Economic analyst Raivo Aleksander Paala has submitted a supplementary application to the Chancellor of Justice concerning the response he received on 28 September 2026. The matter concerns the measures imposed during the COVID-19 crisis, pressure related to vaccination, the protection of fundamental rights, and the actions of the Chancellor of Justice.
Paala stresses that his purpose is not to seek the retroactive annulment of an individual administrative act or the restoration of an expired deadline for filing a complaint. The issue is much broader: is Estonia’s independent constitutional supervisory institution prepared to conduct a substantive assessment of the cumulative impact that COVID-19 measures, official communications, vaccination pressure and restrictions had on people’s fundamental rights and genuine freedom of choice?
We publish Raivo Paala’s supplementary application below.
29 September 2026
SUPPLEMENTARY APPLICATION
concerning the response of 28 September 2026 to the application addressing COVID-19 measures, vaccination, the protection of fundamental rights and the actions of the Chancellor of Justice
Dear Chancellor of Justice,
I am submitting this supplementary application in connection with the response sent on 28 September 2026, under the authority of the Chancellor of Justice, by Kristel Lekko, Head of the Legal Department and Adviser to the Chancellor of Justice.
My earlier application addressed the measures implemented during the COVID-19 crisis, governmental and societal pressure related to vaccination, the protection of fundamental rights, and the activities of the Chancellor of Justice as an independent constitutional institution.
First, I consider it necessary to clarify that this supplementary application is not being submitted merely because I disagree with the response I received. The issue is more fundamental: whether the questions I raised were addressed according to their actual substance and legal significance.
The central question in my original application was not whether I should have challenged a specific order of the Government of the Republic before an administrative court between 2020 and 2022.
Nor did I ask the Chancellor of Justice to initiate court proceedings on my behalf, restore an expired deadline for filing a complaint, or treat proceedings before the Chancellor of Justice as a domestic remedy within the meaning of Article 35(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Nevertheless, the response of 28 September 2026 focused predominantly on those very issues.
The purpose of my application was to assess the actions of public authorities, their cumulative impact, and the performance of the Chancellor of Justice’s own supervisory duties arising from the Constitution and the law.
The institutional role of the Chancellor of Justice is not limited to constitutional review or the performance of ombudsman functions. Since 1 January 2019, the Chancellor of Justice has also performed the functions of Estonia’s national human rights institution.
This gives rise to a justified question: how is the Chancellor of Justice’s duty to monitor, protect and promote human rights compatible with the position that the systemic questions of fundamental rights raised in my application can essentially be answered merely by stating that an individual could have challenged a particular administrative act before an administrative court?
This distinction is also important from the perspective of good administration.
If the Chancellor of Justice publicly draws attention to serious problems in society or in the conduct of public authorities—including fear-based influence, restrictions on people’s freedom of choice, excessive restrictions, or other practices harmful to the functioning of a free society—then people have a legitimate expectation that a specific and substantiated application concerning those same problems will be examined according to its actual substance.
If the central issue raised in an application is replaced with a different and easier question, which is then answered instead, the obligation to respond has been fulfilled only formally, not substantively.
I. THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF MY APPLICATION AND THE ALTERATION OF ITS FOCUS IN THE RESPONSE OF 28 SEPTEMBER 2026
The response of 28 September 2026 states, among other things:
“If the state violates people’s rights and freedoms through an administrative act, they have the right to apply to an administrative court for the protection of their rights and freedoms.”
It also states:
“Therefore, if your rights were violated by any COVID-19 measure, you should have applied to an administrative court in a timely manner to protect your rights and freedoms.”
These statements may be correct where the matter concerns the judicial challenge of a particular administrative act.
However, they do not answer the questions I submitted.
I did not approach the Chancellor of Justice to seek the annulment of any administrative act that was in force during the COVID-19 crisis. I asked for an assessment of a considerably broader range of issues, including:
- The cumulative impact of the restrictions and influence measures applied during the COVID-19 crisis on fundamental rights;
- Whether vaccination decisions were genuinely voluntary in circumstances where refusing vaccination resulted in legal, financial, employment-related and social consequences;
- The methods of communication and influence used by public authorities and their impact on people’s freedom of choice;
- The state’s positive and procedural obligations to investigate possible risks to life and health;
- The activities of the Chancellor of Justice and the use of the supervisory powers granted to that institution by the Constitution and the law.
None of these questions can be answered merely by explaining that an individual could have challenged a particular administrative act before an administrative court.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SUPERVISION OVER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND GOOD ADMINISTRATION
Under § 33 of the Chancellor of Justice Act, the Chancellor of Justice verifies whether a supervised authority observes the principles of guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms and follows the principles of good administration.
Under § 21(1) of the Act, the Chancellor of Justice identifies the facts of material importance in the matter being examined and, where necessary, gathers evidence on their own initiative.
Under § 34(1), the Chancellor of Justice may initiate proceedings on the basis of an individual application or on their own initiative.
At least three legally distinct matters must therefore be distinguished:
- Constitutional review of legislation of general application;
- Judicial review of a specific administrative act for the protection of an individual’s subjective rights;
- Supervision by the Chancellor of Justice over the actions of public authorities from the perspective of guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms and complying with the principles of good administration.
The response of 28 September 2026 addresses the first and second matters but provides no substantive answer concerning the third.
I therefore ask the Chancellor of Justice to state clearly whether the institution considers that it lacks the authority, under §§ 21, 33 and 34 of the Chancellor of Justice Act, to assess the actions of public authorities during the COVID-19 period from the perspective of fundamental rights, freedoms and good administration.
If the Chancellor of Justice considers that such authority does not exist, I ask that the specific legal provision excluding that authority be identified and legally explained.
If the Chancellor of Justice considers that such authority does exist, I ask for an explanation as to why the questions raised in my original application were not substantively considered within the framework of that authority.
III. COVID-19 MEASURES CANNOT LEGALLY BE REDUCED SOLELY TO ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
Several restrictions were indeed introduced through orders of the Government of the Republic, but those orders were based on enabling provisions contained in the Communicable Diseases Prevention and Control Act.
This was also confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court of 31 October 2022 in case no. 5-22-4.
An interference with fundamental rights does not necessarily arise from a single legal provision or a single administrative act. A person’s actual freedom of conduct and choice may be affected by the simultaneous and cumulative operation of several measures.
Where a person is simultaneously subjected to access restrictions, testing requirements, additional financial costs, employment-related and social restrictions, and intensive public persuasion, the combined impact of these measures may be considerably greater than the effect of each measure viewed separately.
It was precisely this cumulative impact that I asked the Chancellor of Justice to assess.
This issue does not concern me alone. The measures applied during the COVID-19 crisis affected a very large proportion of the population, and their legality and justification remain the subject of public debate.
This is therefore not merely my personal concern. It is a broader matter of public interest that deserves substantive examination.
IV. FORMAL VOLUNTARINESS AND GENUINE FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Where refusing a medical intervention results in significant restrictions in employment, freedom of movement, access to services, participation in public life or a person’s financial circumstances, it must be assessed whether consent can genuinely be regarded as voluntary merely because no direct physical force was used.
From the perspective of protecting fundamental rights, a person’s free will cannot be treated as a merely formal concept.
Personal autonomy, bodily self-determination and the right to respect for private life require freedom of choice to be genuine, not merely apparent.
Has the Chancellor of Justice, either during the COVID-19 crisis or afterwards, analysed how far the state may go in influencing an individual’s medical decision before a formally voluntary decision becomes substantively coercive within the meaning of fundamental rights?
V. THE PUBLIC POSITIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CHANCELLOR OF JUSTICE
If the Chancellor of Justice publicly draws attention to fear-based influence, excessive restrictions, manipulative communication or other practices harmful to the functioning of a free society, a specific application concerning those same issues cannot be treated as though it concerned only one individual’s past and unused opportunity to apply to an administrative court.
I therefore ask:
- What specific steps did the Chancellor of Justice take during the COVID-19 crisis to assess whether the methods of influence, official communications and restrictions used by public authorities complied with fundamental rights and the principles of good administration?
- Has the Chancellor of Justice subsequently assessed whether the institution’s actions and interventions during the COVID-19 crisis were sufficient?
- Has the Chancellor of Justice assessed what legal and institutional conclusions should be drawn from the COVID-19 crisis in preparation for future crises?
VI. OWN-INITIATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Under § 34 of the Chancellor of Justice Act, the Chancellor of Justice may initiate proceedings regardless of whether a specific individual has applied to an administrative court to protect their rights.
Has the Chancellor of Justice considered initiating proceedings on their own initiative concerning the combined impact of COVID-19 measures, official communications and methods of influence?
If so, please refer to the relevant proceedings or document.
If not, please explain why such proceedings were not considered necessary.
VII. REFERENCE TO THE ECHR DECISION IN JANATUINEN v. FINLAND
I did not ask whether proceedings before the Chancellor of Justice would allow me to exhaust domestic remedies for the purpose of applying to the European Court of Human Rights.
It therefore remains unclear to me which specific question raised in my application was intended to be answered by the reference to Janatuinen v. Finland.
Please explain this specifically.
VIII. THE ECHR JUDGMENT IN S.T. v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
My question concerns the state’s positive and procedural obligations where sufficiently serious and substantiated allegations of harm to life or health have been presented and the information, registers, expert resources and investigative capabilities required to establish the facts are predominantly under the control of the state or state-controlled institutions.
May the state simply maintain that every individual must prove their own case and initiate court proceedings, or may the state itself, under certain circumstances, have an obligation to conduct an effective investigation?
Please provide a substantive answer to this question.
IX. THE PURPOSE OF MY APPLICATION IS NOT TO CHALLENGE AN INDIVIDUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACT RETROACTIVELY
I am not seeking the annulment of any order that was in force during the COVID-19 crisis.
I am not asking the Chancellor of Justice to restore an expired deadline for filing a complaint or to represent me in court.
My question is whether Estonia’s independent constitutional supervisory institution is prepared to assess substantively a period during which extensive restrictions and influence measures affecting the fundamental rights of the entire population, or large groups within it, were introduced within a very short time.
X. QUESTIONS TO WHICH I REQUEST SPECIFIC ANSWERS
- Did and does the Chancellor of Justice have authority under §§ 21, 33 and 34 of the Chancellor of Justice Act to review the conduct of public authorities during the COVID-19 crisis from the perspective of guaranteeing fundamental rights, freedoms and good administration?
- If such authority exists, why were the questions raised in my original application not substantively considered within that framework?
- If the Chancellor of Justice considers that such authority does not exist, which specific legal provision excludes it?
- Has the Chancellor of Justice assessed the cumulative impact of COVID-19 measures on people’s freedom of choice?
- At what point may influence over an individual’s medical decision become so strong that formally voluntary consent can no longer be regarded as genuinely voluntary?
- What specific steps did the Chancellor of Justice take during the COVID-19 crisis to assess the influence methods, communications and restrictions used by public authorities?
- Has the Chancellor of Justice subsequently assessed whether the institution’s own actions and interventions during the COVID-19 crisis were sufficient?
- What conclusions should be drawn from the COVID-19 period to prevent similar problems involving fundamental rights during future crises?
- Has the Chancellor of Justice considered initiating own-initiative proceedings under § 34 of the Chancellor of Justice Act?
- Can Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights impose a procedural obligation on the state to investigate serious and substantiated allegations of harm to life or health?
- Which question raised in my application was answered by the reference to Janatuinen v. Finland?
- Did the question concerning the actions of the Chancellor of Justice during the COVID-19 crisis receive a substantive answer in the response of 28 September 2026?
- Is it consistent with the principles of good administration to replace the actual substance of a substantiated application with the question of whether the applicant could have applied to an administrative court?
XI. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST
My purpose is not to demand a predetermined conclusion from the Chancellor of Justice as to whether the measures implemented during the COVID-19 crisis were lawful or unlawful.
I ask that my questions be addressed according to their actual substance and legal significance.
If the problems described are considered sufficiently serious to be discussed publicly, they must also be capable of substantive assessment when an individual submits a reasoned application concerning those same issues to the Chancellor of Justice.
Please do not interpret this application as a request for another general explanation of the conditions for applying to an administrative court or the European Court of Human Rights.
I understand those issues, and they are not the subject of this application.
PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS I HAVE ACTUALLY ASKED.
Yours sincerely,
Raivo Aleksander Paala
This is no longer solely a question of what happened during the COVID-19 crisis. The question is whether the Estonian state and its constitutional institutions are prepared to assess their own actions honestly and substantively.
People deserve specific answers—not an attempt to shift responsibility back onto them.
We will continue to keep the public informed about the progress of this application.
