Estonia’s e-voting system, once a model of digital democracy, now faces critical issues affecting its technical security and constitutional compliance. This analysis draws on expert assessments and legal documents, highlighting the crucial need for transparency in the electoral process.
🫵 **Constitutional Issue: The One-Day Rule**
The Estonian Constitution § 60 mandates that elections be held daily. However, the e-voting system allows voting over several days, which directly violates this constitutional provision. This creates a constitutional conflict that the Supreme Court has yet to address.
🫵 **Technical Security Problems**
👉 **Expert Criticism:**
International experts highlight significant security vulnerabilities:
1. System obsolescence: The system is outdated.
2. Manipulation risks: Experts were alarmed by the ease of altering e-voting results.
3. Voter computer threats: E-voters’ devices can be easily compromised.
👉 **IT Expert Evaluations:**
IT expert Kalevi Koplik noted systemic flaws:
1. Inadequate oversight due to lack of the “multiple eyes” rule.
2. Concerns over the security of root certificates.
3. Ambiguities regarding test user exclusions from voter lists.
4. Unverifiable software during elections.
5. Opaque system architecture without proper documentation.
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🫵 Lack of Transparency and Auditing
👉 Limited Role of Auditors
Märt Põder’s documentation indicates that auditors have restricted roles, only being present during procedures, with no software audits.
👉 Observer Restrictions
A joint statement from observers of the 2023 elections noted:
– Inability to observe devices and data flows in e-voting.
– Lack of access to actual IT processes during e-voting.
– Data carrier preparation, server backups, and log creation were not observed.
🫵 Smartmatic and Venezuela Connection
👉 Joint Venture
Smartmatic-Cybernetica Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting OĂś was established in 2014, with Smartmatic holding 60% and Cybernetica 40%. Despite claims that Smartmatic had no role in Estonia’s voting app, the connection raises concerns.
👉 Geopolitical Context
Smartmatic originated from Venezuela and is linked to Hugo Chávez’s system and has faced international rejection. Despite claims that Smartmatic had no role in Estonia’s voting app, the connection raises concerns about potential influence on Estonia’s e-voting system reliability.
🫵 Netherlands’ Experience
In the late 1990s, up to 90% of Dutch voters used DRE voting machines. However, due to security and transparency concerns, NEDAP machines were phased out, and e-voting ended in 2009. This experience serves as a cautionary tale for Estonia’s e-voting system.
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🫵 Experiences in Other Countries
👉 Norway: Tested e-voting but abandoned it, as it did not boost turnout and could undermine trust.
👉 Switzerland: Abandoned due to security concerns.
👉 Germany: Declared e-voting unconstitutional for lacking transparency.
This trend shows that developed democracies are rejecting e-voting systems.
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**Cybernetica’s Dual Role**
Cybernetica AS is connected to Estonia’s defense industry and has been involved in national security since 2009, receiving “Defender Supporter” status in 2023 and 2024. This role of managing elections alongside defense raises integrity concerns, highlighting the need for honest and secure solutions.
**Supreme Court Decision: System Deficiencies**
In 2025, the Supreme Court addressed Märt Põder’s complaint about e-voting result verification, revealing key flaws:
– E-voting results cannot be verified post-election.
– The election commission is not required to recount or validate results.
– E-vote hard drives will soon be destroyed without checks.
**”Broken Election Clock” Incident**
Märt Põder accused election service director Arne Koitmäe of making misleading claims about spot checks. Notably, these claims were supported by Ago Samoson and Tarvo Treier, yet Koitmäe never provided evidence of the checks.
**Supreme Court Ruling Implications**
The ruling indicates that the e-voting system fails to meet constitutional standards, citing a lack of transparency and legal remedies. Justice Vahur-Peeter Liin’s dissent likely offers an even stronger critique.
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👉 **Paradoxical Situation**
The Supreme Court acknowledges that the e-voting system is flawed yet permits its continued use, creating a contradiction: “The system is inadequate, but carry on!”
🫵 **CRITICAL ISSUE: Irreversible Data Destruction**
E-vote data is permanently destroyed after elections, eliminating any chance for future verification. As Märt Põder stated, “Hard drives with e-votes will be destroyed, and we’ll never know if they were counted correctly.”
👉 **Practical Implications:**
– Past e-votes are already gone.
– No audits can occur.
– Errors or manipulations are lost forever.
– Future audits can’t confirm results.
👉 **Comparison to Traditional Voting**
Unlike paper ballots, which can be audited later, e-voting leads to immediate and irreversible data loss.
👉 **Fundamental Principle Violated**
The verifiability of data is essential for democratic elections. Estonia’s e-voting system fails this principle.
🫵 **OSCE Expert Mission Concerns**
The OSCE’s delayed report on Estonia’s e-voting raises suspicions. The government may be attempting to neutralize the mission with pro-e-voting narratives.
🫵 **Democracy Score**
With 49% of votes cast electronically in the 2023 elections, Estonia’s democracy score was only 51%. The destruction of e-votes means half of the polls are irreversibly unverifiable.
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### Comparison to Authoritarian Regimes
Even some authoritarian countries preserve election data for auditing, while Estonia’s e-voting system lacks this verifiability. This raises concerns about Estonia’s democratic status since many elections are irreversibly unverifiable.
### EU Geopolitical Aspect
The EU’s response to election results that don’t align with its interests (e.g., in Georgia, Poland, Hungary) suggests that the e-voting system could be manipulated to favor EU preferences.
### Mobile Voting Risks
Expanding e-voting to mobile devices brings significant risks:
1. Heightened opportunity for manipulation.
2. Weaker security than desktops.
3. Fewer verification options.
### Conclusions and Recommendations
The damage caused by unverifiable elections is substantial and irreversible. Previous election data (from 2005 to 2023) have been destroyed, threatening the electoral process’s legitimacy.
### Core Problems
1. **Constitutional Violation**: Multi-day elections contradict the Constitution.
2. **Technical Vulnerabilities**: The system cannot be verified.
3. **Lack of Transparency**: Observers can’t inspect the system effectively.
4. **No Accountability**: No one is responsible for the results.
5. **Conflict of Interest**: The same company manages elections and defense tech.
### Solutions
1. Conduct elections on one day as stipulated by the Constitution.
2. Implement an independent international audit.
3. Enhance transparency through real oversight.
4. Preserve data for post-election verification.
5. Separate election management from defense functions.
Why is the data hidden and destroyed if everything is legal and honest?
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🫵 Summary
The Estonian e-voting system, once hailed as a digital success, undermines democratic accountability. It exhibits constitutional violations, technical security flaws, and lack of transparency, leading to irreversible data loss—about 50% of recent election data is now irretrievable.
Unresolved, Estonia’s elections cannot be deemed fully democratic. The system endangers the state’s credibility and legitimacy by failing to ensure fair elections and destroying necessary evidence.
The key question is not just about security but about proving the integrity of elections when evidence is lost.
We must continue using this damaging e-voting system or revert to paper voting, guaranteeing transparency and trust. Delaying the switch to paper voting further erodes our democratic legacy.
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*This article is based on publicly available documents, legislation, expert assessments, and published media analyses.*
