Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia shared his country’s response to the latest Congolese Crisis during the emergency UNSC briefing on Sunday that followed the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern city of Goma. The roots of this long-running conflict are complex but boil down to security dilemma, resource, and ethnic reasons that readers can learn more about upon reviewing the following three background briefings:
* 8 November 202: “A Quick Recap Of The Latest Congolese Conflict”
* 9 November 2022: “Investigating The French Factor In The Latest Phase Of The Congolese Conflict”
* 29 May 2024: “Congo’s Polish Spy Scandal Is Worth Paying Attention To After The Recent Failed Coup Attempt”
In short, Rwanda accuses the DRC of backing the majority-Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR and tied to the 1994 genocide), while the DRC accuses Rwanda of backing the majority-Tutsi M23 as part of a power play over its eastern regions’ minerals. These resources are thought to be at the heart of this conflict, which is driven by (partially externally exacerbated) differences between DRC-residing Hutus and Tutsis, the latter of which are considered by some locals to not be indigenous.
Nebenzia began by condemning M23’s offensive, which has displaced 400,000 people thus far, and expressing alarm at its use of advanced weapons systems. He elaborated by talking about “the use of heavy artillery close to civilian infrastructure” and “the continued use of electronic warfare means, which poses a threat, inter alia, to civilian aviation.” This last point might allude to the shooting down of the plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in 1994 that triggered the infamous genocide.
He then expressed condolences to the families of those peacekeepers who were killed in the latest fighting and declared Russia’s support for the UN and Southern African Development Community’s peacekeeping operations in the Eastern DRC. Nebenzia’s next move was to call for restoring the Angolan-mediated Rwandan-DRC talks that broke down late last year. He also importantly said that “real progress on the diplomatic track will be feasible not until the State stops its interaction with illegal armed groups.”
M23 and the FDLR were mentioned by name, after which he added that “when it comes to the parameters of this process, it is for Rwanda and the DRC to decide whether these parameters are to be defined within the relaunched Nairobi process or within other initiatives. In any case, it is clear that this issue requires a comprehensive approach and certain flexibility by both sides.” This shows that Russia recognizes the security dilemma roots of the latest Congolese Crisis and their associated ethnic ones.
He then moved along to addressing the resource ones by reminding everyone of how “We must also not forget that the central element of the crisis is the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources… It is also well known that there are other groups and external ‘players’ involved in this criminal business. We all know very well who they are, and we know that they line their pockets by smuggling ‘bloody’ natural resources from the east of the DRC.” This hints at a Western role in exacerbating tensions.
It also leaves open the possibility that the reportedly Rwandan-backed M23 might be acting as Western proxies to seize the DRC’s minerals, though the Russian Foreign Ministry’s call for a ceasefire the day later instead of that group’s unilateral withdrawal suggest that Moscow isn’t yet convinced. The same goes for RT’s decision to interview Vincent Karega, the former Rwandan Ambassador to the DRC who’s now ambassador-at-large in the Great Lakes Region, and then promote it on their front page on Tuesday.
Karega predictably repeated Kigali’s position that the DRC’s alleged marginalization of its Tutsi minority and failure to implement previous agreements for integrating M23 into the national army are responsible for the latest Congolese Crisis. As could have been expected, he also denied reports that several thousand Rwandan troops have invaded the DRC to help M23 with its offensive. The importance of interviewing him and then promoting it is that it shows Russia’s balanced position towards the crisis.
Accordingly, while observers can read between the lines of Nebenzia’s briefing to intuit that Moscow blames the M23 for the violence and suspects that there might be a Western trace, it’s premature to claim that Russia is against Rwanda. After all, a superficial comparison of the Congolese and Ukrainian Crises suggests that M23 and Rwanda are playing similar roles as the Donbass militia and Russia, and Eastern DRC has lots of mineral wealth just like Donbass has plenty of lithium wealth in particular.
Important differences still exist though to make the aforesaid an imperfect comparison. For example, Rwanda was a close US ally during the Congo Wars but fell out of favor in recent years due to its growing ties with China and Russia as well as M23’s rebellion, while Russia never played any such role as Rwanda did in advancing the US’ regional agenda. Moreover, the DRC’s minerals are already being extracted, while Donbass’ lithium has yet to be. Another difference is the nature of their special operations.
Russia’s officially acknowledged one has gone to great lengths to avoid harming civilians whereas Rwanda’s reportedly ongoing on that it still officially denies has already been devastating for them. Furthermore, there were credible reasons in the run-up to Russia’s special operation for Moscow to suspect that the West was pushing Ukraine to launch an offensive against the Russians in Donbass, while no similar such trigger event apparently existed with regard to Rwanda and the Eastern DRC’s Tutsis.
In any case, the similarities are close enough that Russia might have felt uncomfortable laying the entire blame on M23 and their reported Rwandan patrons in spite of its draft military agreement with the DRC from last March. Russia might also envisage mediating between them given its close security ties with Rwanda in the Central African Republic. Of course, its position might change depending on whether the conflict expands and the ways in which this might happen, but for now it’s impressively balanced.
