The latest Malian insurgency took a twist after the terrorist-designated groups, the Tuareg “Azawad Liberation Front” (FLA) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated “Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM), reached out to Russia. Their messages can be read with Google Translate here. The gist is that they’re open to partnering with Russia if it dumps the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). This follows them allowing Russia’s Africa Corps a dignified withdrawal from Kidal. Here are five questions for Russia to consider:
———-
1. What Are The Odds That FAMA Reverses Its Fortunes?
FAMA has struggled with counterinsurgency despite four years of Russian training for the reasons explained here. Its shortcomings ominously parallel the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) right before Assad’s downfall. Just like with Syria and the SAA, Russia cannot reasonably be expected to take full responsibility for Mali’s defense if FAMA is unable or unwilling to step up during this national crisis. Russia must therefore consider the odds of FAMA reversing its fortunes before planning its next move.
2. Are The Insurgents’ Outreaches Pragmatism Or A Trap?
Regarding the first scenario, they did indeed allow the Africa Corps a dignified withdrawal from Kidal, and it’s possible that they want to emulate Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s East-West balancing act if they win the war. The Tuareg also have a principled warrior culture similar to the Pashtuns’ Pashtunwali. On the other hand, FAMA can’t survive without Russian aerial and drone support, so these outreaches might be a ploy to divide them, conquer the country, then backstab Russia by kicking it out right after.
3. How Far Should Russia Go If It Decides To Balance?
If Russia reperceives the Western-backed Tuareg as akin to the Syrian Kurds with whom it used to be partnered and al-Qaeda-aligned JNIM as the regional al-Qaeda-aligned Hayat Tahrir al-Sham that new partner Sharaa led to power in Syria, then it might decide to balance between them and the state. Russia might call for a ceasefire till a new constitution is written and new elections held (each of which it might help organize). The question is whether the state would agree, and if not, how Russia might compel it to.
4. What Might Be The AES’ Reaction To Russia’s Pivot?
The Alliance of Sahelian States’ (AES) Burkinabe and Nigerien members would closely watch Russia’s pivot in Mali in this scenario whereby it goes from backing FAMA to the hilt to compelling the state to initiate what amounts to a “phased leadership transition” “for the national interest”. They might either accept the seeming inevitability of them being compelled by Russia to do the same if the West soon targets them like it did Mali or go around Russia’s back to cut a deal with the West before then instead.
5. How Sustainable Would Such A New Regional Approach Be?
On the military front, this requires maintaining aerial and drone dominance for deterring ceasefire violations, while the diplomatic one requires enough specialists for helping to draft new constitutions like it earlier sought to draft Syria’s. Both might be in short supply due to the special operation. Its local allies must also be able to adequately respond to urban terrorist attacks as they arise, something that they’ve all struggled with so far. Thus, as ambitious as this proposal is, it might not be feasible.
———-
The common denominator connecting these five questions is the ultimate one about how Russia’s top brass really assesses the conflict’s overall military-strategic dynamics. If they’re certain of a decisive victory, then no policy changes will occur, but changes are possible if they expect a stalemate along the Niger River or even a frozen conflict, while they’re almost inevitable if they conclude that a strategic defeat and consequent undignified retreat from Mali are likely. Everything will be clearer by next month.
