Putin recently hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for candid talks ahead of June’s next parliamentary elections. He conveyed that his campaign shouldn’t indulge in Russophobia, warned about the incompatibility of Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and efforts to join the EU, reminded him of the economic importance of discounted Russian energy, defended not fighting Azerbaijan for Armenia, and expressed hope that Russian-friendly political forces won’t be persecuted.
In response, Pashinyan countered that he appreciates Armenia’s close ties with Russia, insisted that its talks with the EU don’t yet threaten its membership in the EAEU, highlighted his country’s energy diversification policy, reaffirmed his disappointment with the CSTO, and defended the state of Armenian democracy. As can be seen, Putin and Pashinyan mostly have polar opposite views on these sensitive issues, with the upcoming elections likely representing the moment of truth in their countries’ relations.
In brief, Pashinyan has spent his premiership pivoting Armenia to the West, with this process greatly accelerating after his country’s loss in 2020’s Continuation War in Karabakh. He then agreed with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during last August’s White House meeting with Trump to replace Russia’s agreed-upon role in a regional logistics corridor with the US, now known as TRIPP, which will expand Western influence along Russia’s entire southern periphery. Here are five background briefings:
* 12 November 2025: “A US Think Tank Considers Armenia & Kazakhstan To Be Key Players For Containing Russia”
* 29 December 2025: “Armenia’s Next Parliamentary Elections Are Shaping Up To Be Another Flashpoint”
* 12 February 2026: “Armenia’s Pro-American Pivot Might Entail Radical Socio-Cultural Costs”
* 5 March 2026: “Here’s How Karabakh Became The Catalyst Of Russia’s Southern Peripheral Setbacks”
* 26 March 2026: “Armenia Is Politicizing Russia’s Next Humanitarian Aid Package For Refugees From Karabakh”
If Pashinyan’s party wins and he doesn’t recalibrate his policies in a more Russian-friendly direction, then their relations might enter into crisis. By contrast, his defeat by the Russian-friendly opposition would ensure that their relations are repaired, thus possibly restoring a sense of regional balance if Russia is invited to defend TRIPP and inspect the cargo transiting across it. After all, by replacing Russia’s agreed-upon role like Pashinyan did, NATO can now use TRIPP as a military logistics corridor to Central Asia.
Top Russian expert Timofei Bordachev, whose many specializations include the countries along his own’s southern periphery, conspicuously omitted any mention of TRIPP in his recent detailed report about the South Caucasus and Central Asia for the Valdai Club. This led to concern that policymakers might not be aware of how threatening TRIPP is to Russia’s national security interests. Nevertheless, judging by the veiled messages that Putin conveyed to Pashinyan, the Commander-in-Chief understands this very well.
That’s reassuring and suggests that he relies more on classified reports from his country’s security services than on public ones from its think tanks no matter how prestigious they are when formulating Russian foreign policy. With that in mind, it can be concluded that Russia tacitly acknowledges that June’s parliamentary elections represent a “Battle for Armenia” just like Hungary’s own later this month represent a “Battle for Hungary”, with very serious stakes in both with respect to Russian interests.
