Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia Avraham Neguise declared in early September that “Empowering and strengthening Ethiopia and creating stability in the Red Sea is the interest of all, not only for Ethiopia. Israel is behind Ethiopia in this effort. This is clear Israeli policy.” The context concerns Ethiopia’s several-years-long quest for direct sea access to alleviate its near-total dependence on Djibouti. Ethiopia also plans to rebuild its navy to secure the sea lines of logistics upon which its economic stability depends.
Readers can learn more about this policy here, including the connection between economic stability, political stability, and domestic security, while this analysis here describes the way in which Ethiopia’s historical rival Egypt has relied on its other rival Eritrea to thwart its direct access to the sea. Somalia, which can nowadays be described as a joint Egyptian-Turkish condominium, plays a complementary role due to its refusal to recognize the restored independence of Ethiopia’s close partner Somaliland.
Accordingly, Eritrea functions as Egypt’s proxy for dividing-and-ruling Ethiopia through its patronage of disparate armed anti-government groups, some of which are designated by Addis as terrorists. Likewise, Somalia and its two patrons collectively threaten Somaliland, thus endangering Ethiopia’s logistics to the sea through that country. Late last year, Israel recognized Somaliland due in part to its new rivalry with Turkiye, while its gradually revived one with Egypt might lead to the souring of Israeli-Eritrean ties too.
Israel isn’t the only country whose regional policy increasingly converges with Ethiopia’s since the UAE’s does too. Just like Israel, the UAE has close ties with Somaliland where its reportedly building a new airbase, is in a rivalry with Turkiye and Egypt, and its ties have long since soured with Eritrea. Israel and the UAE are also one another’s strategic partners, while each have excellent ties with Ethiopia, so the stage is set for coordinating trilateral action between them in the Horn of Africa.
This leads to the question of how far Israel might go in backing Ethiopia’s quest for direct sea access. Its political support was confirmed by its ambassador, while military support could include jointly defending Somaliland if it comes under attack from Somalia, Egypt, and/or Turkiye. Ethiopia has excellent ties with Turkiye despite their differences over Somaliland, so in the scenario of a Turkish attack on Somaliland, only Israel might target Turkish forces from its suspected joint airbase with the UAE there.
If Eritrea’s Hybrid War on Ethiopia sparks another conventional war, then Israel might carry out strikes against Eritrea. It’s also possible that Israel wouldn’t get directly involved in either conflict, instead deterring Egyptian and/or Turkish involvement on pain of sparking a major war if they intervene, thus making it easier for Ethiopia to defend Somaliland and/or defeat Eritrea. Israel’s support of Ethiopia’s quest for direct sea access is the natural result of Israel’s Egyptian and Turkish rivals trying to thwart this.
If they succeed, then Ethiopia will remain contained, and Egypt might then try to “Balkanize” Ethiopia by weaponizing its growing influence over the Bab el-Mandab to cut off the maritime logistics upon which Ethiopia’s economy depends, thus setting into motion a national collapse. The resultant wealth that Egypt might extract from then-former Ethiopia could turbocharge its rise as a regional power and lead to it posing a much more formidable threat to Israel. That’s precisely the scenario that Israel wants to avert.
