Raivo Paala- Cover Letter Accompanying the Third Request and Public Appeal

Dear Chancellor of Justice,

I am sending you my third request and public appeal on the same subject: the deliberately orchestrated campaign of fear during the COVID-19 crisis, the protection of fundamental rights, and the substantive fulfilment of the Chancellor of Justice’s constitutional and statutory functions and obligations.

You may ask why I am writing again when I have already contacted you twice about the same issue. Do I really naively hope that a third letter will achieve what the previous two have not? Or am I simply a compulsive serial disputant who does not know when to give up?

The answer is very simple.

I am writing because I do not want to become someone who has grown so accustomed to injustice and abuses of power apparent even to an ordinary citizen that they eventually regard them as normal. As an individual, I cannot determine how a public authority fulfils its obligations. As a citizen, however, I can ask whether a public official fulfils their constitutional obligations properly, performs them shoddily, or even takes nihilism to heights worthy of Priit Pärn: “Fuck it!”

For me, the issue is no longer solely what happened during the COVID-19 crisis. I also want to know whether constitutional safeguards and the protection of fundamental rights function when society is gripped not only by pervasive fear, but by a deliberately created totalitarian atmosphere—an atmosphere of terror—accompanied by public pressure and the expectation that everyone should think alike and behave like obedient party-loyal tin soldiers. The true value of fundamental rights protection becomes apparent when respecting those rights is inconvenient and defending them may conflict with a political or societal attitude that is plainly immoral and unethical even in the eyes of an ordinary Estonian.

I do not believe, nor do I expect, that repeatedly contacting the Chancellor of Justice will, in itself, change anything. I do believe, however, that in a state governed by the rule of law, a citizen must be able to ask reasoned questions and receive substantive, understandable answers that are comprehensive within the responding authority’s competence. If questions remain unanswered, or receive only formal or carelessly improvised responses, that does not make the questions disappear.

My aim is not to write endless letters or argue for argument’s sake. I want answers to questions that concern far more than my personal experiences, including degrading and dangerous experiences with public administration in the Republic of Estonia. I have actually been treated in a manner which the Supreme Court, in paragraph 70 of its order of 19 February 2014 in civil case No. 3-2-1-155-13, described as characteristic of a totalitarian society and unacceptable in a democratic state. I therefore know from personal experience how important it is for the exercise of state power to comply impeccably with the principles of the rule of law and fundamental rights.

In mechanics, play is a deviation from prescribed limits. If that play increases over time, it can damage the entire system. The same applies to the rule of law.

Were the public intimidation, pressure on individuals and restrictions on fundamental rights during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with the Constitution and Estonia’s international obligations? This question concerns society as a whole. It also concerns people who did not dare to express their reservations and doubts at the time, or who currently lack the knowledge, resources or strength to stand up for their rights.

Perhaps this appeal, too, will change nothing. But I do not consider the possibility of failure a sufficient reason to stop asking questions.

I cannot demand that an institution be infallible, but I can demand that a public official’s actions be reasoned, verifiable and consistent with the obligations entrusted to them.

Silence does not necessarily mean consent, but it may subsequently be interpreted that way. Nor do I accept the view that decisions made in a crisis release public authorities from the obligation to justify the lawfulness of their actions afterwards. Otherwise, an exceptional situation can become a pretext for burying accountability.

I therefore ask you to treat the enclosed request and public appeal not simply as yet another letter, but as an attempt to obtain clarity on matters concerning the constitutional order, human dignity, the protection of fundamental rights and the accountability of public authorities.

A state governed by the rule of law reveals its true character in whether it can treat a citizen respectfully even when that citizen does not agree with those in power with unquestioning loyalty and obedience, but instead asks uncomfortable questions and demands respect for their rights and dignity. A citizen’s dignity does not depend on their obedience to those in power.

Yours sincerely,

Raivo Aleksander Paala

SUPPLEMENTARY PUBLIC APPEAL TO THE CHANCELLOR OF JUSTICE

Subject: Protection of fundamental rights during the COVID-19 crisis, substantive fulfilment of the Chancellor of Justice’s functions, access to effective legal protection, and accountability of public authorities

Addressee: Chancellor of Justice of the Republic of Estonia

Related document: Letter No. 14-4/262241/2608640 of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, dated 16 October 2026 and signed by Kristel Lekko

Submitted by: Raivo Aleksander Paala

Date: 19 October 2026

1. Purpose of this supplementary public appeal

I am submitting this supplementary public appeal because the response of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice dated 16 October 2026 does not provide a substantive answer to whether people’s fundamental rights were protected comprehensively in Estonia during the COVID-19 crisis, or whether the Chancellor of Justice performed the functions entrusted to the office under the Constitution and international obligations with sufficient thoroughness.

I publicly maintain that the lawfulness of the measures implemented during the pandemic cannot be assessed solely by considering individual orders, decisions and restrictions in isolation. Their cumulative impact on people’s lives, health, employment, income, education, family relationships and practical ability to defend their rights must also be assessed. People did not experience the state’s actions as a series of separate legal instruments, but as a whole: whether they could go to work and access services, whether they felt pressure to be vaccinated, whether they retained their income, and whether they could defend their rights without unreasonable expense, time commitments and risks of adverse consequences.

This raises a fundamental question about the other legal remedies referred to by the Chancellor of Justice. Could a person genuinely and reasonably have been expected to challenge every individual measure in court or initiate proceedings against dozens of public authorities in order to obtain protection that took account of the combined effects of the restrictions? Such an approach acknowledges the formal possibility of challenging individual decisions, but disregards people’s actual circumstances: did they have the time, knowledge, strength and money to do so? The result may be a Kafkaesque process in which legal protection exists in law but remains inaccessible in practice.

The right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not mean merely a theoretical opportunity to lodge a complaint. The remedy must be accessible in practice, allow the substance of an alleged violation of a Convention right to be examined, and provide relief appropriate to the circumstances.

European Court of Human Rights guide: https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_13_eng

Where a situation falls within the scope of European Union law, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) must also be taken into account. National procedural rules must not render the exercise of rights conferred by EU law practically impossible or excessively difficult.

Explanation: https://e-justice.europa.eu/topics/your-rights/fundamental-rights/fundamental-rights-european-union/charter-tutorial/part-iii-scope-application-interpretation-and-effects-charter_en

It is therefore insufficient to respond that each individual decision could have been challenged separately. Where the state’s own measures affect a person from several directions at once, the entire burden of understanding and challenging their combined effects must not be left to that person alone. Good administration means more than merely referring to procedures laid down by law. It also means substantive consideration of the person’s circumstances and an obligation on public authorities to take account of the actual consequences of their decisions. Otherwise, the overall impact of the measures remains unassessed, raising a serious question as to whether the practical and effective protection of fundamental rights required by the Constitution has been ensured at all.

My aim is not to deny that people’s health had to be protected during the pandemic, or to claim that all restrictions imposed during the crisis were unlawful. I maintain that the necessity, proportionality and cumulative impact of the restrictions required substantive assessment, and that the state must not have left the responsibility for scrutinising its actions solely on individuals’ shoulders. Public authorities should not wait until individuals compel them, through the courts, to review their decisions.

Behind this issue lie not only legal disputes, but ordinary people and their lived experiences. During the COVID-19 crisis, tens of thousands of people felt pressured because of their convictions and choices, including their refusal to be vaccinated. Many felt that they were treated unfairly and excluded from participation in society. Their experiences, too, deserve to be heard and substantively assessed, rather than dismissed on the grounds that each person could have brought an individual court case.

Before taking office as President, Ülle Madise herself publicly raised questions concerning decisions made during the crisis, fundamental rights and public trust. When a person approached the institution headed by Chancellor of Justice Ülle Madise about those same problems, they had a legitimate expectation of receiving a substantive answer, rather than merely a reference to the possibility of challenging individual decisions. Such an approach would entail dozens of separate court proceedings and costs amounting to tens of thousands of euros, while still leaving the cumulative effects of different restrictions unassessed.

The response from the Office of the Chancellor of Justice also referred to a lack of competence. This raises a legitimate question: was it appropriate for Chancellor of Justice Ülle Madise to criticise other institutions when the institution she headed now itself invokes a lack of competence? As the saying goes, one sees the speck in another’s eye but fails to notice the beam in one’s own.

This is precisely where I see a serious problem. When a person approaches the state to defend their rights but receives a vague and empty letter that fails to address the substance of their questions, they inevitably feel that no one wants to listen. This not only undermines trust in the Chancellor of Justice, but also deepens people’s alienation from their own state.

That is why I am submitting this supplementary appeal publicly. I demand a clear answer: was there a substantive assessment during the COVID-19 crisis of the restrictions’ impact on people’s fundamental rights and of the cumulative effects of different measures? Does the Chancellor of Justice consider the office’s constitutional duty fulfilled even when a person is referred to the possibility of challenging individual decisions, while the broader problem they raised remains substantively unaddressed?

2. Functions and responsibilities of the Chancellor of Justice

The questions above concern more than whether individuals could challenge specific restrictions in court. They also concern the Chancellor of Justice’s own functions and responsibilities in protecting fundamental rights.

Under § 139 of the Constitution, the Chancellor of Justice is an independent official who reviews legislative instruments of the legislative and executive branches of state power and of local authorities for conformity with the Constitution and the laws. The Chancellor of Justice Act further specifies these functions.

The Chancellor of Justice’s role is not confined to reviewing the formal lawfulness of a particular legal instrument. The Chancellor also performs functions relating to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and, within the competence conferred by law, deals with petitions drawing attention to possible violations of the law.

Under § 19 of the Chancellor of Justice Act, the Chancellor may examine petitions concerning respect for individuals’ constitutional rights and freedoms. Under § 1(10) of the same Act, the Chancellor also performs the functions of a national human rights institution.

This latter function must be understood in accordance with the Paris Principles concerning the status and functioning of national human rights institutions, adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. Central to those principles are the protection and promotion of human rights, institutional independence and the actual capacity to fulfil the institution’s functions.

I request an explanation of whether the Chancellor of Justice’s activities during and after the COVID-19 crisis fulfilled the substantive purpose of these functions. Was the focus confined to specific contested decisions, or were systemic problems in the protection of fundamental rights also assessed, including the cumulative impact of different restrictions on individuals?

I do not claim that the role of a national human rights institution obliges the Chancellor of Justice to initiate separate proceedings on every societal problem or grants the office unlimited competence. However, referring to the limits of competence does not replace a substantive explanation of what the Chancellor could have done to fulfil those functions, what was actually done, and why the chosen approach was considered sufficient. It is precisely this question that the Chancellor must answer with reasons.

3. The combined effects of restrictions and individuals’ actual freedom of choice

During the COVID-19 crisis, restrictions and conditions were imposed in different areas that affected people’s ability to work, pursue education, attend public events, access services and interact with others. These restrictions did not affect everyone equally, but their cumulative effects could substantially restrict people’s rights and their ability to manage everyday life.

I maintain that the lawfulness of the measures cannot be assessed by considering them one by one, separately from their actual effects. A restriction that might have appeared moderate in isolation could, in combination with other restrictions, alter a person’s life so significantly that their opportunities to work, earn an income, study and participate in society were substantially reduced.

The question of whether vaccination was voluntary is particularly acute. Neither signed consent nor a formal opportunity to refuse vaccination proves, in itself, that a person’s choice was genuinely free. If a person had to choose between vaccination and their job, income, education or access to essential services, the actual consequences of refusal must also be assessed. An assessment of freedom of choice cannot disregard pressure, a person’s economic dependence, or whether they had any reasonable alternative at all.

This does not mean that every vaccination requirement or pandemic restriction was automatically unlawful. It means that the necessity, suitability and proportionality of the measures had to be assessed in light of the actual circumstances and their combined effects, rather than relying on the formal justification that a person could refuse or challenge the restriction.

Please explain whether the Chancellor of Justice assessed the cumulative impact of COVID-19 measures on people’s fundamental rights, and whether the assessment of voluntary vaccination and actual freedom of choice also took into account consequences relating to employment, income, education and participation in society.

4. Individual disputes do not answer a systemic question

The response from the Office of the Chancellor of Justice refers to the existence of legal remedies and the limits of the Chancellor’s proceedings. I understand that the Chancellor does not replace the courts and cannot assume the functions of other public authorities or courts.

However, two fundamentally different questions must be distinguished: whether a person could challenge a specific decision concerning them, and whether the state assessed the broader impact of pandemic measures on fundamental rights and ensured their conformity with the Constitution.

I maintain that a person’s ability to challenge an individual decision does not prove that the state protected people’s fundamental rights systematically and effectively. An individual dispute does not, in itself, answer whether the combined effects of different measures were necessary, proportionate and lawful.

A person may have refrained from challenging a decision because they lacked the money and knowledge needed to obtain legal assistance, feared losing their job or income, or saw no realistic prospect of achieving a fair outcome. In some cases, only a specific measure could be challenged, while the person’s actual circumstances were affected by dozens of interconnected restrictions.

It therefore cannot automatically be inferred from an individual’s failure to use an available remedy that the protection of fundamental rights was adequate or that no systemic problem existed. Such an inference would disregard both people’s practical ability to bring proceedings and the question of whether the cumulative impact of the measures was assessed at all.

The application of § 25(3)(4) of the Chancellor of Justice Act, cited by the Office, therefore requires a specific and substantive explanation: how was the availability of other legal remedies assessed in circumstances where the appeal raised a potentially systemic fundamental rights issue?

I am not demanding that the Chancellor initiate proceedings on every petition or replace court proceedings. I demand an explanation of why referring to the possibility of individual disputes was considered sufficient when the question raised concerned a much broader problem: whether the state assessed the combined effects of crisis measures and whether people’s fundamental rights were protected in practice.

5. Effective legal protection and its practical accessibility

Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the right to an effective remedy where a person’s rights and freedoms protected by the Convention have been violated. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the mere formal existence of a remedy is insufficient: it must also be effective in practice, taking account of the circumstances.

European Court of Human Rights guide to Article 13 of the Convention: https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_13_eng-pdf

Effective legal protection means more than the law providing an opportunity to bring a case before a court. It also matters whether a person can actually defend their rights, whether their complaint can be examined on its merits, and whether appropriate relief can be obtained where necessary.

Practical access to legal protection is affected, among other things, by the cost and duration of proceedings, the burden of proof, access to legal assistance and the person’s financial circumstances. These factors do not, in themselves, prove that legal protection was ineffective in a particular case, but they cannot be disregarded when assessing whether a person had a genuine opportunity to defend their rights.

According to Statistics Estonia, 263,200 people, or 19.5% of the population, lived at risk of poverty in 2024. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a one-person household was €858 per month. These figures were published in a Statistics Estonia news release on 6 November 2025, corrected on 11 March 2026.

Source: https://www.stat.ee/et/uudised/suhteline-vaesus-eestis-vahenenud-absoluutne-vaesus-suurenenud

The at-risk-of-poverty indicator does not prove that all these people were unable to bring court proceedings. It does, however, show that the financial circumstances of a significant proportion of the population may have limited their ability to bear the costs and risks associated with legal disputes. Where a person’s income is essential to their everyday subsistence and their family’s well-being, expensive and lengthy litigation may be effectively inaccessible.

The effectiveness of legal protection therefore cannot be assessed solely by reference to the opportunities provided by law, without taking account of people’s actual ability to use them.

Please explain whether, when examining COVID-19 measures and their consequences, the Chancellor of Justice also assessed whether legal protection was genuinely accessible to people whose employment, income or financial security had deteriorated because of the restrictions.

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be invoked within the scope of EU law. I do not claim that the Charter automatically applies to every domestic COVID-19 measure. Please explain whether, and to what extent, the measures in question fell within the scope of EU law, and what requirements for effective legal protection followed from this.

6. Procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, access to public information and the possible influence of economic interests

The procurement of COVID-19 vaccines was of exceptional social and financial importance. It is therefore reasonable to ask how procurement needs were assessed, on what terms contracts were concluded, how responsibility was allocated, and what information was available to the public.

According to the European Commission, contracts were concluded with eight vaccine manufacturers, securing the possibility of procuring up to 4.2 billion doses. The Commission’s report COM(2024) 206 final of 22 May 2024 states that 4.6 billion doses were secured for Europe and partner countries. According to the European Court of Auditors’ 2022 special report, between August 2020 and November 2021 the Commission concluded 11 contracts with eight manufacturers, securing access to up to 4.6 billion doses. The estimated total value of the contracts was almost €71 billion.

Sources:

• European Commission, Safe COVID-19 vaccines for Europeans: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans_en
• European Commission, report COM(2024) 206 final: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/98c6e4dc-0fc3-4ec6-8ec2-bfcdcb2f018a_en?filename=policy_com-2024-206_en.pdf
• European Court of Auditors, Special Report 19/2022: https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/covid19-vaccines-19-2022/en/

These figures must not be added together or treated as two separate procurement volumes. A distinction must also be drawn between the potential volume secured under the contracts and the doses actually ordered, delivered and used. Yet even with that distinction in mind, a question remains to which the public deserves a clear answer: why was it considered necessary to secure such a large quantity of vaccines, amounting to approximately ten doses for every European Union resident?

For many people, this volume was difficult to understand and legitimately open to question. Particular concerns arose because important contractual terms, including prices and details relating to liability, were not fully available to the public. The European Commission has justified partial confidentiality by referring to the protection of trade secrets and commercially sensitive information. That explanation does not, however, remove the need to examine whether everything necessary was done to ensure transparency in the use of public funds, contractual obligations and decision-makers’ accountability.

Nor can it be overlooked that, in October 2022, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) confirmed an ongoing investigation into the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines. On 17 May 2024, the EPPO stated that the investigation was continuing, but that it could not disclose further details in order to protect it. The existence of the investigation makes it even more important to ask whether the exceptionally large procurements, their terms and the decision-making process were sufficiently transparent and subject to independent scrutiny.

Source: European Public Prosecutor’s Office, statement of 17 May 2024 on the investigation into the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines: https://www.eppo.europa.eu/media/news/investigation-acquisition-covid-19-vaccines-clarifications-2024-05-17_en

I maintain that, in these circumstances, it was also reasonable to ask whether vaccination policy was shaped solely by public health objectives, or whether the economic interests of pharmaceutical companies, intermediaries or other interest groups might also have influenced decisions. Where, on the one hand, substantial pressure was placed on people to be vaccinated and, on the other, contracts worth billions of euros were concluded with important terms withheld from the public, it was entirely legitimate to demand that decision-makers explain how undue influence by private interests on public policymaking was prevented.

I do not claim that vaccination policy has been proven to have been driven by pharmaceutical companies’ pursuit of profit. I maintain that the procurement volume, limited contractual transparency, scale of public expenditure and ongoing criminal investigation provide sufficient grounds to demand substantive and independent examination of this issue.

Suspicions of possible self-interest and its criminal influence must not be left unexamined, particularly when people’s fundamental rights and billions of euros in public funds are at stake.

This also raises an important question for the protection of fundamental rights: when encouraging vaccination and imposing vaccination-related restrictions, was sufficient consideration given to whether the measures were driven by independently substantiated public health needs, or whether other interests, including economic interests, might have played a role in shaping them? A public health objective does not release the state from its obligation to ensure that decisions are justified, transparent and proportionate.

My question to the Chancellor of Justice is whether, within the office’s competence, issues relating to the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, disclosure of contractual terms and development of vaccination policy were assessed from the perspective of protecting people’s fundamental rights. Was it assessed whether the public had been given sufficient information about the justification for decisions, possible conflicts of interest, contractual obligations and the use of public funds?

Please also explain which questions relating to procurement, performance of contracts and vaccination policy fell within the competence of Estonian public authorities, and which fell within that of European Union institutions. The division of competence must not become a reason for leaving matters of public interest substantively unaddressed.

7. Health problems arising after vaccination and the state’s obligation to address concerns

In relation to health problems arising after vaccination, a distinction must be drawn between a temporal association and a proven causal relationship. The fact that a health problem occurred after vaccination does not, by itself, prove that the vaccine caused it. At the same time, it is not justified to dismiss health problems reported by individuals solely because a causal relationship has not initially been established.

From the perspective of fundamental rights protection, the relevant questions are whether people could have their health concerns properly investigated, whether they were given understandable information, and whether clear and practically accessible procedures existed in cases of possible vaccine injury.

Please explain whether the Chancellor of Justice assessed whether issues concerning possible health injuries arising after vaccination were handled in a way that ensured reasoned answers, impartial consideration and, where necessary, effective legal protection.

I am not asking the Chancellor of Justice to replace doctors or make medical assessments of causation beyond the office’s competence. The question is whether the system organised by the state allowed people’s concerns to be investigated substantively and whether the responsible authorities fulfilled their obligations.

8. Post-crisis assessment and public authorities’ willingness to scrutinise their own actions

The assessment of decisions made during a crisis does not lose its importance once the emergency has passed. Retrospective assessment helps clarify which measures were necessary, which may have been disproportionate, which consequences received insufficient attention, and what should be done differently in a future crisis.

The response of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice dated 16 October 2026 does not indicate that these questions were addressed in a separate systemic analysis following the COVID-19 crisis or in proceedings initiated on the Chancellor’s own initiative. Please explain whether such an analysis or proceedings have taken place and, if not, on what legal and substantive grounds their initiation was considered unnecessary.

I maintain that public authorities’ accountability is not limited to defending decisions made during a crisis. In a state governed by the rule of law, it must also be possible to assess whether decisions were justified, whether their effects on different groups were considered, and whether lessons were drawn from problems that emerged later.

Such an assessment does not presuppose a finding that the state or any authority acted unlawfully. It requires a willingness to scrutinise decisions critically, consider contrary evidence and give reasons for conclusions.

If the Chancellor of Justice considered further examination of these matters unnecessary or outside the office’s competence, please explain the specific legal and substantive reasons for that decision and how it was ensured that systemic fundamental rights problems did not fall through the gaps between individual proceedings.

9. Restriction on access to the Office of the Chancellor of Justice’s letter of 16 October 2026

Letter No. 14-4/262241/2608640 of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, dated 16 October 2026, has been designated for internal use, with the access restriction stated to expire on 16 October 2101. The letter cites § 23(8) of the Chancellor of Justice Act and § 35(1)(12) and (19) of the Public Information Act as the grounds for the restriction.

Under § 40(3) of the Public Information Act, information containing personal data that has been designated for internal use is generally subject to an access restriction for 75 years from its receipt or documentation. The stated expiry date therefore corresponds to a 75-year period.

However, the fact that the duration corresponds to the statutory period does not, in itself, establish that restricting access to the entire letter was necessary and lawful. A separate assessment is required of whether the legal conditions for imposing the restriction were met and whether it was necessary for the entire document or only particular parts of it.

Please therefore explain which specific personal data or other legally protected information necessitated the access restriction, how the application of the cited legal provisions was justified, and why the entire letter was made subject to the restriction.

Please also explain whether consideration was given to the option under § 38(2) of the Public Information Act of allowing access to the parts of the document not covered by the restriction, while redacting only the protected information.

My question is therefore not limited to the duration of the restriction. I demand an explanation of why restricting disclosure of the entire letter was considered necessary and whether a less restrictive solution was considered that would protect legally protected information while allowing access to information concerning the actions of public authorities.

10. Questions to the Chancellor of Justice

In light of the above, please provide substantive answers to the following questions, where possible addressing each question separately and referring to the relevant documents and proceedings.

1. Did the Chancellor of Justice assess the combined effects of the measures implemented during the COVID-19 crisis on people’s fundamental rights, including their effects on employment, income, education, access to services and participation in society? If so, on the basis of which documents or proceedings, and what conclusions were reached?
2. Was the reality of freedom of choice concerning vaccination assessed, including situations in which remaining unvaccinated could have employment-related, financial or other significant consequences? If it was not assessed, why not?
3. How was reliance on the existence of other legal remedies justified in circumstances where the questions I raised concerned not only individual decisions but also possible systemic problems in the protection of fundamental rights? How was it assessed whether individuals’ ability to use legal remedies was, in practice, sufficient to address systemic problems?
4. Was practical access to legal protection assessed for people whose financial circumstances may have limited their ability to bring court proceedings or bear procedural costs? If this issue was not assessed, or if the Chancellor considered it outside the office’s competence, please explain the legal and substantive reasons.
5. Did the Chancellor of Justice address, within the office’s competence, public-interest questions concerning the procurement and use of COVID-19 vaccines, including the justification for procurement volumes, transparency of contractual terms, allocation of liability, adequacy of information provided to the public, and the possible influence of economic interests on decision-making? If these questions were not addressed, why not, and on what legal grounds?
6. Was it assessed whether effective procedures existed to investigate and resolve concerns about possible health injuries arising after vaccination, and whether individuals could obtain understandable information and, where necessary, legal protection? If this was not assessed, why not?
7. Has the Chancellor of Justice retrospectively assessed the office’s own activities and the arrangements for protecting fundamental rights during the COVID-19 crisis? If no separate assessment or own-initiative proceedings have taken place, please explain why these were considered unnecessary and how critical scrutiny of activities during the crisis and their consequences was ensured.
8. What specific information and legal considerations justified the restriction on access to letter No. 14-4/262241/2608640 of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, dated 16 October 2026? Why was the restriction applied to the entire letter, and was partial disclosure considered, with only legally protected information redacted?
9. How does the Chancellor of Justice ensure the substantive and independent fulfilment of the functions assigned to the office as a national human rights institution under the Chancellor of Justice Act, including where questions concern far-reaching state decisions and their potential impact on the fundamental rights of large numbers of people? How were the Paris Principles adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/134 taken into account in fulfilling these functions?

Judicial review of the Chancellor of Justice’s positions and the right to apply to the Supreme Court

The responses sent to me by the Office of the Chancellor of Justice do not explain whether they constitute a final position in the proceedings or what legal remedies are available to me in respect of such a response. I therefore request clarification of the response’s legal significance and of whether, and to what extent, it is possible to challenge a decision not to address the substance of the questions, a refusal to continue proceedings, or possible violations committed in the course of the proceedings.

Under § 35¹(3) of the Chancellor of Justice Act, the position issued at the conclusion of the Chancellor’s proceedings is final and cannot be challenged in court. This does not, however, automatically mean that all procedural decisions of the Office or possible violations relating to the conduct of proceedings fall outside judicial review.

This raises a fundamental question: what can a person actually challenge if they disagree with the Chancellor of Justice’s substantive position or consider that the fundamental rights issues they raised were not substantively addressed? If the substantive position cannot be challenged in court, how can a person obtain independent scrutiny of whether their appeal was handled properly and whether the Chancellor fulfilled the functions assigned by law?

I do not claim that every position taken by the Chancellor of Justice must be open to challenge in court. I maintain that the practical operation of legal protection cannot be assessed solely by whether a person has been informed of procedural rules. It also matters whether they can obtain real and effective assistance in protecting their fundamental rights.

This gives rise to a further constitutional question: if the Chancellor’s substantive position cannot be challenged in court and a person also lacks a practical opportunity to lodge an individual complaint directly with the Supreme Court to defend their fundamental rights, who reviews, and through what procedure, whether the system established to protect fundamental rights is itself compatible with the Constitution?

I ask the Chancellor of Justice to assess whether the restriction laid down in § 35¹(3) of the Chancellor of Justice Act is consistent with the Constitution also in circumstances where a person considers that important questions raised in defence of their fundamental rights were not substantively addressed and they have no other effective means of obtaining review. Please explain the constitutional provisions and principles on which the Chancellor’s assessment is based.

If the Chancellor considers that this provision may be unconstitutional, I ask the Chancellor to consider applying to the Supreme Court under the Constitutional Review Court Procedure Act to review the constitutionality of the provision in question.

I also request an assessment of whether Estonia’s legal system should provide a clearer and more effective opportunity to lodge an individual complaint where a person makes a substantiated allegation of a violation of their fundamental rights, ordinary remedies are unavailable or do not permit substantive scrutiny of the violation, and the question concerns particularly important public interests or the fundamental rights of a large number of people.

For example, a problem may arise where a state measure, or the absence of an opportunity to review its lawfulness, affects the lives, health or other fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of people, yet an individual has no practical opportunity to seek constitutional review without initiating costly court proceedings and bearing the associated expenses.

It is beyond reasonable doubt that people living in poverty, too, need and have a legitimate expectation of protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. According to Statistics Estonia, approximately 263,200 people, or 19.5% of the population, lived at risk of poverty in Estonia in 2024. Among them are certainly people whose income is spent almost entirely on basic needs such as food, housing, heating and medicines. In such circumstances, even a remedy provided by law may remain inaccessible in practice if a person lacks the means to cover the costs of legal assistance and court proceedings.

That is precisely why the constitutionally established institution of the Chancellor of Justice is important: its functions include both protecting individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms and reviewing legal instruments for conformity with the Constitution and the laws. The Chancellor’s role is particularly important where people lack the resources or practical ability to bring court proceedings to defend their rights.

A person’s right to protection must not become merely illusory because they cannot afford the costly steps needed to defend their rights.

In such a situation, substantive assessment of a systemic problem must not depend solely on whether each individual can initiate separate litigation or whether a competent institution decides to take up the matter.

I understand that, under existing law, the Chancellor of Justice cannot independently create a new right to lodge an individual complaint. I nevertheless request an assessment of whether the current arrangements guarantee the constitutional right to effective legal protection and whether a legislative amendment should be initiated, or a corresponding proposal made to the Riigikogu, to remedy any shortcomings.

Injustice cannot give rise to justice. The principle of the rule of law requires that the arrangements for legal protection themselves comply with the Constitution and the objectives of fundamental rights protection. Finality should not become a reason for leaving a substantiated allegation of a fundamental rights violation without any substantive scrutiny.

The central question of my appeal is whether the protection of people’s fundamental rights was assessed sufficiently comprehensively during and after the COVID-19 crisis, and whether the Chancellor of Justice used the powers entrusted to the office substantively and with proper justification to protect those rights.

I maintain that the formal legality of a specific measure, an individual’s ability to challenge a decision, and the delineation of the Chancellor of Justice’s competence do not automatically answer whether people’s fundamental rights were protected when the actual combined effects of different measures are taken into account.

People who experienced job loss, economic pressure, exclusion from participation in society or health problems during the crisis must be able to obtain an understandable answer as to whether their rights were protected, how possible violations were assessed, and which authorities were responsible for fulfilling their duties.

The Chancellor of Justice need not replace the courts, doctors or other public authorities. However, within the office’s competence, the Chancellor must explain how the fundamental rights questions submitted were addressed, why the chosen approach was considered sufficient, and whether possible systemic problems received a substantive assessment.

Please answer the questions specifically, identify the relevant legal grounds and, where possible, refer to the documents and proceedings on which the answers are based. If answering a particular question falls outside the Chancellor’s competence, please identify the relevant legal basis and explain the limits of that competence.

The purpose of this appeal is to obtain a substantive and verifiable response concerning the actions of public authorities and the protection of fundamental rights in matters that affected many people and whose consequences did not disappear when the most acute phase of the pandemic ended.

Yours sincerely,

Raivo Aleksander Paala