The latest Hungarian parliamentary elections were portrayed in their run-up as a make-or-break moment for ties with Russia. Prime Minister Viktor Orban pledged to continue importing energy from Russia, to not arm Ukraine, and even accused it of meddling through its energy blackmail. Opposition leader Peter Magyar formally echoed many of Orban’s points, but observers were skeptical whether he was sincere since his party is backed by the EU and Ukraine. He also accused Orban of being in cahoots with Putin.
As t turned out, Magyar’s party won a two-thirds supermajority of seats compared to Orban’s one-quarter, which will allow him to change the constitution if he so chooses. He did indeed reaffirm in his first press conference after the election that he wants to continue importing energy from Russia and still opposes Ukraine’s fast-tracked membership in the EU. Nevertheless, the Financial Times and Politico reported that the EU is demanding a pound of flesh from Hungary for releasing billions in frozen funds.
Both claimed that the bloc expects Magyar to end Hungary’s veto of their €90 billion loan to Ukraine, the financing of which was analyzed here as buying time for the Democrats to return to the White House in the hope that they’ll then resume the US’ Biden-era Ukrainian policy. That’s not in Russia’s interest, and they might also make the release of more frozen funds contingent on radically decoupling from Russian energy, thus representing a double-whammy. Hungary could be pressured to arm Ukraine too.
Be that as it may, new President of the Russian International Affairs Council Dmitriy Trenin shrugged off the consequences of that loan in his response to the election that can be read here, arguing that Orban’s loss is more of a defeat for Trump than for Putin. He’s also cautiously optimistic that energy cooperation will more or less remain the same. Trenin concludes that “Hungary’s ‘sovereigntist’ course can largely be expected to remain unchanged” and can thus form the model for Russia’s ties with other EU countries.
Research Director at the Valdai Club Fyodor Lukyanov also opined on Orban’s loss in an article that was translated and republished by RT here. Like Trenin, he too believes that Magyar is sincere with his stated policies and doesn’t take for granted that he’ll bend to Brussels’ anti-Russian demands, pointing to the continued structural realities in which bilateral ties will be shaped. He concludes that “The difference (with Orban) may lie less in the direction of policy than in the manner in which it’s presented.”
Trenin and Lukyanov are two of Russia’s top experts so their assessments should be taken seriously. At the same time, however, it’s possible that they’re aware that they’re perceived abroad as reflecting official policy, which they arguably help formulate to an extent due to their prestigious roles. Therefore, it can’t be ruled out that they’re purposely projecting optimism so as to not spook Magyar away in case he’s more sincere than his skeptics suspect, but they risk looking naïve in hindsight if they’re wrong.
After all, infamous anti-Russian figures like Ursula von der Leyen, Donald Tusk, and Alex Soros, et al., all celebrated Magyar’s victory, and it’s difficult to believe that all of them were duped by him and it wasn’t his (faux) “sovereigntist” rhetoric that duped wishful thinkers and those coping with Orban’s downfall instead. In any case, the reaction from two of Russia’s top experts is still worth considering even if solely because it defies popular expectations, and it’ll be clearer by summertime exactly which camp Magyar duped.
