Swedish Chief of Defense Michael Claesson told The Times in mid-April that Russia might try to seize one of the Baltic’s 400,000 islands to test NATO’s response seeing as how all of the surrounding states except for Russia itself are now members. There’s no indication whatsoever at all that typically (some believe overly) cautious Putin is willing to risk World War III over any Baltic island when he wouldn’t risk it after Ukraine attacked Russia’s nuclear triad last summer with Western support (and not for the first time).
Whether Claesson is deliberately spewing this false narrative about a potential Russian amphibious assault in the Baltic or truly believes it, the result is that it serves to justify adjacent NATO states further accelerating their already unprecedented militarization. The goal is to obtain the forces required to coerce Russia into concessions, or so they seem to sincerely believe would happen, with the possible endgame being a blockade of Kaliningrad that wouldn’t be lifted unless it’s demilitarized at minimum.
Russia has nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles deployed there for deterrence purposes, which unnerves the Europeans, and it’s also the headquarters of its Baltic Fleet. The only way to supply Kaliningrad is via a railway through Lithuania or with ships across the Baltic, which is now essentially a “NATO lake”, so this enclave is indeed vulnerable to being blockaded. The only reason that hasn’t yet happened, however, is because of Russia’s formidable conventional capabilities and nuclear weapons.
Therein lies the flaw in the logic of further militarizing the Baltic since Russia will not allow Kaliningrad to be severed from it, even if at first only in military terms, through a NATO blockade. It would undoubtedly warn NATO about the dire consequences and then escalate to kinetic action in defense of its territorial integrity if the blockade still remains in effect. Even if NATO’s land, sea, and air capabilities in the Baltic come to dwarf Russia’s, Russia could then resort to nuclear weapons per its doctrine.
The same goes for a blockade of its exports, especially energy, through the Baltic as well as the launching of Ukrainian drone attacks against it from these countries too or at least through their airspace. On that note, Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Shoigu recently reminded Finland and the Baltic States that Russia reserves the right to self-defense in response to them. This followed late March’s attacks against its energy facilities in St. Petersburg that are thought to have transited through Baltic airspace.
The interception of these drones in their airspace is therefore a much more likely scenario than the political fantasy of a Russian amphibious assault on any of that sea’s islands. Unlike the aforesaid fantasy, such interceptions would be provoked by NATO and in line with Russia’s right to self-defense under international law, thus emboldening Putin to authorize such measures despite his typical caution. It remains to be seen whether he ultimately will, but it’s nonetheless a realistic possibility.
To wrap it up, Claesson’s fearmongering is nothing but the laundering of a false scenario under the guise of authority, with the end result being the further acceleration of the surrounding NATO states’ already unprecedented militarization in order to bully Russia. Regardless of whatever their demands might be, they’ll remain unfulfilled since Russia’s formidable conventional capabilities and nuclear weapons ensure that it’ll never submit to the bloc’s blackmail in the Baltic or anywhere for that matter.
