The latest phase of Myanmar’s nearly four-year-long conflict, which is part of the world’s longest-running civil war that first began in 1948, has seen the military (locally known as the Tatmadaw) retreat from the minority-majority and resource-rich periphery since October 2023’s Operation 1027. They now only control less than half of the country’s territory. Here are some background briefings over the past year to bring unaware readers up to speed about this worsening conflict and its military-strategic dynamics:
* 8 February: “Myanmar’s Three-Year-Long Conflict Isn’t As Simple As It Seems At First Glance”
* 23 February: “America Is Preconditioning The Public For More Meddling In Myanmar”
* 5 March: “American Meddling Could Disrupt Myanmar’s Fragile Chinese-Mediated Peace Process”
* 18 March: “Myanmar’s Rebels & Their Foreign Supporters Really Dislike Thailand’s Four-Point Plan”
* 28 March: “TASS’ Interview With Myanmar’s Leader Had An Interesting Connectivity Tidbit”
* 5 April: “The West Is Returning To The Rohingya Issue In An Attempt To Divide & Rule This Part Of Asia”
* 27 May: “Bangladesh Warned About A Western Plot To Carve Out A Christian Proxy State In The Region”
* 2 June: “There’s A New Coordinated Push For More Western Meddling In Myanmar”
* 7 August: “Russia Has Limited Means For Helping Myanmar Wage Its War On Terror”
What’s most important for casual observers to know is that China has ties with the “Three Brotherhood Alliance” (3BA) that’s behind Operation 1027. The People’s Republic relied on some of their members for facilitating trade with the rest of Myanmar in prior years but then pivoted to supporting last year’s offensive so as to punish the Tatmadaw. China was angry about its past fling with the US as well as its alleged refusal to crack down on cross-border cybercrime and human trafficking rings.
At the same time, the US has also been backing the 3BA and other armed anti-state militias from the get-go since it considers them to be its best chance for carrying out regime change in this geostrategically positioned country at the crossroads of East, South, and Southeast Asia. The US also wants to threaten China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) projects there that are part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which includes pipelines, a port at Kyaukphyu in the Bay of Bengal, and a planned railroad.
The 3BA’s unexpected military success, which was facilitated by Beijing’s tacit support and refusal to punish them by cutting off their economic lifelines in the People’s Republic, threw China into a dilemma. It can either let events unfold at the risk of losing all influence in Myanmar after the US superceded its own over the 3BA, possibly leading to CMEC’s cancellation or it falling under the US’ proxy control, or it can intervene with private military contractors (PMC) like the latest reports claim that it’s planning:
* 15 November: “Myanmar Junta Planning Joint Security Firm with China”
* 20 November: “China’s joint security proposal sparks controversy in Myanmar”
* 21 November: “Are Chinese private armies entering the fray in Myanmar?”
* 23 November: “What happens when China puts boots on the ground in Myanmar?”
* 26 November: “Myanmar: How far will China go to keep junta afloat?”
None of these reports have been confirmed by China or the Tatmadaw so readers should be cautious, but in the event that there’s any truth to them, they’d represent an unprecedented escalation of the conflict. China’s latest call for peace talks might fall flat just like the ceasefire that it mediated earlier this year so it might feel compelled to unconventionally intervene via PMCs so as to safeguard its investments and influence there out of desperation. That fateful move would entail the following risks:
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1. From Mission Creep To Quagmire
Chinese PMCs might only be authorized to defend BRI projects at first, but this could easily evolve into providing logistical, intelligence, and eventually battlefield support to the Tatmadaw, thus raising the chances of a larger intervention that might even become a formal one with time just like Vietnam did. They might even get trapped in a quagmire due to the ethno-regional complexity of the world’s longest-running conflict as well as the mountainous and jungled geography in which it’s being fought.
2. China’s PMCs Lack Experience
There are no credible reports indicating that China’s PMCs have anywhere near the level of experience that American, other Western, and Russian ones do. Their possibly creeping involvement in this potential quagmire might therefore prove disastrous since they’ll either be defending or advancing against militants with literally decades-worth of experience on their home turf. The Chinese state and its people might also have less of a tolerance for high casualties than their aforesaid counterparts do.
3. Hastening The US’ Return To Asia
Trump 2.0 is already expected to “Pivot (back) to Asia” upon the inevitable end of the Ukrainian Conflict, whenever that might be and regardless of the terms, but they’ll have an even greater incentive to accelerate this process if China unconventionally intervenes in Myanmar. That development would predictably be spun as “aiding a genocidal military dictatorship” in order to justify this move, which could also lead to increased American involvement in the conflict as their proxy war there intensifies.
4. Falling Into A Brzezinski-Esque Trap
The above risk directly leads to the next one of the US having possibly planned this entire time to set a Brzezinski-esque trap for China in Myanmar along the lines of what that late National Security Advisor set for the erstwhile USSR in Afghanistan. The purpose is to draw it ever deeper into this seemingly intractable series of ethno-reginal conflicts in order to bleed it dry, establish the pretext for more sanctions, and rally a growing number of countries across the world against it.
5. Cross-Border Proxy Attacks
Just like the US uses Ukraine to launch cross-border artillery attacks and even raids against Russia, including the now-infamous invasion of Kursk that still hasn’t been pushed back one-quarter of a year since it started, so too might the US use the 3BA or other anti-state militias against China. The purpose would be to humiliate the People’s Republic and provoke an overreaction like more mission creep or an outmatched response that’s exploited to rally even more countries against it.
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China is certainly aware of the risks that any unconventional PMC intervention in the Myanmarese Conflict would entail, but the military-strategic dynamics have changed so much over the past year that it might be willing to throw caution to the wind. That would be uncharacteristic of China, however, so it might ultimately not happen. If it does go through with this, then it might become as much of a game-changer as Russia’s special operation has been, for better or for worse depending on how it unfolds.
