The announcement that France and Poland will hold regular nuclear drills aimed against Russia and Belarus, which follows France’s proposal to extend its nuclear umbrella eastward and Poland’s own declared nuclear ambitions, drew attention to Poland’s foreign policy strategies. While seemingly many, it really only has three: become a junior partner of the Franco–German Entente; become the US’ junior partner; or multi-align between both with an independent eastern policy.
The first strategy is being pursued by Tusk’s ruling liberal-globalist coalition. He dislikes Trump and thinks that Poland’s interests are best ensured through closer cooperation with Europe than with the US even if this policy comes at the expense of US ties. This has taken the form of Franco-Polish nuclear cooperation, Tusk’s alleged subservience to Germany per conservative opposition leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the revived Weimar Triangle, and Poland’s invitation to join the top tier of a “two-speed Europe”.
Kaczynski’s conservative opposition champions the exact opposite strategy of retaining rock-solid ties with the US even at the expense of EU ties. Whereas Tusk suspects that the US would abandon Poland in the political fantasy of war with Russia, Kaczynski believes that it’s France and Germany that would abandon it. By playing the role of the US’ top anti-Russian vanguard, including through pressure on its Belarusian ally, Kaczynski believes that Poland can guarantee US support in that scenario.
The final foreign policy strategy is from Poland’s populist-nationalist opposition, Confederation and Confederation of the Polish Crown, which is to multi-align between the EU and US while practicing an independent policy towards the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. France, Germany, and the US oppose this plan since they’d prefer to subordinate Poland. If these parties become the kingmakers after fall 2027’s next Sejm elections, however, then they might be able to implement some of this vision.
As regards Poland’s relations with Russia, the populist-nationalists’ plan is the most pragmatic and could even see Warsaw independently reach out to Moscow and Minsk to explore their own détente. The conservatives’ plan, however, would likely doom Poland to another intractable years-long rivalry with Russia with the attendant ever-present risk of spiraling out of control. The liberal-globalists’, meanwhile, could hypothetically see Poland repair ties with Russia to a degree if France and Germany do so first.
There are also implications for Ukraine too. In the order that they were mentioned above, the populist-nationalists are extremely critical of that country so relations would become very strained, albeit not as strained as Russian-Polish relations presently are. The conservatives became lukewarm towards Ukraine in recent years but could always pivot back to being Ukrainophiles on an anti-Russian pretext. The liberal-globalists are hardcore Ukrainophiles, however, and might eventually propose a confederation.
Polish foreign policy is formulated through collaboration between the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister, which are now respectively a conservative and two liberal-globalists since fall 2023. This explains the mixed signals coming out of Warsaw since then. If the conservatives enter into a coalition with the populist-nationalists after fall 2027’s next elections, then one of the latter might become Foreign Minister as part of the deal, thus moving Polish foreign policy closer to their direction.
