Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba published an article in The Economist about why the “War in Ukraine may only intensify under Trump”, the gist of which is that Putin, Zelensky, and Trump will all escalate in their own ways since neither can afford to lose or at least look weak to the other. Interwoven within this message are several less visible ones that nonetheless became more apparent upon closer scrutiny. The present piece will decode the remainder of what Kuleba conveyed in his article.
He begins by claiming that the calls for a compromise, which have been revived since Trump’s electoral victory, were responsible for the conflict in the first place. According to him, that’s because Putin fashions himself to be the successor of those Tsars under whom parts of what’s nowadays Ukraine came under Russian control. Correspondingly, he allegedly has no desire to compromise and must thus successfully subjugate Ukraine otherwise he’ll go down in history as a “loser”.
This line of argumentation belies just how afraid Kuleba is that Trump might seriously be considering a compromise whereby Ukraine falls far short of its maximum goal of restoring its pre-2014 borders. After all, if he had no such fears, then he wouldn’t have to frame everything in such over-simplified psychological terms designed to deter any progress from being made in that direction. Kuleba then makes a direct pass at Trump by trying to appeal to a combination of his own fears and ego.
To that end, he peddles a chain of fringe scenarios off as fact by assuming that Trump is seriously considering cutting Ukraine off completely; that this will lead to domestic unrest in Ukraine; and an Afghan-like defeat will then follow for the US. In reality, Trump is considering “escalating to de-escalate” as was explained here, here, and here; close to half of Ukrainians want to trade land for peace (and only ultra-nationalist battalions might keep fighting); and a Russian maximum victory is still very unlikely.
Kuleba also claims that “Neither Mr Zelensky nor Mr Putin will agree to anything like the Minsk agreements”, and while that’s an accurate reflection of their respective official statements on the matter, it ignores the power that the US has to possibly coerce them into accepting such a fait accompli. In order to not be misunderstood, no prediction is being made about the US successfully imposing such an outcome, though it also can’t be totally ruled out either if Trump does indeed “escalate to de-escalate”.
Ukraine’s former top diplomat then wraps everything up by sharing his view that Trump will inevitably be forced to restore assistance to Ukraine even if he curtails or cuts it off since he doesn’t want to “look weak”, though he’s in no position to say so with confidence since he’s not privy to his calculations. Reflecting on what was written, Kuleba comes off as much more scared than he presents himself as being, unconvincingly disguising his deep fears with false confidence all throughout his article.
His fears are just as misplaced as his confidence, however, since the premise upon which they’re based is also false due to the unlikelihood that Trump will totally cut Ukraine off from military and financial aid. What he’s most likely to do is coerce it into accepting a compromise, but the details thereof will be dependent on his negotiations with Putin, which will in turn be greatly shaped by the battlefield situation at the time of his reinauguration.
Trump might oversee a brief intensification of the conflict if he “escalates to de-escalate” in order to end the conflict on better terms for the US, but the sequence of events that Kuleba described likely won’t unfold since they’re a reflection of his own fears and attempted manipulation of Trump, not of reality. This observation is the most important takeaway from his article since it suggests that his former boss is just as afraid and thus much more amenable to doing whatever Trump demands than he makes it seem.
