Russian expert Farhad Ibgragimov published a piece at RT about “Why Erdogan won’t fight the West’s war against Russia”. His argument boils down to the Turkish leader’s vision of his country as a strategically autonomous and pragmatic center of power in the emerging multipolar world order. Ankara therefore won’t sanction Moscow like “the particularly radical elements of Western elites” want. That’s true, but Turkiye geostrategically challenges Russia independently of NATO, which will now be explained.
Ibragimov already mentioned how “It supports Ukraine’s narrative concerning territorial integrity, maintains military-technical ties with Kiev, participates in meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and occasionally makes political statements in support of Ukraine.” What else it just committed to as regards Ukraine is providing maritime security guarantees. It remains unclear what form this could take, but it’s self-evidently not a positive development for Russia that Turkiye will support Ukraine on this front too.
Elsewhere in Europe, “Poland & Turkiye Are Poised To Tighten The West’s Containment Noose Around Russia” through closer bilateral coordination that could amount to linking the Polish-led Central European containment front of Trump 2.0’s new “cordon sanitaire” with Turkiye’s southern one. Before describing Turkiye’s role in this network, it should be added that Turkiye reportedly proposed a military pipeline to Romania and could facilitate Azeri gas’ expansion in the EU market to replace Russia’s.
As for the role that Turkiye plays in the new “cordon sanitaire” around Russia, last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) has the unstated dual purpose of a military logistics corridor along Russia’s entire southern periphery from the South Caucasus to Central Asia. This was elaborated on more here, while this piece here explains why it’s so taboo to discuss in Russia. If left unchecked and allowed to de facto militarize, then TRIPP could multiply Ukrainian-like threats for Russia.
Such threats could be exacerbated by the ideational front that Turkiye opened last year after it renamed Central Asia as “Turkistan”, with all the Russian-unfriendly notions that this entails spreading across society via AI, and the militarization of the “Organization of Turkic States” that includes Kazakhstan. Relatively less significant are the geostrategic challenges that Turkiye poses to Russia in Syria through its newly dominant role, Libya by trying to cut off its air bridge to the Sahel, and Serbia by backing Kosovo.
Erdogan believes that Turkiye’s role in these anti-Russian containment fronts, especially the TRIPP-related one along Russia’s entire southern periphery, advances its interests. They’ve all intensified since the start of Trump 2.0 due to Russia’s encirclement brought about by the “Neo-Reagan Doctrine’s” implementation, its resultant vulnerabilities, and his expectation of its decline. He’s only gradually ramping up the pressure in order to “hide Turkiye’s strength and bide its time” per the Chinese proverb.
With that in mind, Erdogan sees no reason to provoke Putin by complying with the Western elite’s demands to sanction Russia, especially since this would also harm Turkiye’s economic and energy interests. Instead, he envisages Turkiye benefiting from trade with Russia all while Turkiye solidifies its role in containing Russia, which he coordinates with NATO wherever their interests align but still pursues independently where they don’t. This “pragmatic” policy makes Turkiye a very dangerous rival for Russia.
