Le Figaro reported in early April that French military cartographers carried out 3D mapping of Romania’s “Focsani Gate” near that country’s trijunction with Moldova and Ukraine. The pretext was ostensibly to bolster the host country’s defenses in the scenario that Russian forces in Ukraine ever approach this region and subsequently prepare to invade NATO’s southeastern flank. The current context suggests that France might have ulterior motives, however, considering its talk about intervening in Ukraine.
Updated knowledge of the “Focsani Gate” could enable French forces in Romania to swiftly advance towards the Ukrainian ports of Reni and Izmail on the Danube River if the decision is made to formally involve Paris in the conflict. Kiev officially employs those ports for exporting grain, but they’re also suspected of being entry points for Western arms, hence their dual importance. Their other significance is lying on the route to Odessa, which France will likely seek to secure if it intervenes in Ukraine.
All three would therefore likely figure into France’s immediate military-strategic goals if it formally involves itself in the conflict, thus explaining the need for positioning its forces in Romania and especially 3D mapping the “Focsani Gate” for the ulterior purpose of facilitating this scenario. To be clear, France might not go through with an intervention since Russia said that it’ll target all foreign forces in Ukraine and the US said that it won’t extent Article 5 defense guarantees to NATO countries’ troops there.
Nevertheless, it’s worth being aware of the attention that France is paying to tactical details like the local terrain near the Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian trijunction, which suggests that its talk about an intervention in Ukraine is more serious than some think. With these possible motives in mind, it can be concluded that France envisages Romania but also Moldova falling within its “sphere of influence” potentially together with the historical Budjak region of what’s nowadays southwestern Ukraine.
These plans, regardless of whether or not they unfold, are part of France’s competition for leadership of post-conflict Europe that was analyzed here. The gist is that this portion of Southeastern Europe is more likely to remain within France’s “sphere of influence” than anywhere else in the continent due to its military presence in Romania and last spring’s defense pact with Moldova. Although very poor, these two fraternal countries occupy strategic locations that can elevate France’s role in post-conflict Europe.
They essentially serve as NATO’s gateway to Odessa and Transnistria, and if France establishes itself as the main foreign force there, then it can have a decisive say in any such future operations. Furthermore, France might even make its rotational military presence in Romania a permanent one along the lines of the newly opened German base in Lithuania, thus meaning that no return to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act like Putin wants would be possible without both Berlin and Paris’ agreement.
It’s premature to predict that France will do so, but such a scenario can’t be ruled out either since it would align with Paris’ Great Power goals. After all, these new 3D maps weren’t produced just for the sake of it or as a favor to Romania, but to facilitate a French intervention into Ukraine. Even if one isn’t forthcoming, France could entrench its forces in Romania by one day opening a permanent base, which could enable it to retain this option for the future and give it military-diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis Russia.
