Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko just announced that “Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] and I agreed that Gazprom will join us in implementing the project to build a nitrogen plant. We should offer it to the Americans. They want fertilizers, including nitrogen ones, so let us build it together. Using your technology. You [the USA], Gazprom and Belarus. We have already selected a site, with all necessary networks in place. If not, we will build it with Gazprom and the Russians and sell the finished product.”
His proposal follows Trump’s announcement from the week prior that “The United States is working on a massive Deal with respect to the purchase of Potash from Belarus. The pricing would be for substantially less than we are currently paying to Canada, very good news for our Farmers and Ranchers.” It also fell on the same day as The Atlantic’s report that Trump authorized his Special Envoy to Belarus to replicate this arrangement with Russia whereby “massive deals” would follow the release of “political prisoners”.
Lukashenko’s trilateral Belarusian-Russian-US fertilizer plant proposal would require Trump to lift his country’s sanctions on Gazprom, however, but this could be done in exchange for Putin releasing some “political prisoners” per the Belarusian model that he seeks to replicate with Russia. If the US participates in the plant’s construction, which Trump is likely interested in given the importance that he ascribed to the Belarusian fertilizer deal, then other joint projects with Russia might soon follow.
In that event, a change in European policy towards Belarus could soon follow as well in order for the bloc not to fall too far behind events, with Poland leading the way through its “snowdrop diplomacy” that it surprisingly commenced last week after their foreign ministers met for the first time in a decade. Radek Sikorski revealed shortly thereafter that “meetings are also taking place with other ministries and at other levels”. His disclosure raises the odds of a game-changing diplomatic breakthrough by early 2027.
The EU will consider extending its sanctions on Belarus on 28 February, and since it only takes one country’s veto for them to end, Poland might play that role in order to profit from their improved ties. At the very least, it might demand that certain sanctions be lifted in exchange for extending others, but the commencement of “snowdrop diplomacy” means that this scenario is no longer a political fantasy. “Belarus Has More To Offer Poland Than Ukraine Does”, and by the looks of it, Poland finally realizes this.
Any meaningful change in EU policy towards Belarus, such as the partial lifting of sanctions at Poland’s request following the US’ lead, could then result in the same with Russia with time. Poland could lead the way in this respect too. As was suggested here and here, mutual de-escalation moves along the Polish-Belarusian border could lay the basis for similar such moves elsewhere along NATO’s Eastern Flank, and a crisis-control channel between the Polish, Russian, and US leaders could keep the peace.
Lukashenko’s trilateral Belarusian-Russian-US fertilizer plant proposal is therefore a genius move because it could set into motion this fast-moving sequence of events for de-escalating New Cold War tensions provided that Trump agrees to participate in this project as expected. Even if he doesn’t, then this proposal still proves Lukashenko’s interest in facilitating such an outcome by having Belarus serve as a bridge between East and West, the role of which he’ll likely continue to pursue for the sake of peace.
