Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk claimed that “It is precisely the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Grynkiewicz, as well as the US administration, who very often convey these appeals to the Polish government to provide missiles for Patriot systems whenever possible.” He nevertheless said that the ruling liberal coalition has yet to decide on this matter, likely due to the national uproar that followed the last time it did so in early spring, which was only revealed this summer.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk claimed in mid-spring that Russia might test Article 5 in months, not years, yet his rhetoric was exposed as hollow after his government’s secret transfer of five Patriot interceptor missiles to Ukraine was discovered upon being leaked to the media. After all, the argument goes that Tusk mustn’t truly believe his rhetoric if he’d donate what CNN recently described as “the most sought-after weapon in the world”, whose global stockpiles have been greatly depleted by the Third Gulf War.
Although Trump denies that there’s a dearth of Patriot interceptor missiles, observers have reason to doubt him, not least because few of Kiev’s partners are willing to part with them nowadays and have thus left Ukraine very vulnerable to Russia’s summertime “systematic strike” campaign. That campaign has reshaped some of the Ukrainian Conflict’s dynamics by de facto rendering the country landlocked, among other consequences, which could cascade to further worsen ties with Poland as explained here.
Returning to Tomczyk, he also said that Poland is preparing for war with Russia and lent false credence to prior reports that Russia is planning major provocations that could lead to this, which inadvertently gives his government less flexibility on the issue of transferring interceptors to Ukraine. If Tusk and Tomczyk truly believe their rhetoric, then they wouldn’t authorize anymore transfers, especially not after the national uproar that followed the last time and which could influence fall 2027’s next Sejm elections.
At the same time, “The Recent Polish-German Defense Pact Indisputably Prioritizes Berlin’s Interests Over Warsaw’s”, and Tusk’s closeness with Berlin – which prompted the conservative opposition’s grey cardinal to accuse him of being a “German agent” – could lead to him doing its bidding if it demands it. Interestingly, he’d also be doing the US’ despite his tensions with Trump, which would make for some odd optics. The same holds true if the conservative opposition continues opposing these transfers.
For as pro-German as Tusk is, his conservative opponents with whom he’s taken turns ruling the country over nearly the past two decades are equally pro-American, which puts them on the opposite side of the US on this issue. Just like Tusk’s closeness with Berlin could lead to him doing its bidding if it demands it, with the possible pretext being “solidarity with Ukraine”, so too could their closeness with Washington lead to them toning down their opposition to this and largely turning a blind eye if it goes through.
Be that as it may, Poland should resist US pressure to transfer more Patriot interceptors to Ukraine since it’s in the country’s objective national security interests to retain its increasingly valuable stockpile, some of which it might eventually transfer to Ukraine at a later date but only in exchange for tangible benefits from Germany and the US. Praise by the patrons of each half of Poland’s ruling duopoly wouldn’t be enough, and any politician who accepts only that in exchange risks accusations of selling out or worse.
