Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed in early March that Armenia rejected her country’s next intended humanitarian aid package for refugees from Karabakh. The last round provided 140 tons of food, essential goods, and baby products to 7,000 families upon their request. Some of this was even purchased in Armenia itself, Zakharova said, thus stimulating small businesses. The latest intended round was rejected, however, on putative election-related legal grounds.
According to her, Russia was told that “Armenian legal norms restrict the provision of donations, as well as charitable assistance, during the pre-election period”, but she countered that “such restrictions apply only to those entities whose names may be somehow connected, for example, with the names of parties participating in the elections…International or charitable organizations are prohibited solely from conducting campaigning. What does campaigning and humanitarian aid have to do with this?”
Zakharova concluded that “It’s clear that Yerevan’s refusal to provide purely charitable humanitarian aid, which has no political undertones, is motivated by the authorities’ pre-election desire to ‘cleanse’ any mention of Russia.” A day earlier, Prime Minister Pashinyan told the European Parliament that clergymen who allegedly used to be KGB agents “are trying to sacrifice Armenia’s independence to the interests of third countries” ahead of June’s parliamentary elections. Here are three background briefings about this:
* 30 June 2025: “The Outcome Of Armenia’s Latest Round Of Unrest Will Be Pivotal For The Region’s Future”
* 29 December 2025: “Armenia’s Next Parliamentary Elections Are Shaping Up To Be Another Flashpoint”
* 12 February 2026: “Armenia’s Pro-American Pivot Might Entail Radical Socio-Cultural Costs”
In brief, last summer’s protests were due to concerns that Armenia’s impending deal with Azerbaijan would subordinate it as a “Neo-Ottoman Sanjak”, ergo why Pashinyan arrested two archbishops and an opposition leader in an attempt to prevent them from stopping him. Later that summer, Armenia agreed to the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) with Azerbaijan during their leaders’ trilateral summit at the White House with Trump, but the project isn’t yet implemented.
That’s poised to occur after June’s parliamentary elections, which contextualizes why JD Vance endorsed Pashinyan during his visit last month. The trade-off though is that Armenia might have to accept the return of the ~200,000 Azeris who fled during the chaotic Soviet collapse (and their descendants), grant them equal language rights, teach in schools that they consider Armenia to be “Western Azerbaijan”, and possibly agree to a Schengen-like deal with Azerbaijan. Many Armenians are naturally opposed to this.
It’s in connection with these enormous stakes that Pashinyan is fearmongering about a Russian meddling plot through the clergy and rejected Russia’s next humanitarian aid package for refugees from Karabakh in an attempt to turn this nationalist segment of the electorate against the Russian-friendly opposition. If he wins re-election, then TRIPP will be implemented and Armenia’s fate as a “Neo-Ottoman Sanjak” might be inevitable, but it could possibly be averted if the nationalist opposition replaces him instead.
