Putin candidly admitted during mid-October’s Business Russia Forum that Russia was caught off guard by Ukraine’s strikes against Wildberries, his country’s analogue to Amazon, that were part of Zelensky’s failed 40-day influence operation aimed at coercing Russia into a ceasefire without preconditions. He said in connection with this being referenced by the company’s founder that “They’re constantly taking steps that, frankly, we probably should have foreseen, but we thought they wouldn’t think of that.”
He continued that “They do it, we start responding, and then they immediately turn to their sponsors to influence us and stop us…They took the first step, and now we’re starting to respond—and there’s already a squeal about energy, too, and about other facilities, including data centers and so on. They started. They shouldn’t have started. They should have carefully considered the consequences before taking this step.” His candid admission reveals his mindset up till at least summertime’s strikes
For context, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov shared some insight into his people’s character in early September, which is also relevant for understanding Russia’s “strategic culture”. This refers to the way in which its diplomatic, expert, intelligence, and political bureaucracies see the world. He suggested that they’re pragmatic, sometimes optimistic to the point of implied naivete, and also tend not to proactively address latent crises. This is extraordinarily relevant to Putin in light of what he just candidly admitted.
He’s a consummate pragmatist, but he somewhat naively projected his pragmatism onto Zelensky in miscalculating that his foe wouldn’t authorize strikes against Russia’s civilian infrastructure due to the gross power asymmetry between their countries, which would prompt overmatched retaliation. Former deep-cover Russian spy Andrey Bezrukov, who’s now an expert, candidly admitted in early June that “we were not prepared” for Ukraine’s precision drone strikes against Russia’s civilian infrastructure.
They all seemed to calculate that Zelensky wouldn’t expose Ukraine to Russia’s overmatched retaliation, which began to follow over the summer after Putin mildly “escalated to de-escalate” through systematic strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure that are now expected to bring the country to its knees by winter. This miscalculation contextualizes why Russia didn’t preemptively fortify its civilian infrastructure because, per what Lavrov earlier conveyed, Russians tend not to proactively address latent crises.
Ironically, Putin indulged in wishful thinking about this four years after advising his Foreign Intelligence Service to abandon this approach, which shows that Russians – including the President himself – struggle to overcome their optimism that sometimes borders on implied naivete. Just like China engages in self-criticism and -reform per President Xi Jinping’s 2019 exhortation, so too should Russia do the same in order to finally overcome this socio-cultural obstacle due to the enormous strategic stakes involved.
Putin is human, and humans are shaped to a large degree by socio-cultural factors, thus meaning that he’ll likely continue to be influenced by his people’s naivete-bordering optimism and tendency to not proactively address latent crises since this is now characteristic of Russia’s “strategic culture”. He and his closest advisors would therefore do well to prioritize reforming Russia’s “strategic culture” from the top-down by fixing the broken feedback loops that are responsible for reaffirming wishful thinking therein.
