India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA) clarified on Saturday that their country “did not participate in the discussions” on the SCO’s statement earlier that day condemning Israel for its latest strikes on Iran. The absence of any clause in that group’s statement indicating that India disagreed with them initially suggested consensus (including with rival Pakistan), but after the MEA’s clarification, it now suggests that India was kept out of the loop. This could have political ramifications if that’s indeed what happened.
The SCO was founded to peacefully resolve border issues between China and the former Soviet Republics after the USSR’s dissolution and then united them all in their opposition to the shared threats of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The group has since taken on economic and other connectivity functions after expanding to include India and Pakistan in 2015, with these additional interests increasingly taking center stage since those two accuse each other of fomenting the aforesaid threats.
Article 16 of the SCO Charter clearly states that “The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during its consideration (consensus)… Any member State may state its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.”
Accordingly, given the absence of any clause in the SCO’s statement indicating that India disagreed with what was written, it therefore compellingly appears that it was kept out of the loop. That arguably being the case, Western-friendly policy influencers and policymakers in India might now feel vindicated after claiming for a while already that the group no longer aligns with their country’s interests as much as before. This could in turn lead to pressure upon India to more publicly distance itself from the SCO.
It’s premature to conclude that India will react in that way, especially since it’s remained in the SCO thus far in spite of the aforesaid interpretations among some in order to avert the scenario of China dominating that group, which the possibly attendant consequence of Russia becoming its junior partner. From India’s perspective, that would pose a major national security threat if China then leveraged its influence over Russia to deprive India of military equipment in the event of another border crisis.
To avoid any misunderstanding, there are no credible signs that any such Russian subordination to China is imminent, nor that Russia would comply with speculative demands from China to cut India off ahead of or during a future crisis so as to give Beijing the edge over Delhi. Nevertheless, such fears might now be lent renewed credence among some important people in India given what just happened with the SCO, which follows concerns that Russian policymakers’ perception of India might be changing.
Readers can learn more about that here and here, with the second analysis explaining why Russia lent credence to Trump’s claim that he personally stopped the latest Indo-Pak conflict, which India has repeatedly refuted. More than likely, Indian diplomats might soon discreetly request a clarification from Russia about why the group that it co-founded with China arguably kept their country out of the loop when issuing its latest statement, and hopefully the answer will calm any qualms about its intentions.
