Israel and Turkiye held talks in Azerbaijan last week on the creation of a so-called “deconfliction mechanism” for preventing an accidental conflict between them in Syria. No details were disclosed but it might resemble the one that Israel and Russia agreed upon in September 2015 and which is still in use. Unlike its precedent, however, this new one that’s reportedly in the works has much higher stakes given the escalating Israeli-Turkish rivalry in Syria since the fall of the Assad Government last December.
Israel never regarded post-Soviet Russia as a threat, and in fact, relations between them are closer than ever under Putin due to his lifelong passionate philo-Semitism. Their “deconfliction mechanism” therefore wasn’t all that difficult to negotiate and maintain since Russia had no ideological or strategic reason to interfere with Israel’s regular bombing of the IRGC and Hezbollah in Syria. Israeli-Russian relations sharply contrast with Israeli-Turkish ones, however, in the ways that’ll now be explained.
Israel and Turkiye’s mutual threat perceptions worsened after October 7th. Turkiye believes that Israel’s military operation in Gaza is a genocide that could one day be replicated against Muslims everywhere and can only be averted by restoring a regional balance of power. Israel suspects that Turkiye might try to achieve the aforesaid by ordering its Syrian clients to host ideologically aligned Hamas militants who’d be defended from Israeli airstrikes by Turkish air defense systems (even if they’re only Syrian-manned).
Turkiye abuts Syria so it can bolster its new authorities’ military capabilities and those of their shared Hamas allies much easier and quicker than Iran was able to bolster the Assad Government’s and their shared “Resistance Axis” allies’. This represents a much greater national security threat than the one that Israel earlier mitigated via its “deconfliction” mechanism with Russia, not least because Turkish systems might be used to defend Hamas, while Russian ones were never used to defend the “Resistance Axis”.
The potential downing of an Israeli jet by Turkish air defense systems (even if they’re only Syrian-manned) during an anti-Hamas bombing mission in the Arab Republic could spark a regional crisis that they want to avoid for now. Neither can be sure whether the US would take their side against the other, both over that hypothetical incident and whatever they choose to do afterwards, and the worst-case scenario of a direct Israeli-Turkish clash – let alone a conventional war – is fraught with uncertainties.
At the same time, such a scenario could become more likely if the newly exacerbated Israeli-Turkish security dilemma in Syria isn’t responsibly managed, but the root cause is arguably more connected to regional leadership aspirations than it is to Hamas. Israel and Turkiye are vying to fill the void left by the unexpected expulsion of Iran’s on-the-ground influence in Syria, which both envisage achieving via a hybrid approach, but their methods differ.
Israel wants to retain its freedom to bomb whoever it wants there together with strengthening the Druze and Kurds in order to facilitate the creation of a decentralized Syria that could be more easily divided-and-ruled for thwarting latent threats. Turkiye wants military bases and Hamas militants in a centralized Syria, which are tangible returns on its 14-year-long investment into regime change there, and to symbolically lead the Ummah by positioning its forces to strike Israel from Syria (even if it never does).
Each is convinced that their national security interests can only be ensured by filling the void left by Iran in Syria through their respective abovementioned methods, which they consider to be a zero-sum competition, but one that doesn’t have to lead to an accidental war if it’s responsibly managed. To that end, they might agree to a compromise whereby Turkiye entrenches itself in the north while Israel maintains freedom of action in the south, but such an arrangement would likely prove unsustainable.
Israel would feel uncomfortable with Hamas possibly operating training camps in Turkish-defended northern Syria while Turkiye would feel uncomfortable with Israel holding the Damocles’ sword of airstrikes above the head of Syria’s new authorities in Damascus. Turkish air defense systems could also secretly be deployed in proximity to the Golan Heights for defending Hamas militants that might launch missiles against Israel from there. A regional crisis might therefore only be delayed instead of averted.
As such, whatever imperfect “deconfliction mechanism” might be agreed to between Israel and Turkiye would be insufficient for responsibly managing their escalating rivalry, thus perpetuating regional instability as they continue vying for leadership in Syria. These dynamics raise the risk of a direct Israeli-Turkish clash that could quickly spiral into a conventional war unless creative diplomacy succeeds in reshaping them. It’s here where Syria, Russia, and the US could possibly play positive roles.
To explain, Syria wants to replace some of its military equipment that Israel destroyed right after Assad’s fall, which Russia could help it do in exchange for privileged economic (reconstruction, resource, etc.) contracts and so long as this is within Israeli-approved limits. Israel doesn’t regard post-Soviet Russia as a threat and has a decade-long history of successfully interacting with it in the context of their “deconfliction mechanism” so Israel would accordingly prefer for Russia to rearm Syria than for Turkiye.
This accounts for why Israel is reportedly lobbying the US to keep Russia’s bases in Syria as a way for Moscow to help West Jerusalem balance Turkish influence there through these means. Damascus would have to agree, however, but it would do well to go along with the abovementioned arrangement since this is the only realistic pathway for partially rearming, liberating itself from Turkish tutelage, and eliminating the pretext for more Israeli bombings. It’s unclear how interested it is in this though.
The new authorities came to power due to the leading role that their Turkish patron played in the 14-year-long rolling regime operation in Syria so they’re indebted to Ankara and trust it a lot too. These factors reduce the likelihood that they’d agree to rely on Russia instead of Turkiye for (at least partially) rearming, not to mention within Israeli-approved limits that would amount to tacitly subordinating themselves to its interests, though the US could offer phased sanctions removal as an incentive.
The problem though is that Turkiye wants tangible returns on its lengthy investment in overthrowing Assad, so it probably won’t accept not being able to at least set up a few bases in Syria and secure the right to use its airspace for military purposes, both of which Israel doesn’t want Damascus to provide. Just like the US could offer incentives to Syria for agreeing to this, so too could it offer some to Turkiye after Trump volunteered to mediate between it and Israel, though it’s unclear what he might propose.
All in all, the insight that was shared in this analysis suggests that more than a “deconfliction” mechanism is required for responsibly managing the escalating Israeli-Turkish rivalry in Syria, with the most effective solution being the proposal that was just forth with regard to Russia. Damascus might not agree, however, while Turkiye could unilaterally establish more bases in Syria even if it does. Trump might therefore try to broker a deal, but if he fails, then an Israeli-Turkish clash might be inevitable.
