It was assessed here from one of Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev’s recent pieces that he’s optimistic about the situation along Russia’s southern flank despite Armenia’s pro-Western pivot that he expects will weaken their ties. His nonchalance towards Armenia, which has also taken the form of him conspicuously omitting any mention of last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) in his work about Armenia, makes his reaction to its elections all the more surprising.
RT translated and republished his article on this subject that was originally titled “Russia Owes Nothing To Anyone”, which signaled to readers who are familiar with his views that he’s not going to be as calm, soft, and optimistic as usual. His anger is palpable, albeit controlled, throughout the piece. Bordachev began by explaining that, “When considering the appropriate strategy towards Armenia, and towards all of Russia’s neighbors along its borders, several options are possible. They are not mutually exclusive.”
The first is that Russia isn’t under any obligation to recognize Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s victory since “The example of Georgia shows that perfectly healthy trade and economic ties can exist even in the absence of diplomatic relations, let alone recognition of the official results of a popular vote.” The second is that Russia might impose economic consequences on Armenia, exactly as Putin himself previously implied, even before Armenia’s pro-Western policies begin to inflict tangible harm to Russia.
Third, Russia practices a multi-vector policy just like its neighbors do, the subtext being that it’s not dependent on any of its neighbors and could therefore cut them off if they’re unfriendly. And finally, Bordachev wrote that “when setting priorities for cooperation with any country, Russia is free to decide what matters most to it. Its neighbors are guided by their own perceptions, interests and political constructions. No one in Moscow is obliged to accept these as the framework for dialogue.”
That’s true, as is what he later wrote about how “[Russia’s] interests all come down to one strategic task: ensuring the survival and development of the multi-ethnic Russian nation.” That’s why security takes precedence in its ties with Central Asia, he pointed out, perhaps with the innuendo that the same might soon be the case in its ties with the South Caucasus too. He’s thus far ignored TRIPP’s dual role as a NATO military logistics corridor along Russia’s southern periphery but maybe he’s finally opening his eyes.
Bordachev then ominously concluded that “no one should doubt that any decision taken by Russia’s top political leadership will be based solely on Russia’s current interests. Not on fraternal feelings and not on historical sentiment and not on traditional ties, because Russia owes nothing to anyone.” The entire piece is uncharacteristic of him and almost seems as if it’s written by a different person. This suggests that he might be belatedly recalibrating his views about southern-emanating threats from NATO.
Even if he and his peers don’t break what was described here as the “ultimate taboo” of talking about TRIPP due to its national security implications, they all might start looking at their southern neighbors through an even more hardline security prism. After all, if the usually nonchalant Bordachev could be provoked by events into such a fiery reaction, then his peers (most of whom aren’t nearly as optimistic as he ordinarily is about this subject) might soon adopt even harsher views that then influence policy.
