Written by Pepe Escobar
Iran is diversifying massively – and is not relying solely on the overland corridors to Pakistan, which are subject to secondary US sanctions.
SHANGHAI – Just hours after markets priced in a possible deal between the U.S. and Iran, CENTCOM attacked the Iranian island of Qeshm in a “limited and defensive” manner, located just over 20 km off Bandar Abbas and the linchpin of Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.
This may have been officially defensive; However, the fact remains that CENTCOM is fighting inside Iran (italics by me), while Qatar is “mediating” in Tehran.
The attack on Qeshm could have been a response to Iranian fire against a US fighter jet. However, what the IRGC Navy says it has shot down is decisive: two MQM-170 reconnaissance drones south of Qeshm – in addition to an MQ-9 drone over the east side of the Strait of Hormuz (Iran has already destroyed 55 MQ-9s in recent months).
Tehran sources confirm that CENTCOM is sending MQM-170 reconnaissance drones as bait to provoke an Iranian response and thus expose the positioning of tactical air defense systems. This has been going on for weeks. CENTCOM’s justification: to fend off attacks on ships that illegally sail through the Strait of Hormuz.
The greatest danger: The government of the sociopath at the top negotiates and shoots at the same time. We are all on a knife’s edge. Tehran could well interpret the attack on Qeshm as the beginning of a massive campaign of aggression rather than a warning.
The attack on Qeshm came on the same day that JD Vance spoke of “some progress” and Trump loudly declared that he would not resume attacks after the midterm elections. The machinery for a comprehensive joint campaign by the US and Israel is already ready for use; only the decision is still pending.
Brief review: Admiral Cooper briefed Trump on attack options on Thursday last week. Both the clownish Minister for Endless Wars Hegseth and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan “Razin” Caine were present. The oil sheikhs in the Gulf were told that attacks could take place immediately after the midterm elections.
Meanwhile, Tehran continues to negotiate and is at the same time fully ready for combat. Foreign Minister Araghchi has described the uninterrupted indirect talks as “extremely intensive”. At the same time, Iran’s army chief has raised the possibility of a preemptive strike, and no fewer than ten proposals to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have been submitted to the Iranian parliament.
Comprehensive negotiations will not resume until Iran’s conditions for the Strait of Hormuz are met. Rezaee did not formally answer Vance’s letter, but now says that the “tone of the US has completely changed”.
Iran’s plan in September was to reopen the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day; now Iran is offering two days, and Araghchi said Qatar has proposed five. Qatar’s framework plan provides for the cessation of attacks on Hormuz in return for the lifting of the naval blockade.
And of course, Iran will keep the toll booth: The new Persian Gulf Road Authority (PGSA) collects transit fees – in rials – and keeps lists of ships that do not comply with the regulations.
The real situation on the ground – or rather at sea – is that Tehran has turned the closure into a permit system. And it simply won’t give up such a lever.
China comes to the fore
Pakistan seems to have returned to the top of the negotiating channel. Araghchi reaffirmed that the Qatari and Pakistani channels were both “very active”.
The main difference is that Tehran now wants Pakistan – the mediator of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which failed repeatedly last June – to make its case, regardless of the risks involved.
And in parallel, as an added spice, Beijing is finally going beyond statements – and acting in the background – and taking up active shuttle diplomacy. A Chinese special envoy will visit Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia later this month. This means that China is now deeply involved in the talks on the Oman route for the first time.
President Xi has told the Sultan of Oman that the Gulf “should not become the scene of rivalries between great powers”. China’s interests are pretty clear: crude oil is to flow unhindered through the Strait of Hormuz; the interests of its partners in the Gulf should be safeguarded; and Beijing is determined to stay away from the secondary US sanctions.
It cannot be stressed enough how crucial Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent talks in Tehran were in clarifying Russia’s position: what West Asia needs is a new security architecture – or the “indivisibility of security” – involving all major actors.
This is related to the three-page APEC idea – it comes from Putin’s top adviser Ushakov, not from Lavrov: Russia, China and the US are to discuss Iran in detail at a Yalta 2.0-style meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen in two weeks.
The whole fuss about a possible nuclear strike on Pickaxe Mountain, allegedly with a B61-11 nuclear bomb that can penetrate the ground, actually leads to nothing – and was de facto defused by a high-ranking source in Tehran: The place is already abandoned.
As for the proposals to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty introduced in the Iranian parliament – none of which have yet been voted on – Mohsen Rezaee, the Iranian government’s number two, confirmed that a change in the nuclear doctrine is being considered. The final decision, of course, lies with leader Mojtaba Khamenei, whose personal representative is Rezaee.
Even if the quick-tempered sociopath at the top decided to bomb Pickaxe, that would not clarify what he says the US is about in the war: Iran’s ability to enrich uranium.
Then there is Dimona in the area of the death cult. Mojtaba’s order to all military commanders last Saturday to respond “geographically unrestricted” in the event of an American/Israeli attack naturally includes Dimona as a priority target.
Iranian missiles hit the city of Dimona as early as March 21; the IAEA found no damage to the reactor and no unusual radiation at the time. The reactor is small: no Chernobyl. The impact could be severe for the Negev region, but a direct hit would not make all of Israel uninhabitable.
Each page follows its own security logic
The Mecca defense alliance continues to cause all kinds of unrest. In literal interpretation, it is a collective defence treaty between three states. It was approved by Turkey’s Committee on Foreign Relations; the vote in the plenary is still pending. So far, there have been “no objections” to the accession of new members.
BADR, for its part, is a declaration of intent for cooperation in the defense industry between four countries (Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, Indonesia), with no obligation to provide assistance and no money.
The bottom line is that each actor protects its own priorities: Pakistan its energy supply, its border and Saudi deposits of 8 billion dollars; Riyadh an end to Ansarallah’s shelling (but for this it must sit down at the negotiating table); Ankara a defense pact without combat duty; and Doha, as well as its liquefied natural gas.
But another interpretation is also widely discussed. Let’s assume that the alliance came to the summit in Tehran with at least the subliminal intention of threatening the Persians. For this, it would be crucial to ignore the positive portrayal by Mohsen Rezaee.
According to this interpretation, the three members are under the influence of the Anglo-Zionist axis; they are not prepared to defend Gaza, but they are united in “warning” the Persians.
Turkey is the intelligence center, integrated into NATO and obsessed with Great Turan and a neo-Ottoman return to Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is a “follow the money” area – and characterized by hatred of Shiites.
Pakistan stands for the more complex aspect: it maintains indissoluble ties with both the Anglo-Saxon elites and Saudi wealth. At the same time, it is enforced by actors who believe they can send Baloch mercenaries and all kinds of Salafist jihadists to Iran and get away with it.
Iran, meanwhile, is diversifying on a large scale – and is not relying solely on the overland corridors to Pakistan, which are subject to secondary US sanctions. The country is building railway lines to Afghanistan; Araghchi is currently in Turkmenistan to strengthen ties; Bagheri-Kani, the extremely competent number two of the Supreme National Security Council, is in Beijing; and Mohsen Rezaee called President Putin to speed up the Caspian Sea corridor.
In short, as Election Day approaches in the US, diplomacy continues at the top, while shooting is already underway. Washington responds by day with words about “progress” and by night with attacks on Qeshm – while the tanker fleet is ready for something much bigger in the Negev.
Each side acts according to its own security logic. Iran wants the naval blockade to be lifted and its permit system for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to be recognized. The US wants verifiable restrictions on the nuclear program. The death cult desperately wants a bombing campaign.
If Iran responds to Qeshm at sea and JD Vance continues to respond via Pakistan this week, the window of opportunity will remain open. If Iran’s response hits Gulf energy infrastructure or U.S. planes, the November 4 date communicated to the Gulf petromonarchies will become current, and Shenzhen will become the place where Russia, China, and the U.S. will argue over the bill in two weeks.
