Trump casually quipped in early September that the US might not come to the UK’s aid in the scenario of another war with Argentina over what London calls the Falkland Islands and Buenos Aires considers to be the Islas Malvinas since it didn’t help the US in the Third Gulf War. A little over a week later after his meeting with the Irish Prime Minister in Dublin, Trump declared that Ireland will be reunified one day and that it “would be a great thing.” These statements understandably infuriated many Brits.
There might be more to them than Trump trolling like some speculate or signaling his displeasure with the UK for not helping the US in the Third Gulf War. It’s possible that his administration is considering breaking from the UK as part of its National Security Strategy. As a reminder, it harshly condemned unnamed European countries for their radical censorship and demographic transformations driven by large-scale immigration from civilizationally dissimilar countries, both of which are relevant to the UK.
All three factors – the UK not helping the US in the Third Gulf War, its radical censorship, and its growing civilizational dissimilarity with the US – could have contributed to his team seriously contemplating the end of their country’s “special relationship” with the UK. Although the UK has helped advance US interests vis-à-vis Russia, the reorganization of NATO’s Eastern Flank into Swedish-led, Polish-led, and Turkish-led sub-regional blocs reduces London’s importance, thus giving Washington more flexibility.
It’s perhaps with this flexibility in mind that the US decided to pressure the UK through Trump’s quips about its disputed islands with Argentina, Irish unification, and its deal with Mauritius over the Chagos Islands before that at the start of the year. The UK already knows what the US dislikes about it, so the UK can either change its policies (by at the very least agreeing to be the US’ junior partner in all future conflicts it becomes engaged in) or face the scenario of US-backed threats to its territorial integrity.
Of course, the US’ abovementioned speculative coercion of the UK could also end if a Democrat returns to the White House, which the UK might be banking on and could be why it might not comply. It’s too early to tell what it’ll do since Trump only just recently ratcheted up his rhetoric by talking about these two emotive territorial issues in sequence amidst their bilateral political tensions over the Third Gulf War. Nevertheless, the UK might also blatantly defy the US, perhaps thinking that Trump is bluffing.
It’s anyone’s guess what means the US could employ to help end British control over its disputed islands with Argentina and Northern Ireland, and it’s possible that a Democrat could replace Trump before he achieves tangible progress on this, but the UK also has tricks up its sleeve too. It could seriously escalate tensions with Russia through multiple means, both directly at sea and indirectly via its allied Viking Bloc (especially Estonia) and/or Ukraine, either in revenge or to signal such an intent as a deterrent.
While it might thus seem like the UK could get the US to reconsider backing threats to its territorial integrity vis-à-vis Argentina and Ireland, a Russian-US rapprochement would remove London’s leverage. Trump might therefore not act on his implied threats till after he first reaches a deal with Putin, but since no such deal is on the horizon, it’s possible that he won’t make any moves against the UK if it refuses to subordinate itself as the US’ junior partner in all future conflicts that Washington becomes engaged in.
