Politico published a piece about “How Russian attacks, European protectionism and drought are trapping Ukraine’s vital grain”, which drew attention to the interplay between these factors. Of particular interest is their reporting that Poland is considering once again allowing the transit of Ukrainian grain across its territory en route to non-EU markets due to Russian strikes rendering Ukraine de facto landlocked. Farmers’ protests followed the last time this happened after lots of grain actually remained in Poland.
The demonstrations by this electorally significant group represented the first major deterioration of Polish-Ukrainian ties whose full-blown collapse was averted after Poland embargoed Ukrainian grain. While Politico quoted the Polish Agricultural Minister’s reassurance to local media last week that “We are doing everything to keep the embargo” and the Foreign Ministry spokesman’s claim that their talks only concern transit rights, they also quoted one of the farmers’ protests leaders as expressing doubt.
The scenario of a grain transit deal being reached that once again leads to lots of grain remaining inside Poland and thus another round of farmers’ protests couldn’t come at a worse time in bilateral ties. “Polish Polarization Over Ukraine Is Likely The New Normal” amidst their spiraling dispute that followed Zelensky’s state-level glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits in May. If there are more farmers’ protests, then bilateral ties might further deteriorate, which could have electoral implications.
Reputable polling, including from politically unfriendly Politico, indicates that the two conservative and two libertarian-nationalist parties already have enough support to form a coalition after fall 2027’s next Sejm elections for deposing the ruling liberal one. These four parties, all of which are critical of Ukraine to varying extents, might see their collective popularity further explode and consequent pressure being placed upon the ruling liberal coalition to hold early elections if there are more farmers’ protests.
On the topic of elections, “Ukraine Is Reportedly Plotting What Amounts To An Election Meddling Campaign In Poland”, which could potentially see its spies concoct evidence alleging that one, some, or all of these opposition groups and/or any new farmers’ protests are funded by Russia. The combination of these factors – new farmers’ protests, an explosion of popularity for the opposition, and Ukrainian meddling – could exacerbate Poland’s preexisting political polarization with uncertain consequences.
Readers shouldn’t forget that the catalyst for this scenario sequence isn’t Russia’s new strike campaign in Odessa Region per se, but Zelensky’s 40-day influence operation earlier this summer that sought to coerce Russia into an unconditional ceasefire, but which provoked Putin into “escalating to de-escalate”. The ever–cautious Russian leader eschewed making Ukraine de facto landlocked for 4.5 years already but was finally pushed into doing so after Zelensky’s new Trump-backed and drone-driven “war of attrition”.
Zelensky is therefore responsible for setting into motion what might be the next Polish-Ukrainian grain crisis, not Putin, although the Ukrainian leader obviously didn’t expect that his Russian counterpart would respond to this latest spree of attacks in such a way. This goes to show just how badly his 40-day influence campaign backfired since it might now also neutralize his superficial efforts to repair ties with Poland. Zelensky would have thus been better off not launching that fateful operation in the first place.
