Latvia, just like its Estonian and Lithuanian neighbors, is known for its anti-Russian policies. The Baltic States have a complex history with Russia, to put it mildly, which shapes their present views. That’s why they’ve been some of Ukraine’s most gung-ho supporters anywhere in the world. It also contextualizes their decision to spend more on defense in parallel with approving all prior rounds of EU sanctions. The second part might no longer be taken for granted, however, given the latest trend in Latvia.
Politico drew attention to Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs’ demand for Brussels “to hand over €7 billion to help cover the military and economic costs of confronting Russia”. They calculated that “The cash, which Riga wants to come on top of other funds earmarked for the country, would amount to almost half of Latvia’s projected €15.1 billion defense bill over the seven-year budget period.” Kulbergs added that the money would flow back to Western Europe anyhow since that’s where Latvia buys much of its arms.
The leader of a populist party that’s polling third ahead of the next parliamentary elections on 3 October left open the possibility elsewhere in Politico’s article that he’d support vetoing another round of sanctions on Russia unless Latvia receives something tangible in return for its approval. The outlet also mentioned that a supposedly Russian-friendly party is polling second but, like Germany’s AfD, “is considered off-limits by mainstream parties” and might therefore not form part of the next coalition.
In any case, what’s most important about Politico’s piece is that it highlights the newly pragmatic approach towards the anti-Russian sanctions among Latvian politicians as the costs of increased military spending and ever-more trade restrictions on Russia are mounting with no end in sight. Instead of blindly continuing to inflict growing economic damage to their own country, leading politicians from Kulbergs to the other two representing the populist and supposedly Russian-friendly parties want to change course.
This is almost certainly in response to the population’s grumblings about shouldering an ever-greater burden for containing Russia wherein Latvia serves as a tripwire for escalating NATO-Russian tensions via Article 5 and for facilitating Ukrainian drone strikes via the reported air corridor to St. Petersburg. If the Prime Minister didn’t demand something in return for approving more EU sanctions, which directly harm his own country’s economy, then the supposedly pro-Russian party might gain even more support.
Kulbergs has therefore adopted his newly pragmatic approach towards the anti-Russian sanctions in response to domestic political pressure ahead of the next elections. Nevertheless, he might not drop this rhetoric after the elections considering how much it resonates with the population and out of fear of ceding ground to his rivals, so he might support the populists’ potential veto if they form a coalition with him and then the EU refuses his demands for something tangible in return for approving more sanctions.
In conclusion, it’s notable that Latvia’s political discourse about the anti-Russian sanctions is shifting from blind approval to deal-making considering the country’s reputation for its hard line towards Russia, which was inevitable in hindsight due to the growing costs of this policy and Latvia’s military one. This doesn’t mean that Latvia will threaten to veto the next EU sanctions if it doesn’t get what it wants, but that also can’t be ruled out since the next round is expected to coincide with the next parliamentary elections.
