Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Venediktov shared some insight into his country’s ties with Afghanistan following last week’s meeting between Secretary Sergey Shoigu and Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. He didn’t say anything that hasn’t been said by other Russian officials, but it was nevertheless a concise review of their relations. Venediktov repeated Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent praise of the Taliban for its anti-terrorist and governance successes.
He also referenced their cooperation on countering drug production and trafficking, especially of synthetic substances, and reaffirmed that “The SCO is discussing restoring cooperation with Afghanistan through the previously existing contact group.” Venediktov importantly declared that “Afghanistan’s role in regional affairs should not be underestimated” because “a prosperous, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan is in the interests of all countries in the region.”
On that topic, he said that “we must not allow a group like ISIS to rise again” and reminded everyone that “the United States has made no secret of its plans to return military infrastructure to Afghanistan. The establishment of such a stronghold would pose a direct threat to all countries in the region.” Lavrov made both points at the eighth Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, where he and Pakistan’s representative took polar opposite stances towards Taliban-led Afghanistan, which was analyzed here.
The preceding hyperlinked analysis referenced Shoigu’s August 2025 article for the Russian government’s Rossiyskaya Gazeta, his remarks to the SCO in May, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov’s ones to them the month prior in April, and Lavrov’s comments in July that are all of relevance to Venediktov’s briefing. They’re all cited above, but for the convenience of casual readers, they reaffirm the points that he made regarding the flow of terrorists and arms to ISIS in Afghanistan as well as the US’ regional military plans.
Pakistan is the only one of Afghanistan’s neighbors that could realistically facilitate any of this, and it’s notable that Venediktov’s briefing coincided with the four-day visit of Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev to Pakistan, which the Pakistani Interior Ministry described as a “new chapter” in their ties. The Pakistani Embassy in Russia later reported that their talks will place “particular emphasis on strengthening cooperation in internal security, law enforcement & counter-terrorism.”
Given the seriousness of Russia’s implied suspicions about Pakistan’s ties with ISIS-K, which echo the Taliban’s that Muttaqi repeated during the previously mentioned meeting in Moscow and certainly discussed with Shoigu, Kolokoltsev’s lengthy visit to Pakistan is probably about that. It’s ultra-sensitive, however, so observers shouldn’t expect either side to confirm the reasonably conjectured purpose of his visit. In fact, they’ll likely deny it if asked, but such denials shouldn’t be taken at face value as explained.
Russian-Pakistani ties are at a crossroads amid suspicions by Moscow that Kabul’s claims of Islamabad’s ties with ISIS-K are true, the Kremlin’s similarly growing concerns that Pakistan could facilitate the return of US military infrastructure to the region, and Pakistan’s troll-driven infowar on Russia over false claims that it’s arming the Taliban (even if only indirectly) against Pakistan. Venediktov’s briefing lends credence to this assessment and the findings from Kolokoltsev’s visit will influence what Russia does next.
