Veteran Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz published a thought-provoking piece at Wirtualna Polska in early July about the tectonic shift in Polish-Ukrainian relations. In his view, the spiraling Polish-Ukrainian dispute that was sparked by Zelensky’s state-level glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits and the bipartisan hardline reaction thereto marks the end of the Giedroyc Doctrine. Casual readers likely aren’t aware of what this is so a few words are required to bring them up to speed.
In a nutshell, this refers to Poland’s decision to respect the post-war eastern borders despite cities of significant importance to Polish Civilization such as Wilno (Vilnius), Grodno, Brest, and Lwów (Lvov) remaining outside of Poland as a result. In the Ukrainian context, Parafianowicz reminded readers that the Giedroyc Doctrine also preaches that “a secure and independent Poland cannot exist without an independent Ukraine.” It was upon this basis that Poland has backed Ukraine to the hilt against Russia.
Parafianowicz is now convinced that “Ukraine will remain independent and will be able to pursue its own interests. Doing so very assertively.” He cite its proxy wars against Russia in Africa, helping the Gulf States defend themselves from Iranian drone strikes, creating a 40-kilometer “kill zone” along the front lines with Russia, carrying out deep strikes against the latter, attacking its “shadow fleet”, assassinating its VIPs, building a robust military-industrial complex during wartime, and allegedly destroying Nord Stream.
This leads to his conclusion that “Such a state doesn’t need mythical protection and care. And if so, Poland can finally conduct a thorough examination of its own interests in Ukraine. And seek the means to achieve these goals.” Parafianowicz proposes that Poland sell military equipment to other countries instead of continuing to donate it to Ukraine and he suggests that it do so with an eye on helping them counter or contain Russia. That’s reasonable from the perspective of Polish national interests.
He also suggests that Poland impede Ukraine’s implementation of the “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” with the EU to protect the Polish businesses, especially those in the agricultural and service industries, that would be threatened by this. Parafianowicz envisages Poland coordinating its efforts with its allies in the Visegrad Group – Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – and nearby Romania. Poland should also request that Ukraine allow it to monitor all pre-accession EU funds for anti-corruption purposes.
Poland’s ruling liberals might not implement Parafianowicz’s proposals, but the importance of his piece is the fact that he accurately declared the end of the Giedroyc Doctrine, specifically Poland’s hitherto policy of privileging Ukrainian interests over its own. It’s now political suicide for either half of the country’s ruling duopoly to do so ahead of fall 2027’s next Sejm elections. This means that Polish-Ukrainian ties will likely remain strained till then, and if the liberals lose, then they might even get worse afterwards.
In the larger context, Polish foreign policy towards Ukraine is indisputably changing, but nobody should expect that Poland will pursue revanchist goals against it for the reasons explained here. It also probably won’t cut off aid to Ukraine, both its own and especially its NATO allies’, but it’ll likely still demand that Ukraine stop glorifying the OUN-UPA. As Ukraine begins challenging Poland’s regional interests more assertively, Polish policy towards it will further harden, thus exacerbating their revived rivalry.
