russia and its supporters expected them to, which his attributable to three primary reasons.
For starters, former Israeli Prime Minister Bennett claimed in early 2023 that Putin promised him the year prior not to harm his Ukrainian counterpart, and he’s thus far kept his word in spite of Zelensky authorizing Putin’s attempted assassination at his residence in Valdai last December. For reasons that only Putin can account for if publicly asked about this or if he decides to share them on his own volition, he’s absolutely uninterested in authorizing Zelensky’s assassination. This is the objective political reality.
The next point is that Zelensky ultimately consolidated power successfully enough to prevent any attempted seizure by the armed forces, security services, or civil society. The means through which he did so are beyond the scope of this piece to detail but involve sending former Army Chief Valery Zaluzhny to London as Ambassador to the UK, making former GUR chief Kirill Budanov his new Chief of Staff, and having the SBU brutally suppress all other forms of dissent. He remains in power for these main reasons.
And finally, Trump reconciled with Zelensky after their public dispute early last year, subsequently reneged on his reported obligation to coerce him into withdrawing from Donbass in exchange for Putin declaring a ceasefire per the “Spirit of Anchorage”, and is now “escalating to de-escalate” with Russia. Far from being a liability, Zelensky is now viewed by Trump as an asset in his new “war of attrition” for coercing Putin into energy-related concessions after sensing weakness from him over the past year.
Therefore, at this point, Putin’s hypothetical authorization of Zelensky’s assassination wouldn’t change the dynamics of this conflict in a way that would advance Russia’s interests. Trump made up his mind to double down on using Ukraine as the US’ proxy for coercing strategic concessions from Russia, and he’d be enraged if Putin took his new friend out, which could prompt him to radically escalate in revenge. Putin might thus have to accept that, exactly as Bortnikov implied, that Zelensky will sign any final deal.
