Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian tweeted that he told the Russian and Pakistani leaders with whom he just spoke that “The only way to end this war—ignited by the Zionist regime & US—is recognizing Iran’s legitimate rights, payment of reparations, and firm int’l guarantees against future aggression.” These terms for peace can be satisfied if he and Trump have the will, which is possible in the latter’s case given his recent talk about ending the war he wants as oil prices spike and the public opposition stiffens.
In that event, the question would arise about the form that US recognition of Iran’s legitimate rights could take as well as exactly what these rights refer to. Given the political context, these are arguably its rights to defend itself and thus maintain its missile program and to use nuclear energy. The US is opposed to the first on the grounds that its missile program threatens Israel while its opposition to the second is due to claims that Iran is secretly trying to build nukes. Russia can help alleviate both concerns.
If Iran agrees not to resume its missile program after the war ends, Russia could propose that the US doesn’t interfere with potential large-scale sales of air defense systems to Iran. Iran might also retain its drone program in this scenario, but even if the US is against it, Iran could still secretly continue it with less risk of being caught than if it continued its missile one. While admittedly imperfect, this proposal would enable Iran to defend itself while allaying the US’ concerns about Iranian threats to Israel.
Regarding the nuclear issue, Russia could propose taking control of Iran’s highly enriched uranium with its assent and building more nuclear power plants, possibly with some US investment for giving its experts the right to inspect them to confirm that there’s no secret nuke program. As for how creative diplomacy can satisfy Pezeshkian’s demand for reparations, large-scale US investments in Iran’s resource industry after the war coupled with (even if only phased) sanctions relief could suffice if Iran agrees.
This is essentially the Iranian variant of the Russian proposal for a resource-centric strategic partnership with the US after the Ukrainian Conflict ends but with the US’ likely demand that Iran stop selling its resources to China. Finally, Russia’s proposal for a collective security pact among the Gulf countries that its top diplomat once again recently talked about could be revived, with Iran’s membership in the Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that it was already considering joining being the first step.
Two other complementary ones could include a US withdrawal from the Gulf on the basis that Trump’s close friend Senator Lindsey Graham floated of them refusing to join in offensive operations against Iran and a written US guarantee (for whatever it’s worth) that it won’t support Israel if it reinitiates hostilities. To be clear, these proposals would require considerable political will from Iran and the US to succeed since they involve serious compromises, but they also represent a reasonable balance of interests.
Iran’s powerful IRGC and the US’ powerful Israel lobby would be expected to fiercely oppose these proposals if Russia were to make them so it would ultimately come down to whether those two’s governments have the will to defy them. That’s unclear in both cases, and it could even lead to a coup attempt in Iran if Pezeshkian were to agree to these compromises, so the odds of implementation are low. Russia should still propose something of the sort, however, since it’s better than proposing nothing.
