Jarosław Stróżyk, who heads the Military Counterintelligence Service and is Chairman for the Commission for the Study of Russian and Belarusian Influence, shocked Poles in a recent interview. In his words, “Pro-Russian behavior in society is on the rise. This is the subject of our concern, observation, and operational-reconnaissance activities. The number of such individuals, especially in the growing army, which already has over 200,000 men, may be increasing. We are closely monitoring many cases.”
The context was alleged espionage and sabotage committed in Poland by individuals that Warsaw believes were acting at the direction of Russia, but the Polish word for behavior, zachowanie, was mistranslated by two Russian outlets as sentiment and then they misreported what he said. These were Eurasia Daily and Military Affairs. Other outlets might also republish what they wrote so it’s important to address the subject of whether or not pro-Russian sentiment is indeed spreading throughout Poland.
Candidly speaking, Poland is one of the most politically Russophobic countries on earth in the sense of hating the Russian government for historical and/or personal reasons beyond the scope of this analysis to explain but are all connected to their millennium-long rivalry. Poland hasn’t had conscription since 2008, so its 200,000-strong armed forces – the largest in the EU and the third-largest in NATO – are volunteers, many of whom adhere to the aforesaid perspective for nationalist reasons.
It’s therefore difficult to believe that “pro-Russian sentiment” is spreading throughout their ranks or society in general unless one’s understanding of this goes beyond the definition of supporting the Russian government. As it turns out, liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the like-minded ruling coalition that he represents (arguably including top officials like Stróżyk who he appointed), and their supporters do indeed believe that “pro-Russian sentiment” is nowadays much more than cheering on the Kremlin.
This is ironic since Tusk presided over an ultimately failed Russian-Polish rapprochement during his first premiership from 2007-2014, yet his second one from 2023 till today has seen him vastly expand the scope of what he considers to be “pro-Russian” to discredit political views that he dislikes. Examples include criticizing the influx of Ukrainian refugees, opposing them flying “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” (UPA) flags, and condemning their and Kiev’s glorification of the UPA fighters who genocided Poles.
Beyond Ukraine, expressing displeasure of the EU is also considered “pro-Russian” by Tusk’s government, and he recently alleged that his rival, the conservative president, is in cahoots with Russia as part of a “Polexit” plot because he wants the Central Bank to finance Polish arms purchases instead of Brussels. All of the aforesaid views are shared by the conservative opposition and the two populist-nationalist opposition parties that a reputable poll from December showed have 53.06% electoral support in total.
“Pro-Russian sentiment” is therefore only spreading throughout Poland if one dishonestly conflates this with typical right-wing opinions about Ukrainian refugees, Bandera, the EU, and national sovereignty like the ruling liberal coalition does. As such, while the two earlier cited Russian outlets mistakenly reported that Stróżyk espoused such a view, it is indeed how his government misportrays the opposition’s beliefs in an attempt to preemptively discredit them far ahead of fall 2027’s next parliamentary elections.
