Pakistan Railways Freight CEO Sufiyan Sarfaraz Dogar announced last week that the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service will launch on 15 March and transit across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. It’ll facilitate the export of Russian energy and industrial products to Pakistan and Pakistan’s export of agricultural ones and textiles to Russia according to reports. This has been a long time in the making and represents the latest milestone in their relations. Here are the top three takeaways:
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* Iran’s Irreplaceable Role In Their Expanded Trade Is A Double-Edged Sword
Next month’s plans show that Russia and Pakistan are prioritizing Iran over Afghanistan as the irreplaceable transit state for expanding their bilateral trade, which is sensible considering the continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions that’ll be touched upon next, but it also carries with it some risks. Trump already revived his first administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and is therefore expected to impose secondary sanctions against all companies that still trade with it without a waiver.
He’s so serious about this that he threatened to modify or rescind the waiver that his first administration extended to India so he’ll predictably come down harshly against Pakistan too. Therein lies the problem since Pakistan has proven in the past that it’ll comply with American sanctions against Iran, most infamously the one that’s obstructing their over-decade-long pipeline plans, so it might very well do the same during the US’ latest sanctions crackdown and therefore abandon this route for trade with Russia.
* Continued Pakistani-Taliban Tensions Impede The Most Direct Trade Route
Russian-Pakistani trade could be more effectively conducted in terms of cost and time by relying on Afghanistan as their irreplaceable transit state, but that’s not possible so long as Pakistani-Taliban tensions persist. In a nutshell, they boil down to the Taliban suspecting that Pakistan’s de facto military junta is secretly allied with the US against them, while Pakistan accuses them of backing Pashtun and Baloch terrorist groups (perhaps as an asymmetrical means of restoring the lopsided balance of power).
Although Russia is better positioned than anyone else to mediate between them, it hasn’t yet formally attempted this, nor might it ultimately succeed in resolving the security dilemma at the core of their disputes. That’s regrettable since remaining reliant on Iran carries with it the abovementioned risk that Pakistan capitulates to the US’ secondary sanctions pressure. The self-evident solution is to patch up their problems for the greater good of Eurasian connectivity but that’s a lot easier said than done.
* At Least The Will Exists On Both Sides To Expand Bilateral Trade Though
Ending everything on a positive note, it’s laudable that the will exists on both sides to expand bilateral trade in spite of the obstacles that were just described. Quite clearly, a faction/school of the Pakistani Establishment still veritably exists which is serious about diversifying from their country’s economic dependence on China and testing the limits of its traditional political dependence on the US, each by means of Russia. This suggests that the higher-ups are hedging their bets a bit on both.
From the Russian side, there’s a consensus on the need to comprehensively develop relations with non-traditional partners like Pakistan at this historic phase of the global systemic transition to multipolarity, though nobody should be under any illusions about this ever being done at India’s expense. The combined effect of the aforesaid imperatives is that the parties are sincerely attempting to make good on their economic agreements from last year in pursuit of their complementary interests as explained.
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The impending launch of the first Russian-Pakistani freight train service across Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is a big deal, but the obstacles posed by Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and continued Pakistani-Taliban tensions might limit bilateral trade. The best-case scenario would therefore be for Pakistan to defy the US on Iran, patch up its problems with the Taliban, and thus rely on two trade routes to Russia instead of just one, but that might be asking too much of its de facto military junta.
