The conflict between the US and Iran is also about control of the Strait of Hormuz – and thus control of one of the world’s most important energy transport routes.
By Alex Männer
The American-Israeli military intervention against Iran, launched on February 28, is clearly anything but successful for Washington and with each passing day of fighting reveals increasingly serious errors made by the Pentagon in its planning.
Despite numerous devastating airstrikes against the Iranian leadership, military, and civilian infrastructure of the Islamic Republic, the Iranians have been able to implement effective countermeasures and have even gained the strategic initiative in the conflict. This is primarily due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and sustained, massive missile attacks on Israel and facilities of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf.
More and more experts now believe that the US has reached a dangerous impasse: it can neither defeat Iran nor reopen the “blocked” Strait of Hormuz, meaning it will continue to suffer severe economic and reputational damage. (Just on Sunday, an American Boeing E-3 Sentry reconnaissance aircraft, worth approximately $700 million, was destroyed by an Iranian missile at a US airbase in Saudi Arabia.) Furthermore, the Americans cannot simply extricate themselves from this mess because they are already too deeply involved. While a ground invasion of the Iranian island of Kharg is being considered, this undertaking carries the risk of heavy losses and a painful defeat for the US military. Aside from the fact that an invasion was not originally included in the US Department of Defense’s operational plan, its preparation would take considerable time. During this time, Iran would also be preparing for an enemy invasion, if it hasn’t already done so. Most likely, the Iranians are prepared for that as well.
In this respect, Washington already revealed its weakness by declaring its willingness to negotiate with Tehran. The White House has presented the Iranian leadership with a so-called 15-point plan for resolving the conflict, which includes, among other things, limiting the Iranian nuclear program, a pledge from Tehran never to develop nuclear weapons, a halt to the production of ballistic missiles, the normalization of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and the lifting of sanctions against Iran.
Iran rejected this proposal, however, evidently believing it holds the stronger hand in this dispute with the US. Instead, the Iranian leadership responded by presenting the other side with harsh conditions, such as the payment of reparations, the closure of US military bases in the Gulf region, the lifting of sanctions, or an agreement on security guarantees for Iran.
From Tehran’s perspective, however, a key prerequisite for peace is the American recognition of its sole control over the Strait of Hormuz. This could well be a major reason for the US attack on Iran. Some of the official reasons for the war, which US President Donald Trump initially cited—namely, the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and by the “Ayatollah regime,” which allegedly supports international terrorism and threatens the US and its allies—have since faded into the background and may no longer play a role in potential peace negotiations.
In contrast, the question of control over the Strait of Hormuz has always been fundamental to the conflict-ridden US-Iranian relations. After all, this trade and transport route is of immense importance for both the global economy and the energy supply of numerous countries. Besides the fact that more than a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas traffic is handled via this route, other energy shipments must also pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
Most of the deliveries undoubtedly go to Asia, leading to the conclusion that whoever controls the Strait of Hormuz is likely to have a major influence on the energy supply of Asian countries and thus also on the economic development in this region.
Which brings us to the economic war between the US and China. By controlling the aforementioned shipping route, Washington would gain a significant geopolitical and geoeconomic advantage in its struggle against Beijing and could simultaneously limit Tehran’s influence in the Middle East. However, if the Iranians retain control of the Strait of Hormuz and continue to decide which ships are allowed to pass through it, then Chinese energy imports from the Gulf region would be secured in the long term, given the very close and, in some respects, strategic ties between China and Iran.
For Washington, this means that anything less than complete US control of the Strait of Hormuz would be tantamount to defeat. Therefore, the Americans will not accept the current status quo and will instead prolong the conflict even further. However, their position is steadily weakening, while Iran can continue to pursue its strategy for a long time. This should, sooner or later, clarify who will control this strait in the future and under what conditions.
