RT published a very insightful piece last week about “Why Moscow’s Taliban outreach unnerves Pakistan”. It was written by Gleb Makarevich, who’s a Research Fellow at the Center of the Indo-Pacific Region within the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Suffice to say, his professional affiliations are impressive, but he’s sharing his views in a personal capacity unrepresentative of the aforesaid or RT. What he wrote is still very important, though.
From his authority as one of Russia’s leading experts on Pakistan, Makarevich assessed that “Until recently, concerns within Pakistan’s ruling circles about Moscow’s growing closeness with Kabul were largely confined to tight-lipped diplomats and a narrow circle of experts. In October, however, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Moscow Format spilled into the public domain with a number of leading Pakistani outlets publishing critical commentary.”
Makarevich soon thereafter wrote that “To say that Pakistan’s elites have simply inherited the British colonial idea of Russia as an inherently expansionist power would be an oversimplification…But when it comes to Afghanistan, old colonial notions still tend to surface – particularly the belief that Russia seeks to expand its influence in Kabul in order to gain access to the ‘warm waters’ of the Indian Ocean (even though this myth conveniently ignores the fact that Russia already has maritime access).”
The third significant point that Makarevich made in his latest piece was that “Finally, and most importantly, Pakistan fears that some third power might aggravate these two problems (with Afghanistan) — by encouraging Afghan claims on the border and by indirectly supporting anti-Islamabad elements. In Pakistan’s strategic imagination, that role is usually assigned to New Delhi, but in moments of acute crisis – as in the 1970s and 1980s – Moscow can also be cast in the same role.”
He concluded that “Moscow and Islamabad are currently moving in different directions”, but then he expressed hope that ties will remain stable since their worsening wouldn’t be in either side’s interests. In the order that they were shared, Makarevich confirmed that an information campaign critical of Russia is underway in Pakistan, assessed that outdated British imperialist views have perverted Pakistan’s perception of Russia, and suspected that Pakistan might thus once again view Russia as a threat.
All of this aligns with my ongoing series on the Russian-Pakistani dispute over Taliban-led Afghanistan, which I’ll share in full at the end of this analysis so that readers can review it at their leisure. I was recently defamed by a Pakistani site after it maliciously implied that I’m a foreign agent for expressing the exact same concerns as Makarevich. I responded to them here and speculated that their hit piece might even have been commissioned by anti-Russian elements within the Pakistani Establishment.
Whether or not it was, Makarevich independently shared the same observations, thus proving that the concerns that I expressed as a fellow expert on Pakistan aren’t just my own but reflect the views of even more esteemed and influential ones like Makarevich. He probably won’t be crudely attacked like I was because that would further discredit Pakistan in the eyes of those who matter in Russia, but now those who matter in Pakistan know that my series generally conveyed how their dispute is perceived in Russia.
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* 3 October: “Is India Financing The Taliban’s Reported Purchase Of Belarusian Drones?”
* 5 October: “Russia & Pakistan Have Polar Opposite Views On Taliban-Led Afghanistan”
* 6 October: “What’s The Future Of Russian-Afghan Military Cooperation?”
* 6 October: “Is Pakistan Waging An Infowar On Russia Over Its Ties With The Taliban?”
* 6 October: “How Might Russia’s Threat Perception Of Pakistan Change If It Arms Ukraine?”
* 7 October: “Clarifying Seven Important Points About Russia’s South Asian Policy”
* 8 October: “Russia Hinted At What An Afghan-Pakistani De-Escalation Agreement Could Look Like”
* 9 October: “The Taliban Isn’t Entirely Wrong About Pakistan”
* 10 October: “Fact Check: Pakistan Didn’t Dissolve The USSR”
* 11 October: “Korybko To Imtiaz Gul: Here’s What Russia Is Really Up To In Afghanistan”
* 12 October: “Korybko To Kamran Yousaf: Pakistan Should Address Russia’s Suspicions About Its Ties With ISIS-K”
* 14 October: “The Deputy Secretary Of Russia’s Security Council Elaborated On Ties With Afghanistan”
* 15 October: “The Latest Sequence In Russian-Pakistani Relations Is Worth Paying Attention To”
* 15 October: “What’s Russia’s Foreign Spy Chief Doing In Kabul?”
* 15 October: “Five Reasons Why Russia Should Arm The Taliban”
* 16 October: “The Roadmap For Russian-Pakistani Relations Amid Their Dispute Over Afghanistan”
* 16 October: “Pakistan’s Hypothetical Arming Of Ukraine Could Backfire”
* 17 October: “Fact Check: Lavrov Didn’t ‘Reject’ The Taliban’s Claim That Pakistan Backs ISIS-K”
* 17 October: “What’s Russia’s Game Plan In Afghanistan?”
* 19 October: “Korybko To Kamran Yousaf: Russia’s Regional Moves Have Nothing To Do With The Islamic NATO”
* 19 October: “Korybko To Dawn: Pakistan Is The One In Denial About The Regional Terrorist Reality”
* 20 October 2026: “Korybko To Asif Durrani: The Russian-Pakistani Dispute Over Afghanistan Likely Won’t Be Resolved”
* 20 October 2026: “Korybko To Bordachev: The Threat Posed By ISIS-K Will Keep Russia & Central Asia Close”
* 20 October 2026: “Russia Is Beginning To Conceptualize Central Asia & South Asia As The CASA Macroregion”
* 23 October 2026: “Pakistan’s Latest Proxy War On Afghanistan Risks Destabilizing Central Asia”
* 23 October 2026: “Pakistan Would Do Well To Avoid A Second Proxy War With Russia In Afghanistan”
* 25 October 2026: “The Pakistani Premier’s Planned Trip To Russia Comes At A Pivotal Moment In Bilateral Ties”
* 29 October 2026: “Assessing The Veracity Of Pakistani Media’s Claim That Afghanistan Is Plotting An ISIS-K Psy-Op”
* 2 November 2026: “Korybko To Amir Jahangir: Russia Won’t Place Pakistan’s Interests In Afghanistan Above Its Own”
* 4 November 2026: “Pakistan’s Implied Position Towards Russian-Afghan Relations Is Illogical”
* 12 November 2026: “Is Pakistan Assembling Death Squads To Terrorize The Baloch & Invade Afghanistan?”
