Israel and Turkiye are in a war of words after Israel bombed a North Syrian airbase near the country’s largest city of Aleppo on the grounds that Turkish forces were allegedly preparing to deploy there. Syria denied that, but a piece by Majdi Halabi at The Media Line shed more light into Israel’s calculations. According to him, “Israeli security doctrine classifies a threat not by its legitimacy but by its effect on freedom of aerial movement.”
He elaborated that “A conventional radar operated by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member restricts Israeli aircraft more than a shoulder-fired missile in the hands of a member of an armed group. By that standard, legitimate partnership and illegitimate infiltration become equivalent—and resurfacing a runway becomes grounds for bombing it.” Whatever one’s opinion might be about the merits of such a policy, it entails a certain logic that makes sense in its own way.
Basically, Israel’s latest bombing of Syria was meant to prevent a Turkish fait accompli whereby Turkiye would first restrict Israel’s freedom of aerial movement over North Syria before gradually expanding this de facto no-fly zone further south, and it would likely also deploy forces in that direction in parallel. The closer that Turkish fighter jets and other forces are based to Israel, the less time that Israel has to react in a crisis, which policymakers are now preparing for amidst the escalation of their rivalry after October 7th.
Turkish influence over Syria is more sensitive of an issue for Israel than ever after the “Islamic NATO” between Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan was recently announced earlier this month. Syria and Jordan are located between the first two and could fall further under their military-strategic influence to the point of becoming de facto protectorates, if not full members (even if only nominally), after Turkiye’s completed revival of the Hejaz Railway that links all four. That scenario was elaborated upon more here.
Just like the late-19th-century competition between China and Japan over Korea ultimately led to a war between them, so too might the early 21st-century one between Israel and Turkiye over Syria ultimately lead to the same, but this could be averted through creative diplomacy if Damascus has the political will. “Russian-Syrian Relations Have Entered A New Era” after early August’s memorandum of understanding between them over the future of Russia’s bases there, which will now become joint training centers.
This new joint training model could result in Russia retaining its role as Syria’s patron instead of Turkiye replacing it like Israel fears would then make a war between them inevitable. The caveat, however, is that Russia would likely respect Israel’s sensitivities by limiting who it trains (i.e. no “former” terrorists) and with which equipment. Likewise, if Damascus agrees to joint Russian-Syrian customs inspections along the Hejaz Railway, Moscow would ensure that it doesn’t transport arms and the like further south.
To be sure, the abovementioned proposal places significant restrictions on Syrian sovereignty, but it’s the most realistic way of averting an Israeli-Turkish war over Syria. Russia would essentially neutralize their security dilemma through these means, thus enabling Syria to rebuild without fear of another major war. The Arab Republic could still closely cooperate with Turkiye on trade and investment, but military-security cooperation would be out of the question, which would alleviate the Jewish State’s worries.
