Russian Ambassador to Argentina Dmitry Feoktistov shared some bad news about bilateral ties in mid-July. He told Izvestia that nuclear energy cooperation has been at a dead end since 2022 as a result of American sanctions despite them being imposed during the tenure of leftist-multipolar President Alberto Fernandez who casual observers might have expected to defy these unilateral restrictions. They were predictably continued by radically pro-US President Javier Milei after his rapid ascent to office in 2023.
“Moreover, the Milei government announced the privatization of the nuclear state-owned company Nucleoelectrica Argentina, joined the US nuclear program FIRST and signed a $1.2 billion contract with the American Meitner Energy for the construction of a small reactor ACR-300”, according to Izvestia. They also reached out to the Argentine Embassy, which told them that “Argentina is able to completely close its nuclear needs without outside help.” This basically nullifies Argentina’s contract with Rosatom.
Likewise, Feoktistov also confirmed that Russia was forced to shift its regional lithium focus from Argentina to neighboring Bolivia due to American sanctions, but Izvestia added that its back-up plan has been frozen since the new pro-US president decided to audit the project for what might be political reasons. They then quoted an expert who predicts “either expensive spot imports from Chile, China and Australia, or the urgent and costly development of its own deposits with complex geology.”
That same expert told them that “Domestic lithium mining projects (including the Kolmozerskoye deposit in the Murmansk Region and projects in Siberia) can only partially compensate for the shortage, as it will take 5-10 years from exploration to commercial production. In the coming years, these mines will not close the shortage of raw materials due to the need for large investments in processing.” This resource is required for military-industrial and electronic purposes, Izvestia added, thus making it highly strategic.
Putin lamented during his speech at February 2025’s “Future Technologies Forum” that “We still do not extract lithium. But how can we manage without it? This is self-evident to specialists. Yet we are capable of doing so. And we could have begun doing it 10–15 years ago.” Earlier this summer, so around 15 months later, “Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Outlined His Country’s Rare Earths Strategy”. He was vague but the preceding hyperlinked analysis notes that Russia requires foreign capital and technology.
These could be acquired from the US-led Quad in the scenario that a ceasefire in Ukraine is followed by at least phased sanctions relief for facilitating the West’s access to Russia’s related resources as a means of reducing that bloc’s disproportionate dependence on its systemic Chinese rival. To be sure, Russia can still likely develop its lithium and other rare earths mines without Western capital and technology, but it might be costlier (especially in terms of redirecting funds from other investments) and longer.
It was always risky for Russia to rely on states within the US’ traditional sphere of influence like Argentina for the critical minerals that its military-industrial complex requires when it has its own such deposits. That’s why Putin lamented that Russia should have developed them long ago. The opportunity cost of not having done so is huge but partially recoverable so long as Russia has the political will to finally do what’s needed and especially if it cuts a deal with the US for unlocking Western capital and technology.
