The Times of India cited sources to report in late 2025 that Defense Minister Rajnath Singh received verbal confirmation from his Russian counterpart Andrey Belousov during Putin’s summit with Modi in December that Moscow will allow Delhi to sell jointly produced BrahMos supersonic missiles to Indonesia and Vietnam. They’re now supposedly just waiting on the formal no-objection certificate before going through with what’s estimated to be $450 million worth of total sales to those two.
In that event, they’ll follow the Philippines in purchasing these state-of-the-art missiles that India credits with the victory that it claimed over Pakistan during last spring’s clashes, but it’s still possible that the US might threaten secondary sanctions against them to impede these deals. After all, 2017’s “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (CAATSA) still remains in effect, and it’s been used against Turkiye after its purchase of Russia’s S-400s (that it now reportedly seeks to return and receive a refund).
It was argued a year ago in January 2025 that “Trump Should Let Indonesia Purchase Jointly Russian-Indian Produced BrahMos Missiles” since this would lead to Russia and India playing an indirect role in managing China’s rise in Southeast Asia in alignment with American interests. The strategic logic was explained a year prior to that in January 2023 here with regard to why Russia let India export BrahMos missiles to the Philippines, a “Major Non-NATO Ally” that’s in a serious territorial dispute with China.
Over the past year, Indo-US ties deteriorated then improved, while Russian-US talks on Ukraine have yet to result in a deal. The first trend incentivizes the US to ignore its own CAATSA sanctions if these deals go through while the second disincentivizes it. That being said, eschewing CAATSA sanctions threats could further improve ties with India as well as be seen as a goodwill gesture by Russia for advancing their talks, so the case can be made that US interests would be best advanced through these means.
The argument in favor of the US threatening CAATSA sanctions to scupper these deals is that the targeted states might then pivot towards purchasing analogous American arms, but the opportunity cost is losing the chance for Russia and India to jointly manage China’s rise in Southeast Asia. Objectively speaking, the US gains more by letting those two carry out the aforesaid task that’s also in its own interests than obstructing this, but the military-industrial complex’s interests might still win out.
While it’s too early to predict what’ll happen, the reports about Indonesia’s and Vietnam’s interest aren’t anything new, which speaks to their leadership’s assessment that these arms are best suited for ensuring their national security interests (vis-à-vis China). In turn, it can be intuited that this is due to their quality as well as the political advantage of relying on Russia and India for meeting these needs instead of the US, which can reduce China’s threat assessment of them after they obtain these supersonic capabilities.
All in all, the latest news represents an opportunity for the US to improve relations with India and Russia, but only if its objective national interests supercede the military-industrial complex’s ones. That can’t be taken for granted, however, hence why it’s possible that it’ll threaten CAATSA sanctions to scupper these reportedly planned deals. There should be more clarity in the next couple of months, in which case a follow-up analysis might be published if these deals are confirmed and the US doesn’t obstruct them.
