Putin unexpectedly signed a decree in mid-May simplifying citizenship procedures for residents of Transnistria, the breakaway region of Moldova that isn’t recognized as independent by anyone, not even Russia. It’s majority-Slavic population is pro-Russian, however, and Russia still has an estimated 1,000-1,500 troops there per a peacekeeping arrangement that was agreed to with Moldova in the 1990s. Transnistria usually only makes the news due to speculation of a Moldovan and/or Ukrainian attack.
It’s also sometimes referenced in the scenario of Moldova (re)joining Romania due to the unclear future political status of this majority-Slavic polity in which Russian troops are deployed if that happened. The uncertainty surrounding Transnistria’s future in general, whether as regards the Moldovan-Ukrainian invasion or Romanian merger scenarios, is why it’s considered a flashpoint. Suffice to say, Putin’s recent decree once again makes it the subject of speculation, ergo the need to discern his motives.
Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who’s been laser-focused since assuming office in late 2020 on incorporating her country into Euro-Atlantic institutions at the expense of its traditionally friendly relations with Russia, chalks it up as a mobilization tool for replenishing Russia’s armed forces. Zelensky ascribed the same motives to Putin but added that this might signal future Russian claims to that territory, the innuendo being that Russia could soon lay claim to Odessa and Nikolaev Regions too.
While some “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” might also expect that Russia will expand the scope of its territorial claims, especially when recalling Putin’s description of Odessa as a Russian city in late 2023, his motives might be altogether different. As was argued here in spring 2019 after Putin’s related decree at the time simplified citizenship procedures for Donbass’ residents, facilitating replacement migration, an anti-fascist exit strategy for the locals, and dealmaking with the US are more likely.
To explain, Russia’s population is naturally declining, which it hopes to reverse in part by encouraging replacement migration from civilizationally similar countries like Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. Transnistria would also be very difficult for Russia to defend in the scenario of a Moldovan and/or Ukrainian invasion, ergo the humanitarian interest that Moscow has in ensuring that its friendly people can easily relocate to Russia ahead of that possibility by simplifying citizenship procedures for them.
Finally, given the context of Russian-US talks for ending the Ukrainian Conflict with a view towards reforming the European security architecture, Russia might consider agreeing to Transnistria’s reintegration into Moldova as part of a larger deal due to the aforesaid challenges in defending it. In that event, members of Transnistria’s majority-Slavic population who fear the consequences of returning to Moldovan rule due to what some consider to be Sandu’s fascist tendencies can safely leave for Russia.
As is known, everything unfolded differently in Donbass, whose people all became Russian citizens after voting to join the country in September 2022 and therefore didn’t need any anti-fascist exit strategy nor was their polity ultimately returned to Ukraine as part of a grand Russian-US deal. Transnistria’s situation is incomparable with Donbass’, not least due to that polity’s physical separation from Russia making it much more difficult to defend, so it’s much more likely to be part of a deal than ever join Russia.
