In an open letter to the heads of state and government of the G7, G20, BRICS, and all other nations, the World Health Organization (WHO) is increasing political pressure. Together with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, it is urging governments to swiftly conclude the remaining open negotiations on the WHO pandemic agreement. At the heart of the matter is the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) system – an international mechanism for the exchange of pathogens with pandemic potential, biological samples, and genetic sequence data. At the same time, the WHO warns that another pandemic is likely within the next decade.
The timing is no coincidence. From July 6 to 17, delegates from WHO member states will meet in Geneva to negotiate precisely this outstanding PABS annex. Only once agreement is reached on this can the WHO pandemic agreement be fully adopted and subsequently ratified by the member states.
According to the WHO, the PABS system is designed to ensure that new pathogens can be shared as quickly as possible with laboratories and research institutions worldwide. This should accelerate the development of diagnostics, vaccines, and medications. At the same time, developing countries should gain fairer access to these products in the future – a lesson learned from the inequalities during the COVID-19 pandemic.
But this is precisely where the criticism begins.
The planned system would significantly expand the international exchange of pathogen samples and genetic sequence data. Critics therefore question whether this might also increase the risks. The more laboratories worldwide gain access to pathogens or their genetic blueprints, the more frequently these samples will need to be transported, processed, stored, and analyzed.
This raises fundamental questions about biological safety: Does such a system potentially increase the risk of laboratory accidents, accidental releases, theft of biological samples, or misuse? The misuse of synthetic sequence data or cyberattacks on corresponding databases have also been discussed in expert circles for years.
Furthermore, the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic remains unclear. The debate surrounding a possible laboratory accident has raised global awareness of the potential consequences of even a single safety incident. Against this backdrop, the call for an even more intensive global exchange of potentially dangerous pathogens appears contradictory to some observers.
The WHO argues, however, that only a rapid international exchange of information and samples can prepare the world for the next pandemic. Without this exchange, vaccines, tests, and medications could not be developed in time.
At the same time, a crucial question remains: Who will control access to the samples, the genetic data, and the resulting products in the future? The PABS system is intended to define precisely these rules. Critics, however, fear that this will create a global infrastructure whose implications could extend far beyond pandemic preparedness.
One thing is certain: With its open letter, the WHO is making it clear that it wants to finalize the pandemic agreement as quickly as possible. Whether the member states will follow suit will be decided in the negotiations in Geneva. But it is also clear that the debate is no longer solely about health policy, but also about biosecurity, national sovereignty, and the question of how far international structures should be involved in dealing with biological risks in the future.
